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This thesis comprises three chapters.
The first chapter investigates how wealth inequality affects preferences for redistribution
and voting behavior. Exploiting house price shocks in England and Wales, it evaluates the
effect of wealth inequality on the preferences and voting behavior of homeowners relative
to renters. It tests whether homeowners become less supportive of redistribution and in turn
more likely to vote for the Conservative Party. The results show that homeowners experiencing
positive shocks to their housing wealth are more likely to vote for stated party, but do not
decrease their support for the government ownership of public services. Heterogeneity in home
value and endowment effects might explain the results.
The second chapter looks at the effect of conscription on political ideology, voting partic-
ipation and national identity. The motivation of this analysis comes from a renewed policy
interest in bringing back conscription to foster civic participation. Considering the costs of
conscription identified in the economic literature, this chapter aims at evaluating the effec-
tiveness of this policy in achieving its proposed goal. Using a regression discontinuity design,
it uses the introduction of conscription in West Germany to investigate its long-term effects
on right-wing ideology and voting participation. The results show no statistically significant
effect of conscription on any of the outcomes considered. These results are corroborated when
conducting the analysis using a similar empirical methodology and Spanish data.
Lastly, the third chapter analyses the effect of migration on household consumption in
rural Ethiopia. Using panel data, it analyses the effect of having at least one migrant in the
household on total, food and non-food consumption. Variation in migration over time allows
me to unpack heterogeneous effects by duration of migration, possibly explained by changes
in the composition of the household.
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1Introduction
This thesis comprises three papers.
The first and second paper investigate, respectively, the relationship between inequality
and political preferences and the formation of such preferences, national identity and voting
participation. In the first paper, the analysis focuses on the effect of wealth inequality in
shaping individual preferences for redistribution and the support for political parties. This
analysis contributes to the empirical literature on inequality and political preferences, as well
as shedding light on the current debate on the consequences of rising wealth inequality.
Following from this interest in understanding political preferences, the second paper an-
alyzes their formation and the effect of a specific policy, rather than inequality, in shaping
these outcomes. In particular, the paper investigates the effect of conscription on political
ideology, voting participation and national identity. This paper is motivated by the recent
interest among European policy-makers in bringing back national service as a way of fostering
youth civic engagement and social cohesion, and is aimed at providing causal evidence on the
effectiveness of conscription in achieving its proposed goal.
National identity, social cohesion and civic participation are central themes in the current
political discourse. Often, policy-makers discuss and promote policies aimed at strengthening
these values in response to large migratory flows from lower-income countries. However, this
political debate is usually focused on the effects of migration at destination and ignores the
discussion on its effects on migrant-sending households. The third paper aims at providing
evidence on the relationship between migration and household welfare in low-income countries.
This analysis is of particular relevance in contexts where migration might contribute to lift
households out of poverty, as in the case of rural Ethiopia.
This thesis contributes in several ways to the existing literature.
The first paper investigates the relationship between wealth inequality and political pref-
erences. In particular, it tests whether higher wealth inequality affects both individual pref-
erences for redistribution and voting for the Conservative party in England and Wales. The
motivation for this paper spurs from a recent interest in rising wealth inequality and its con-
sequences on political and economic outcomes.
2The paper contributes to the well-known economic literature on inequality and preferences
for redistribution. Starting from the median voter theory (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), several
scholars have looked at the relationship between rising income inequality and one's preferences
for redistribution. The empirical evidence in this field, however, has mostly been focused
on wages and income, with only few studies analyzing the distribution of wealth (Di Tella
et al., 2007; Caprettini et al., 2019), traditionally more difficult to measure. Thus, this paper
contributes to the literature by providing causal evidence of the effect of wealth inequality on
political preferences.
Of particular relevance for this paper is the work by Barth and Moene (2016), which
investigates the effect of inequality on both preferences for redistribution and on the support
for a party with a political agenda in line with such preferences. Barth and Moene (2016)
also test these relationships empirically and provide correlations showing that as individuals
become more likely to support redistribution, they are more likely to support more left-wing
parties. This paper innovates by testing whether these relationships are causal and whether
they apply to changes in the distribution of wealth. Studies looking at wealth show that land
redistribution affects both individual preferences (Di Tella et al., 2007) and voting decisions
(Caprettini et al., 2019). However, and to the best of my knowledge, none of these studies
looks at both preferences and political party support.
To carry out the analysis, I identify an increase in wealth inequality between homeowners
and renters using the house price boom in England and Wales for the period between 1995
and 2007. Exploiting county-level variation in house price shocks and using individual level
data from the British Household Panel Survey, I evaluate the effect of house price shocks
on homeowners preferences and voting behavior relative to renters. Following the literature,
I test whether richer homeowners become less supportive of redistribution, and in turn are
more likely to vote for the Conservative Party. I find that homeowners experiencing positive
house price shocks are more likely to support the Conservative party. However, I do not find
a decrease in their support for redistribution.
The results show that homeowners preferences vary depending on the value of the property
owned. I also find that when using self-reported value of one's property the expected mech-
anisms are fully corroborated: higher self-reported house values are correlated with a higher
3probability of voting for the Conservative party, and lower preferences for redistribution. This
second result might suggest a link between endowment effects and homeowners preferences.
Following from this interest in the analysis of political preferences, the second paper eval-
uates whether conscription affects the formation of political ideology, voting participation and
national identity. This analysis contributes both to the policy discussion aimed at bringing
back conscription in some European countries, as well as to the economic literature on the
effects of conscription. In recent years, several policy makers in Europe have discussed the
possibility of bringing back conscription. Among these, some have motivated such reform as
a way to foster civic engagement and social cohesion among the youth (for media coverage of
this political discussion, see here and here).
However, bringing back conscription would have non trivial costs both in terms of govern-
ment budget (being one of the main reasons why conscription has been abolished in Europe)
and in terms of economic outcomes. These effects have long been investigated in the economic
literature. Angrist (1990) first showed the existence of a wage gap between Vietnam-era
draftees and non-draftees, finding negative long-term effects on wages for the former. Follow-
ing from that seminal work, several studies investigated the effect of conscription on wages,
showing mixed results (Imbens and Klaauw, 1995; Grenet et al., 2011; Bauer et al., 2012).
More recently, Card and Cardoso (2012) find that peacetime conscription has positive effects
on wages for men with lower levels of education, suggesting that conscription might have pos-
itive, though small, effects on wages as it allows men to learn new skills. The literature has
further investigated the effects of conscription on other outcomes. It finds that conscription
has negative effects on health (Autor et al., 2011; Bedard and Deschênes, 2006), it might in-
crease or decrease one's investment in higher education (Cipollone and Rosolia, 2007) and it
increases crime rates (Galiani et al., 2011).
Following from these evidence on the costs of conscription, this paper contributes to the
policy discussion by presenting causal evidence of the effect of conscription on political ideology,
voting participation and national identity. Thus, the main contribution of the paper is to
inform the policy discussion aimed at bringing back conscription as a way to affect such
values. This evidence is crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy in light of the costs
that come with it.
4In this paper, I conduct an empirical analysis using a regression discontinuity design and
exploiting the introduction of conscription in West Germany to investigate its long-term effects
on right-wing ideology, and voting participation. Using this empirical method, I am able to
exploit an exogenous shock to the probability of being drafted for men in the treatment group
based on their date of birth, and compare them to individuals in the control group who were
too old to be eligible for the draft.
The results show no statistically significant effect of conscription on any of the outcomes
considered. These results are corroborated by a series of robustness checks. As part of these
checks, I conduct the analysis using a similar reform and Spanish data. The advantage of doing
so are several. First, I find no short-term effects of conscription on political attitudes. Second,
I do not find statistical significant evidence on the effect of conscription on Spanish national
identity. Third, I am able to provide evidence of the external validity of the results. Overall,
the analysis does not find convincing evidence that conscription affects political attitudes,
suggesting that the intended benefits of this policy might not offset its costs.
Lastly, the third paper investigates the relationship between migration and origin house-
hold consumption. The motivation for this paper spurs from the central role of migration in
the current political, economic and development agenda (see Sustainable Development Goals
2030). While the political discourse is often focused on the consequences of migration in host
countries, the design of effective migratory policies will also depend on its effects on origin
countries.
The economic literature has long studied the link between migration and development,
identifying people's relocation as a way to increase individual and household welfare (Harris
and Todaro, 1970; Stark and Bloom, 1985). This is particularly important for poorer house-
holds living under financial constraints and income variability (Clemens et al., 2014; Clemens
and Ogden, 2014), which are usually higher for poorer households strongly depending on
agriculture (Rosenzweig, 1988). Empirical evidence has shown that migration can have large
positive effects on household welfare (Yang, 2008; Gibson and McKenzie, 2014; Clemens and
Tiongson, 2017), but that this effect might become negative depending on the context of anal-
ysis. In fact, Gibson et al. (2011) find that in the short-run the absence of the migrant has
a negative effect on household per capita consumption. These mixed results further motivate
5the analysis of this paper.
The paper carries out the analysis using panel data from rural Ethiopia. This context is of
particular interest both for its high levels of poverty, among the highest in the world, and for the
relevance of migration in the country. Several studies have looked at the relationship between
migration and land rights (De Brauw and Mueller, 2012), youth agricultural employment
(Bezu and Holden, 2014; Mueller et al., 2018), as well as migrant's consumption and income
(de Brauw et al., 2017). Following from these findings, this paper contributes to the literature
by investigating the effect of having at least one migrant in the household on household
consumption.
The paper contributes further by conducting the analysis using newly available panel data
(Gibson and McKenzie, 2014; Beegle et al., 2011). I find that migration has a negative effect
on per capita consumption, at least in the short term. I investigate two possible mechanisms
behind this result, finding that migration affects household composition and showing quali-
tative evidence on the change in migration experience for the period of analysis. Following
from these results, the paper contributes further by showing empirical evidence on the effect
of migration in Sub-Saharan countries. This is particularly important to evaluate the welfare
effects of migration in one of the poorest areas in the world, especially given the relatively
scarcer evidence focused on this region (Lucas, 2006).
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the analysis on the effects of wealth
inequality on political preferences. Section 2 presents the analysis on the effects of conscription
on political ideology, voting participation and national identity. Section 3 investigates the
effects of migration on household consumption in rural Ethiopia. The general conclusions,
bibliography and the appendices to each of the papers follow.
61 The effect of wealth inequality on political preferences: evi-
dence from the house price boom in England and Wales.
1.1 Introduction
Rising wealth inequality is at the center of the political and economic debate (Alvaredo et al.,
2017a; Piketty et al. 2014;for a political discussion on the topic see here). Yet, analyzing
the effects of wealth inequality separately from income and wages has been traditionally more
difficult. In particular, while there is a large literature showing the salience of income and wage
inequality in affecting one's political preferences (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Giuliano and
Spilimbergo 2014; Fetzer 2019), fewer studies focus on changes to the distribution of wealth
(Di Tella et al., 2007, Caprettini et al., 2019). Recent research (Barth and Moene, 2016)
has provided theoretical evidence showing that increasing wage inequality not only affects
individual preferences for redistribution, but leads to a change in voting for one party or
another, according to the party's stand on redistributive policies.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this literature and investigate how wealth in-
equality affects both preferences for redistribution and political party support.
This relates to a long standing literature in economics on preferences for redistribution.
Seminal work in this field is based on the predictions set out in the median voter theory
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981), stating that higher inequality will result in higher redistribution
as the median voter will be worse off. Such prediction has been extensively tested empirically
and the evidence shows that inequality matters in determining one's preferences (a review of
this literature can be found in Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). Among these studies, Giuliano
and Spilimbergo (2014) show that local-level macroeconomic shocks affect both preferences for
redistribution and the probability of supporting one party or another in the U.S., suggesting
that preferences for redistribution are coherent with party support. This empirical evidence,
however, has rarely focused on the link between wealth inequality and political preferences,
with the exception of few studies looking at the effect of wealth redistribution on individual
preferences and voting behavior. When looking at land, Di Tella et al. (2007) find that
redistribution reforms make individuals more in favor of free-market policies, while Caprettini
7et al. (2019) find that they increase the probability of winning the elections for the incumbent
party.
The closest study to this paper is Barth and Moene (2016), who use a model to formalize
the effect of inequality on both preferences for redistribution and voting behavior and test it
using a correlation analysis. The authors demonstrate that increasing wage inequality will
result in individuals voting for political parties offering less generous redistributive policies
and this will result in lower welfare spending, leading to even higher inequality. They also
provide cross-country evidence showing correlations in support of their theory. In particular,
they show a positive association between higher wage inequality and the probability of a party
less favorable to redistribution holding the majority in the parliament. This is then positively
associated with lower levels of public spending. Following from these findings, this paper
investigates whether these predictions apply to wealth inequality and whether the relationships
they hypothesize are causal.
The first contribution of this paper is its focus on wealth inequality rather than wages or
income. To capture the effect of a change in the distribution of wealth, the analysis focuses
on changes in the distribution of housing wealth in England and Wales. It does so for two
main reasons. First, housing wealth represents one of the larger shares of private wealth in
this context (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Atkinson et al., 2011), making it a good proxy
for individual total wealth. Moreover, and differently from other assets, changes in housing
wealth inequality affect a large share of the population in the context of analysis, where the
home-ownership rate is of around 70 percent. Second, the effects of housing wealth inequality
between homeowners and renters are particularly relevant in this context. A large literature
investigates the effects of the housing price boom and its different distributional effects on
homeowners and renters in the U.K..
Increasing housing prices affect homeowners differently in terms of labor market decisions,
making them more likely to anticipate their retirement (Disney and Gathergood, 2018), they
affect positively homeowners health and increase their demand for private healthcare (Fichera
and Gathergood, 2016). Higher house prices increase segregation in British cities (Sá, 2015),
and other studies provide evidence of the effect of house price shocks on consumption smooth-
ing over the life-cycle (Disney et al., 2010). The relevance of these effects brings housing
8policy at the center of the British economic and political discussion (Hood and Joyce, 2017),
as well as at the center of the political program of the major parties in the country. Pro-
posals as Housing for the many (https://labour.org.uk/issues/housing-for-the-many/) and
Housing the nation (https://www.conservatives.com/sharethefacts/2018/01/conservatives-
housing-the-nation) are only the most recent political stands on a decade-long debate on the
housing market. Following from this discussion, this paper contributes further in showing
whether rising wealth inequality also affects voting and political preferences.
The second and main contribution of this paper is to carry out a single-country empirical
analysis on the causal effect of wealth inequality on political preferences. In order to move
beyond the correlations presented in Barth and Moene (2016), I exploit an exogenous source
of variation in wealth inequality to estimate its effect on a change in individual political
preferences, addressing both issues of reverse causality and endogeneity that are typical of
cross-country correlation studies.
The identification strategy of this study relies on the presence of unanticipated county-level
house price shocks experienced in England and Wales between 1995 and 2007. These shocks
measure an exogenous increase in wealth inequality and will affect differently homeowners and
renters, who share the same geographical area but hold or not housing wealth assets (Disney
et al., 2010). If the predictions set out in the literature hold, this increase in wealth inequality
should cause a decrease in homeowners preferences for redistributive policies such as taxation
and welfare spending (Barth and Moene, 2016). This is because, for example, homeowners
experiencing an appreciation of their property would prefer to pay lower taxes. At the same
time, homeowners experiencing a positive house price shock should also become more likely to
support the Conservative party, traditionally more averse to include welfare policies in their
political agenda.
The results of the paper corroborate these mechanisms only partly. On one hand, I find
that a positive shock in house prices at the local level leads homeowners to increase their
support for the Conservative party. On the other, I do not find evidence of a decrease in
pro-public sector attitudes nor in the support for government intervention in the economy.
The third contribution of the paper is to propose two potential mechanisms to explain the
main results. First, the paper examines whether the effect on preferences is heterogeneous
9among homeowners. I do this by using variation in the value of property types as a measure
of higher or lower wealth endowment among homeowners. In line with the theory and with
empirical evidence from the U.K., homeowners of more expensive properties might benefit
more from house price shocks and need to rely less on public services. I find evidence of such
heterogeneity.
First, homeowners of more expensive properties (detached and semi-detached houses) are
more likely to support the Conservative party than homeowners of cheaper ones (terraced
houses and flats in the sample of analysis) . Second, the former are less likely to support
redistribution than the latter. These results are in line with the predictions made by the
literature and are crucial to interpret the average statistically insignificant result on preferences
for redistribution.
Second, I use self-reported value of one's property as an alternative measure of wealth
inequality. I find that the hypothesis tested is fully corroborated when conducting such esti-
mation. In fact, an increase in self-reported house value both increases the probability that
homeowners support the Conservative party and decreases their support for redistributive
measures. This result suggests two things. First, it confirms the presence of endowment ef-
fects in the housing market, with homeowners valuing their property more than its market
value. Second, it shows that individual perceptions of the property's value strongly correlate
with political preferences and voting choices. To the best of this author's knowledge, this
constitutes novel evidence on the determinants of political preferences.
The remaining of the paper is articulated as follows. Section 1.2 overviews the literature.
Section 1.3 describes the context of interest and section 1.4 the data used in the analysis.
Section 1.5 discusses the identification strategy. Section 1.6 illustrates the empirical speci-
fication used in the analysis. Section 1.7 provides the summary statistics for the sample of
interest. Section 1.8 contains the results, which are investigated further in section 1.9, where
I present evidence supporting possible mechanisms. It concludes with the robustness checks
used to validate the main results and with the overall conclusions (Section 1.10 and 1.11).
Supplementary materials to this paper can be found in Appendix 1.
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1.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the literature on inequality and political preferences, and to a
growing literature on the consequences of wealth inequality.
Both theoretical and empirical work has addressed the limitations of the median voter
theory proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981). In their seminal work, the authors prove
that individuals form their preferences according to their distance from the mean level of
income. The model predicts that for higher levels of inequality, the median voter will be worse
off and thus demand more redistribution. This core version of model has been extended by
Piketty (1995) to account for what individuals believe to be driving inequality, i.e. luck or
effort. Bénabou and Tirole (2006), then proposed a further extension of the model to account
for social mobility.
Aiming at testing these models, empirical work has investigated whether inequality affects
preferences for redistribution according to the theoretical predictions (Alesina and Giuliano,
2009). Among the studies more relevant for this paper, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) find
that exposure to macroeconomics shocks, such as recessions, changes permanently individual
preferences for redistribution. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) also show that an increase in
preferences for redistribution is in line with an increase in the probability of having more left-
wing political preferences and higher probability of supporting a Democratic candidate in the
presidential elections. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) use the probability that an individual
supports a Democratic candidate to examine the validity of self-reported political preferences.
Using a similar rationale but focusing on wage inequality rather than exposure to recessions,
Barth and Moene (2016) develop a theoretical model showing how higher wage inequality
affects negatively both preferences for redistribution and the probability of supporting left-wing
parties, traditionally more generous in terms of redistributive policies. In their model, voters
support one political party or the other according to the welfare spending proposed, which
will then constitute the level of welfare spending implemented by the government (Barth and
Moene, 2016). The main assumption is that a reduction in inequality will increase demand for
redistribution. The authors stress the social insurance motive behind this increase in demand,
i.e. poorer voters becoming richer experience a higher risk of income loss and thus demand
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for more redistribution for insurance motives.
This translates into higher levels of welfare spending as a consequence of political com-
petition, i.e. higher demand for welfare spending will increase parties' competition in terms
of welfare spending promises introduced in their electoral agenda. This relation works in the
opposite way for higher levels of inequality: richer individuals demand for less redistribu-
tion and so do individuals moving from the middle of the distribution to the left tail. These
predictions are confirmed by the correlation analysis conducted by the authors, finding that
an increase in the country's Gini coefficient is associated with higher probability of having a
right-wing government and lower levels of welfare state. Following from this model, this paper
contributes by testing empirically its hypotheses and by focusing on the distribution of wealth,
providing novel causal evidence beyond the cross-country correlations provided in Barth and
Moene (2016).
The choice of focusing on wealth inequality relates to a growing and recent literature
documenting an increase in top wealth inequality (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty et al., 2014).
The new evidence collected in the World Inequality Database (Alvaredo et al., 2017b) shows
that not only private wealth constitutes an increasing share of national income, but that
wealth is highly concentrated at the top 10 percent (and even more at the top 1 percent) of
the distribution. This levels of wealth inequality could have consequences in terms of limiting
inclusive growth, increase inter-generational inequality and increase the role of inheritance
(Piketty et al., 2014).
Notwithstanding this increasing interest in high levels of wealth inequality, there are few
studies assessing the causal effect of wealth inequality on political preferences. An exception
are some studies providing causal evidence on the the effect of land redistribution reforms.
Di Tella et al. (2007) finds that landless individuals in Argentina acquiring property rights
are more likely to support free market and individualism. Caprettini et al. (2019) show that
land redistribution in Italy increases the support for the incumbent party and this effect lasts
for as long as for forty years after the reform implementation. However, to the best of this
author's knowledge no empirical work focuses on the effects of rising wealth inequality on both
preferences for redistribution and political party support.
This paper contributes further to the literature on the consequences of housing wealth
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inequality between homeowners and renters in England and Wales. Focusing on this context
has two main advantages. First, real estate constitutes the larger share of private assets in
the U.K.. In fact, the wealth went up to be 4.5 times national income in 1995 to more than
6.3 times in 2007 (Alvaredo et al., 2017b), with rising value of real estate contributing the
most to this increase. The World Inequality Database (Alvaredo et al., 2017b) reports that
private wealth in the form of housing assets was three times the national income of the U.K.
in 2013, increasing steadily from around 1.5 times in 1995. Moreover, and similarly to other
developed countries covered in the database, public wealth in the form of housing wealth
has been decreasing substantially in the last decades and constitutes less than 10 percent of
national income. This plausibly reflects the decrease in council owned houses and the rise in
private homeownership rates (Disney and Luo, 2016).
Second, the housing wealth distribution experienced unprecedented changes during the
period of analysis (Hills, 2013). Due to both deregulation policies and an unprecedented
housing price boom, the distribution of housing between homeowners and renters have changed
to the advantage of the former. In particular, the increasing rate of home-ownership, caused
by the Right to Buy legislation in 1980 (Disney and Luo, 2016), and the exponential rise
in housing assets value following from the 1990s-2000s housing price boom, have motivated
several studies looking at the consequences of the resulting wealth effects favoring homeowners.
Hills (2013) finds that marketable wealth increased remarkably between 1990 and 2005, as did
inequality (independently of cohort effects). Using data from the BHPS the author shows
that the increase in median wealth experienced in this period has been mainly explained by
an increase in housing wealth and in house prices. Following from their relevance in affecting
the wealth distribution, average house prices have been often used by the literature to proxy
for house wealth shocks (Attanasio et al., 2011; Attanasio et al., 2009;Campbell and Cocco,
2007).
In particular, Disney et al. (2010) look at how homeowners experiencing unexpected in-
creases in their house wealth (proxied with house price shocks) adjust their consumption over
the life cycle. Using similar data and a similar measure of wealth effects, Disney and Gather-
good (2018) find that older men homeowners and young female homeowners spouses decrease
their supply of labor as a results of local level house wealth effects. The increase in average
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house prices and the resulting wealth effect have been found to affect also health outcomes.
In particular, homeowners experiencing an increase in the value of their home have better
health and are more likely to demand for private healthcare (Fichera and Gathergood, 2016).
Moreover, the same study finds that an increase in housing wealth value can offset negative
effects on health resulting from worsening labor market conditions.
These studies confirm both the relevance of housing wealth for individuals in the U.K. and
the presence of differential effects favoring homeowners relative to renters as a result of housing
wealth effects. However, to the best of this author's knowledge, no evidence exists on the effect
of this increase in wealth inequality between homeowners and renters on political preferences.
This paper uses similar data and the same period of analysis of previous studies (Disney et al.,
2010; Disney and Gathergood, 2018; Fichera and Gathergood, 2016) to identify whether the
above mentioned effects were accompanied by changes in political beliefs and party support.
Lastly, this paper relates to the scarce empirical literature on the consequences of wealth
polarization. This is a different concept from inequality, more focused on the appearance
and disappearance of groups in the population, such as those of homeowners and renters
(Chakravarty, 2015). Most of the work done after Esteban and Ray (1994) seminal work on
the definition of polarization, has been focused on income and on the different ways to measure
polarization. In general, polarization measures were developed to explain the disappearance
of the U.S. middle class during the 1980s (Wolfson, 1994).
D'Ambrosio and Wolff (2001) find that homeownership status is positively correlated with
wealth polarization. Following from this literature, the recent increase in political polarization
(Autor et al., 2016) has lead researchers to focus on the relationship between rising economic
inequality and political polarization (Bonica et al., 2013). The empirical evidence on this link
remains mostly limited to correlations between economic and political polarization. Although
this paper does not look at measures of polarization itself, it provides evidence on the effect




This section aims at providing information on the context of England and Wales in the period
of analysis. It focuses on two main aspects: one is the relevance of housing as a measure of
individual wealth, the other is its relationship to the political agenda of the Conservative party
during that period.
1.3.1 Housing wealth
Real estate is the main component of private wealth in the U.K. (Piketty et al., 2014). The
homeownership rate during the early 2000 was of around seventy percent, showing that a
consistent share of the British population is affected directly by changes in housing wealth
value. In this analysis, I focus on England and Wales as the house price information is
available at the local level for the longer period of time and starting from 1995. This year
coincided with the start of a housing price boom unprecedented in the post-war period. As
a result of large deregulation reforms to the housing market (Disney and Luo, 2016), housing
prices more than doubled in all of the regions of the country (with Greater London registering
a threefold increase).
Figure 1 shows regional average house prices in England and Wales for the period 1995-
2007. This increase in housing prices allows me to identify a clear increase in inequality between
homeowners and renters. Evidence of this increase in inequality can also be seen in figure 6
(in Appendix 1), plotting a significant shift to the right in the distribution of homeowners
self-reported house value between 1995 and 20071.
1Data for renters is missing, as by definition renters do not own the property where they reside in (infor-
mation is available for second or additional property, but it is not exploited in this paper). Self-reported house
value will be used in the empirical analysis and explained in Section 1.9
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Figure 1: Regional-level average house prices for a typical semi-detached house in England
and Wales in the period between 1995 and 2008.
Note: Real average house prices at the regional level for the period 1995 to 2008, vertical line at 2007. From top to
bottom indicatevely: Greater London, South East, South West, East, West Midlands, East Midlands, Wales, North
West, Yorkshire and the Humber, North East.
1.3.2 Housing and political agenda
Following Barth and Moene (2016), I identify right-wing parties to be less generous in terms
of welfare spending and, thus, representing the interests of individuals with lower preferences
for redistribution. In the context of the U.K., and during the period of analysis, this party is
identified to be the Conservative party.
The Conservative party has traditionally promoted less redistributive policies and lower
welfare spending in its political agenda. If the hypothesis of Barth and Moene (2016) holds,
richer individuals will be more likely to support the Conservative party as their preferences
for welfare spending and for the public role of the State in the economy decrease. A possible
rationale is that homeowners favor lower taxes on their property or that rely less on public
services relative to renters (Fichera and Gathergood, 2016). Evidence supporting the stand of
the Conservative party on redistributive measures is provided in several political discussions
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and platforms.
The Conservative party has always adopted a clear stand on these matters in its political
agenda. In the period 1995-2007, one of the main points of the Conservative manifesto has been
to support and facilitate home ownership via tax cuts and advantageous buying possibilities.
Similarly, the Conservative party has had, traditionally, a less generous political program in
terms of welfare spending and public services provision. The following quotes show some
examples of the party's stand on this topic extracted from their own political manifestos.
It's time to [...] cut taxes and regulation; time for our schools and hospitals to benefit from
choice and freedom; time to show respect to our pensioners; time for real savings not welfare
dependency; time to endow our universities; [...]  Conservative Party Manifesto 2001
Lower taxes promote enterprise and growth. But they also promote the right values. Hard
working families have suffered from Labour's tax raids on mortgages and marriage, pensions
and petrol, buying a home and having a job. Conservative Party Manifesto 2005
Alongside the increase in housing wealth inequality seen in figure 6, the support for the
Conservative party has been rising in the same period of time (figure 7 in Appendix 1).
These two stylized facts point towards a correlation between increasing housing wealth for
homeowners and an increase in support for the Conservative party.
In line with this correlation, evidence has shown that an increase in housing prices at
the local level affected positively British homeowners relative to renters. In particular, it
increased the health status of homeowners and their demand for private healthcare (Fichera
and Gathergood, 2016), and it changed their labor supply decisions (Disney and Gathergood,
2018). These effects might point towards a change in homeowners preferences for public
services provision, corroborating the change in beliefs suggested by Barth and Moene (2016),
as well as a change in political party supported.
1.4 Data
I use two main data sources for this analysis.
First, I use the house price index published monthly by the Office of National Statistics
(ONS). This contains county-level information on house prices for England and Wales from
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1995 until present. Following from the limitations of using housing price data from different
sources (Chandler and Disney, 2014), the ONS house price index represents the latest attempt
to harmonize house price information from a multitude of sources to have a more compre-
hensive measure. It does so by incorporating historical house price information from both
the Land Registry data on transactions of sold houses, and from administrative data looking
at house characteristics, more useful when capturing the evolution of housing quality. This
means that the the house price index also captures increases in prices due to improvements in
housing quality, which could mean an underestimation of house price values relative to other
indices. The ONS house price index adopts a rolling definition of a typical house, periodically
updating transaction data of completed mortgages by combining the price of all house types
in proportion to the frequency with which properties with those characteristics are actually
sold. (Chandler and Disney, 2014).
Moreover, because weights are determined using transaction data, these indices are more
likely to reflect the prices of the subset of houses that are transacted, rather than of the entire
housing stock. The index is estimated using hedonic regression techniques aiming at control-
ling for variations in terms of different mortgage policies and different sample of mortgage
institutions. In fact, the ONS data contains information relying on a survey of most mortgage
lenders (70-80 percent of mortgage market). One of the main advantages of this house price
index is the availability of housing prices broken down by property types: detached house,
semi-detached house, flat, terraced house. This will allow to differentiate the analysis in order
to pinpoint the heterogeneity of the effects for different types of homeowners. All the house
price data are adjusted to 1995 level prices using the yearly Retail Price Index published by
the ONS.
Second, I match county-level house price information to individual data from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS)2. The BHPS is a panel survey covering the period from
1991 to 2008. For each year it covers a sample of approximately 5500 households and 10,000
individuals. Previous literature has used the same data to explore whether house price shocks
improve the health status of individual (Fichera and Gathergood, 2016) or change their labor
2Due to some data limitations the geographical match of house price data (based on 2011 administrative
boundaries) to individual data in the BHPS (based on 1991 administrative boundaries) is not perfect. Thus,
the housing price data used in this analysis covers fifty-three counties in England and Wales.
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supply (Disney and Gathergood, 2018). The main advantage of the dataset is its multi-purpose
design. This allows me to have individual-level information on values, attitudes and political
preferences, as well as information on home-ownership status and income.
The sample used in the analysis is restricted to household heads, being the person fi-
nancially responsible for the household, aged between 15 and 80. The sample only includes
individuals that state to be either owners or renters, dropping around two percent of the orig-
inal sample who reports to live in the house rent-free or to share the accommodation. In order
to match this data to the house price index, the original BHPS sample is limited to to head
of households living in England and Wales in the period 1995-2007.
Additionally, the main sample does not include individuals switching between the renter
and homeowner status between each wave. This is done in order to avoid biased estimates,
especially in terms of redistribution preferences of owners downgrading to renting. The esti-
mates presented in this paper might also be affected by individuals moving across counties as
a response to house price shocks or as a response to increasing support of the Conservative
party. In the robustness checks the estimation excludes individuals moving across counties
from one year to the next.
The BHPS provides information on all the dependent variables of interest. In particular, I
use two variable in the database to measure political support for the Conservative party. The
first one is a binary variable equal to one if the individual identifies the Conservative party
as the party supported, and the second one equals one if the individual reports to feel closer
to that party compared to any other party. In an alternative specification, I measure party
support as the probability of voting for said party. To do so, I use a binary variable equal to
one if the individual reports to have voted the Conservative party in the general elections of
1997, 2001 or 2005.
To measure a change in preferences I use data on political and social beliefs. In particular,
I measure pro-redistribution attitudes creating a binary variable equal to one if the individual
reports to agree or strongly agree with the following statement Major public services ought
to be in state ownership, and zero otherwise. Other studies have used similar questions to
measure pro-redistribution attitudes (Clark et al., 2010; Ashok et al., 2015)3 as it is clearly
3Barth and Moene (2016) refer to a decrease in individual preferences for welfare spending which correlates
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related to one's preferences over the public provision of services. I use similar binary variables
to measure other attitudes related to the role of the government in the economy, using three
more statements on values included in the BHPS: Private enterprise is the best way to solve
Britain's economic problems, The government ought to impose a maximum level of money
one can make and It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who
wants one. For all these statements the individual can choose among strongly agree, agree,
neither agree or disagree, disagree and strongly disagree.
1.5 Identification strategy
I am interested in the effect of wealth inequality on political attitudes. Before explaining the
main challenges to the identification of shocks to the wealth distribution, I motivate the use
of housing wealth and house price data to measure wealth inequality.
First, I use housing wealth as a proxy for individual total wealth. This is a credible
approximation in the context of England and Wales, where housing constitutes the larger
asset in individual's portfolio and has often been used in the literature to measure individual
total wealth (Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Disney et al., 2010; Disney and Gathergood, 2018).
By focusing on housing wealth, I am able to identify an increase in inequality between two
well-defined groups of the population: homeowners and renters.
Second, I follow the literature in using average county-level house price data to measure
housing wealth. Several studies use this approach and use county-level house price data in
England and Wales for the period between 1995 and 2007 in their analysis (Disney et al., 2010;
Fichera and Gathergood, 2016; Disney and Gathergood, 2018). They do this for two reasons.
On one hand, this period of analysis saw average house prices more than doubling in these two
countries (Fichera and Gathergood, 2016). On the other, geographical and temporal variation
in prices at the county-level allows to study a more dis-aggregated effect than previous studies
using regional data. This allows to control for similar geographical characteristics affecting
homeowners and renters. This allows me to use house prices to measure rising wealth inequality
as an increase in house prices will increase the value of one's property, widening the gap between
with voting for right-wing parties. In their work the level of welfare spending, measured at the national level
using the welfare generosity index (Scruggs et al., 2014), implemented by right-wing governments is then the
outcome of these change in individual preferences.
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homeowners and renters, i.e. our measure of wealth inequality.
Although including county and year fixed effects will capture time and space heterogeneity
and looking at the effect on homeowners relative to renters will control for local labor market
conditions (Fichera and Gathergood, 2016), identifying wealth inequality using only average
local house prices would produce biased estimates. This is because of unobserved heterogeneity
that might affect both local house prices and political preferences, e.g. quality of public goods
(Gibbons et al., 2013), as well as issues of reverse causality. To overcome such limitations, I
identify an exogenous shock to the distribution of housing wealth to evaluate the causal effect
of a change in wealth inequality on political preferences.
Following Disney et al. (2010) and Disney and Gathergood (2018), I estimate a year-on-
year shock to house prices as a proxy for wealth shocks. The intuition behind this strategy is
to use only the unanticipated change in local average house prices as a measure of exogenous
changes to the distribution of housing wealth. This unanticipated change, or surprise, will
be uncorrelated with other local level characteristics once year and county fixed effects are
included in the estimation. Thus, house price shocks represent an exogenous source of variation
that affects differently homeowners and renters living in the same county and experiencing
similar geographical conditions, but differing in terms of housing wealth endowment (Disney
et al., 2010).
This exogenous shock is estimated using the residuals of an auto-regressive model of order
two on average house prices using county-level fixed effects. Including county fixed effects
allows to isolate the effect of local unobservable characteristics. This is estimated, as follows:
pt,c = α+ β1pt−1,c + β2pt−2,c + Countyc + εt,c (1)
εt,c = ∆(pt,c − pt−1,c)− E[∆(pt,c − pt−1,c)] = PriceShockt,c (2)
Where p is the natural log of the average house price in county c at year t as defined by
the ONS house price index. PriceShockt,c is the predicted unanticipated change in average
house prices at the county level for each year t of the period of analysis. Table 1 shows the
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results of the auto-regressive model with county fixed effects. The R-squared in the model
is 98 percent. Hence 98 percent of the variation in prices is explained by the auto-regressive
structure. The shocks are identified off the remaining 2 percent.
Figure 8, in Appendix 1, aims at providing graphical and intuitive evidence of the price
shocks. It shows the deviation from the predicted trend of average prices at the national level.
In the next section I discuss how I use the same yearly shocks calculated at the local level to
estimate the effect on political preferences. Following from the discussion presented in this
section, using the exogenous house price shocks will provide causal evidence of the effect of an
increase in wealth inequality on the outcomes of interest.
Table 1: Auto-regressive model of order two of county level average house prices in England
and Wales between 1995 and 2007.
(1)
Avg Price
Avg Price (t-1) 1.683***
(0.0205)








∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Clustered Standard Errors in parenthesis
Note: All models estimated using OLS with county fixed effects for 69 counties in England and Wales and for 12 years
for the period 1995-2007. House price data are from the house price index published monthly by the ONS expressing
the average price of all property types. Variable Price all is the natural log of the CPI-deflated average price at county
level of all house types.
1.6 Empirical model
The empirical analysis presented in this paper looks at the effect of wealth inequality on two
different outcomes: preferences for redistribution and support for the Conservative party.
In the previous section, I have discussed how house price shocks can be used to identify
an exogenous change to the housing wealth distribution. Following from that discussion, this
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section explains the empirical models used to evaluate the effect of these price shocks on the
two outcomes of interest.
1.6.1 Political party
Firstly, I estimate the effect of house price shocks on individual support for the Conservative
party, using the following specification:
yi,c,t = α+β1PriceShockc,t+β2Owner+β3 ˆPriceShockc,t ∗Owner+β4Zi+γc+δt+εict (3)
where yi,c,t is a binary variable equal to one if the individual states to support the Conser-
vative party (SupportTory). I use an alternative measure to capture support for the Conser-
vative party, this is a binary variable equal to one if the individual states to feel closer to the
Conservative party relative to all other parties (CloserConservative).
Owner is a binary variable equal to one if the individual is a homeowner and equal to
zero if the individual is a renter. Thus, the coefficient β3will give the effect of an unexpected
change in average prices at the county level (PriceShockc,t), estimated following the model
in section 1.5, for homeowners relative to renters. The net effect for owner will be given by
β1+β3. Zi is a vector of individual characteristics, in line with what is done in the literature on
preferences for redistribution (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014): marital status, employment
status, type of employment, gender, highest educational degree, and the log of real equivalized
net household income.
The same model is estimated to predict the probability of having voted for the Conservative
party in the previous year's general election. The following model is estimated only for the
three years post election (1998, 2002, 2006) using the lag of the house price shock as follows:
yi,c,t−1 = α+ β1PriceShockc,t−1 + β2Owneri,c,t−1 + β3 ˆPriceShockc,t−1 ∗Owneri,c,t−1+ (4)
+ β4Zi + γc + δt + εict
23
where yi,c,t−1, is the probability of having voted for the Conservative party in the previous
year's general election. ˆPriceShockc,t−1 is the house price experienced at the county level in
the year of the general election, and all other variables are defined as in equation 3.
Estimating equation 4 allows me to check whether self-reported support for the Conser-
vative party is accompanied by an actual vote during elections. Although the correlation
coefficient between these two measures is 84 percent, I still perform this test to provide evi-
dence of the robustness of the results.
The next step is to evaluate whether the change in political party supported is accompanied
by a change in preferences for redistribution. The next section discusses the empirical model
used in the estimation of the latter.
1.6.2 Preferences for redistribution
I estimate a similar linear probability model to evaluate the effect of house price shocks on
preferences for redistribution. This second part of the estimation relies on the same empirical
specification used to estimate party support, but it is estimated separately using different
outcome variables for each of the values analyzed. In particular, I estimate:
yi,c,t, = α+β1 ˆPriceShockc,t+β2Owner+β3 ˆPriceShockc,t∗Owner+β4Zi+γc+δt+εi,c,t (5)
Where yi,c,t is a binary variable indicating if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with
one of following the statement:
1. Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's problem (Private)
2. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership (Public)
3. The government should provide a job for anyone who wants one (GovJob)
4. The government ought to impose a maximum level of money one can make (MaxMoney).
Statements 1, 2 and 3 are included in the BHPS for the years 1995, 1997 and 2004, while
question 4 was asked in 1996, 1998 and 2003. β3 captures the net effect of a house price
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shock for homeowners relative to renters. In the main analysis, I will focus on the change
in preferences for the state ownership of public services (Public). Following from previous
literature (Clark et al., 2010), this constitutes a plausible measure of preferences for a larger role
of the government in public service provision and better captures preferences for redistribution
through government spending.
I will provide evidence of the effect on the other preferences to check the consistency of
the results. In particular, following the hypothesis tested, one would expect that rising wealth
inequality will make homeowners more likely to agree with statement 1 (Private), and less
likely to agree with statement 3 (GovJob) and 4 (MaxMoney). All the estimations include
individual controls, as well as year, age and county dummies. Standard errors are bootstrapped
with 200 repetitions.
1.7 Summary Statistics
This section provides information on the context of England and Wales between 1995 and
2007 and on the characteristics of the sample used in the analysis.
First, this section documents the increase in house prices and its variation by region and
property type. The period between 1995 and 2007 was characterized by a unprecedented
increase in house prices in England and Wales. Figure 1 shows the increase in average price
broken down at the regional level. Moreover, this increase interested all types of properties
(figure 2 in Appendix 1), with the average price of a detached houses being the highest and
doubling over the period 1995-2007. I will use the ranking of properties by average price in
figure 2 to evaluate the impact of house price shocks for richer homeowners relative to the
poorest (i.e. owners of flats).
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Figure 2: Average house prices by property type in England and Wales for the period between
1995 and 2007.
Second, table 2 shows the summary statistics for the sample used in the empirical analysis.
The homeownership rate in the country reached a peak of 72 percent, showing that changes
in housing wealth affect a big part of the British population. Among these, 2 percent became
owners in each year and 7 percent became renters from one year to the next. These switchers
between home ownership status are dropped from all the estimations4. Another consistent
part of the sample moved across counties in each year. In the robustness checks these groups
are excluded from the estimation. Table 2 shows that 62 percent of the owners in the sample
own their house with mortgage.
Overall, table 2 shows that the two groups are fairly homogeneous in terms of household
size and age. There are some consistent differences in terms of household composition with
married or cohabiting couples (73 percent for owners and only 43 percent for renters). Then,
home-owners are more educated, with three percent of the them having a higher education
degree (versus one percent of renters), and are more likely to be male, 63 percent versus 47
4Notice that I only exclude switchers in home-ownership status between waves, rather than anyone who
ever switched from being owner to renter in the whole period between 1995 to 2007. Thus, it is possible that
one individual is dropped from the analysis in the year when she switched status, but then kept in the following
year if the home-ownership status did not change again.
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percent of renters. Renters are also more likely to be unemployed than owners.
Table 2: Summary statistics of the sample used in the analysis of individual head of household
characteristics by homeownership status: BHPS data.
Renter Owner
Owner 0.72
Renter to owner 0.02
Owner to renter 0.07
Moved across counties 0.16 0.07
Age 45 50
Male 0.46 0.63
Higher Degree 0.01 0.03
Mortgage 0.62
Couple 0.43 0.73
Household size 2.41 2.60
Unemployed 0.08 0.02
Retired 0.21 0.23
Self Employed 0.04 0.10
Employed 0.38 0.57
Outcomes
Voted in Last General Election 0.65 0.80
Support Tories 0.14 0.30
Voted Tories 0.16 0.32
Closer Tories 0.17 0.37
Public Services 0.41 0.39
Private Enterprise 0.19 0.32
Max Wage 0.30 0.20







Note: Summary statistics for the main sample of analysis. Sample includes head of households only. Data from the
BHPS wave 5-17 (1995-2007). Binary variables "Owner to renter" and "Renter to owner" indicate individuals who
switched between homeownership status during the period of analysis, these will be dropped in the main analysis.
Binary variables "Public Services" "Private enterprise" "Max wage" "Govmt Job" equal 1 if the individual agrees or
strongly agrees with statements on political and social beliefs. Variables "Detached" "Semidetached" "Flat" "Terraced"
indicate self-reported type of house of residence from the BHPS.
Now, I provide information on the outcome variables of interest. First, we see that there are
some differences in terms of voting turnout, with 80 percent of owners and only 65 percent of
renters stating to have voted in the last general election. This might suggest that homeowners
are more involved in civic life and have higher social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999).
Looking at the outcome variables of interest for this analysis, table 2 shows that there are some
differences in terms of party support and voting behavior between homeowners and renters.
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Homeowners are more likely to support the Conservative party (30 percent of homeowners
support that party against only 14 percent of renters); to have voted for the Conservative
party in the previous election (32 percent of homeowners); and to feel closer to that party
(37 percent). Over time the support for the Conservative party has been stable during this
period, but increased steadily after 2005.
Looking at the differences between the two groups in terms of political preferences and
beliefs, table 2 shows that there are not consistent differences in terms of agreement over
public ownership of services. Both group support this statement in 40 percent of the cases
(Public). Clearer differences arise when looking at different types of beliefs. Owners are more
likely to have pro-private enterprises attitudes (Private). Oppositely, renters agree more both
with government provision of jobs (Govjobs) and with government intervention on the amount
of money one can make (Maxwage).
Figure 9, in Appendix 1, shows the proportion of individuals agreeing with each of these
statements by home ownership status. Overall, the analysis of summary statistics and cor-
relations suggests that the hypothesis theorized in the literature holds in this specification
(Barth and Moene, 2016). In fact, homeowners are more likely than renters to support the
Conservative party and have less favorable preferences towards the government intervention
in the economy. However, so far I am not able to see a clear cut difference between the two
groups in terms of support for public services being in state ownership.
1.8 Results
Before proceeding to the results of the estimation of equations 3 to 5, this section presents
the results of a naive regression estimating the correlation between county-level average house
prices and the outcomes of interest. The aim of this initial exercise is twofold. First, I
investigate further the correlations emerging from the summary statistics. Second, presenting
this estimation shows whether the results change when using my preferred specification and
house price shocks to estimate the causal effects of wealth inequality on party support and
preferences.
Table 3 presents the results of a naive OLS regression of average house prices on political
preferences. These correlations show mixed results. A small, positive and statistically signifi-
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cant correlation between the interaction term of home-ownership status and the probability of
supporting or feeling closer to the Conservative party (columns 1 and 2). On average, there is
no statistically significant correlation between the interaction term and political beliefs, with
the only exception of a positive correlation with supporting the government provision of jobs.
Table 3: Regression analysis of the correlation between county-level average house prices, party
support and political preferences for individuals living in England and Wales 1995-2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Support Closer Public Govmt Job MaxWage Private
Conservative Conservative
Avg Price -0.027 0.018 -0.053 -0.032 -0.046 0.003
(0.027) (0.034) (0.056) (0.054) (0.040) (0.050)
Avg Price x Owner 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.017 0.028∗ -0.001 0.018
(0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
Owner -0.181∗ -0.169 -0.224 -0.398∗∗ -0.043 -0.129
(0.097) (0.127) (0.194) (0.187) (0.174) (0.163)
Couple -0.001 -0.005 0.008 0.014 0.009 -0.014
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Household income 0.049∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Higher Degree -0.043∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.271∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022)
Undergraduate 0.002 -0.036∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.240∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Secondary Edu 0.079∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ -0.017∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Male 0.003 -0.002 0.070∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.008 0.149∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Employed 0.003 0.009 -0.002 0.003 -0.008 -0.039∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Household size -0.001 -0.006∗∗ -0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Self Employed 0.101∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015)
Unemployed 0.004 0.010 0.015 0.033 0.028 -0.029
(0.010) (0.015) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019)
Retired 0.034∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.032∗ -0.033∗∗ 0.028
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
N 47015 33524 19001 19537 19634 18824
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis
Note: All models estimated using OLS. All outcome variables are binary variables equal to 1 if : (1) the individual
supports the Conservative party, (2) the individual supports the Labour party, (3) the individual agrees with state
ownership of public services, (4) the individual agrees with the government providing jobs, (5) the individual agrees
with the government imposing a maximum wage, (6) the individual agrees with a stronger role of the private sector in
the economy. All types is a continuous variable indicating the natural log of the average price at the county level for
53 counties in England and Wales between 1995 and 2007.Owner is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is a
homeowner and equal to zero if she is a renter. The regressions are estimated using a linear probability model. Each
regression includes controls for marital status, education level, household income, gender, employment status, household
size and binary variables for county, age and survey year.
These correlations change when estimating the causal effect of house price shocks on polit-
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ical preferences, suggesting that the estimates of the previous specifications might be biased.
Table 4 shows the main results of this analysis. Homeowners are on average 1.2 percentage
points more likely than renters to support the Conservative party. This effect is larger and
statistically significant when I look at the coefficient of interest, i.e. the interaction between
home-ownership status and house price shocks. The results show that homeowners experienc-
ing a ten percent unexpected increase in average prices at the county level become on average
2.1 percentage points more likely to support the Conservative party (and 2.4 percentage points
more likely to feel closer to it). The net effect for homeowners compared to renters is of an
increase of 1 percentage points in the probability of supporting the Conservative party. Eval-
uating the magnitude of this effects at the average, a total house price shock of 10 percent
increases the probability of supporting the Conservative party of approximately 2.8 percent
for homeowners.
In line with this, column 2 in table 4 shows a similar 1 percentage point effect when using
an alternative measure of support for the Conservative party compared to renters experienc-
ing house price shocks in the same county. Column 3 shows that the support for the Labour
party decreases, in line with the main finding for the Conservative party, but in this case the
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. Notice that the baseline category is support-
ing all other parties in the U.K. including the Conservative party.This result corroborates the
hypothesis suggesting that richer groups of the population becoming richer, as a results of
house price shocks, are more likely to support more right-wing leaning party, when using the
definition for the Conservative party used in Barth and Moene (2016).
Table 4 includes all the controls used in the estimation. Note that, household income is
positively associated with voting for the Conservative party, and more educated individuals
are less likely to vote for the Conservative party.
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Table 4: The effect of wealth inequality on support for the Conservative party and preferences
for government ownership of public sector in England and Wales 1995-2007: main results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Closer Support Public
Conservative Conservative Labour
Price shock -0.109 -0.155 0.150 -0.116
(0.079) (0.097) (0.120) (0.162)
Price shock x Owner 0.213∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗ -0.094 -0.030
(0.072) (0.097) (0.113) (0.165)
Owner 0.120∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
Couple 0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Household income 0.046∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Higher Degree -0.041∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.027)
Undergraduate 0.004 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015)
Secondary Edu 0.076∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Male 0.003 0.001 0.017∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Employed -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.010
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Household size -0.001 -0.006∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Self Employed 0.091∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018)
Unemployed 0.008 0.008 -0.009 0.019
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.029)
Retired 0.030∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.008 0.001
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 40708 28679 40708 15793
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parenthesis
Note: All models estimated using OLS. Standard errors are bootstrapped (200 reps).The dependent variables are binary
variables equal to 1 if :(1) the individual supports the Conservative Party, (2) the individual feels closer to the Con-
servative party, (3) the individual supports the Labour party, (4) the individual agrees with state ownership of public
services. "Price shock all" is estimated as the residuals of an autoregressive model of order 2 on average house prices at
the county level for 53 counties in England and Wales in the period 1995-2007. Owner is a binary variable equal to 1
if the individual is a homeowner and zero if a renter. Sample includes head of households only. Data from the BHPS
wave 5-17 (1995-2007) and from the ONS-HPI. The estimation includes a set of controls: binary variables for marital
status, gender, education level, retirement status, employment status, log hh equivalised income, county, year of survey
and age.
I corroborate these findings further by estimating the model presented in equation 4. This
exploits the information on the party for which individuals voted in the last general election.
These results are in line with what presented above. In particular, table 5 shows that
individuals experiencing a house price shock in the year of a general election are more likely
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to have voted for the Conservative party and less like to have voted for Labour. The sign of
the coefficient for the interaction term does not change if using a probit model to estimate
the average marginal effects following the same equation. However, the effect becomes smaller
and not statistically significant.
Table 5: The effect of wealth inequality on the probability of voting for the Conservative and
Labour party in England and Wales 1995-2007: post-election years only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Probit
Voted Conservative Voted Labour Voted Conservative Voted Labour
Price shock -0.503** 0.319 -0.323 0.232
(0.252) (0.286) (0.375) (0.396)
Price shock x Owner 0.497** -0.449* 0.215 -0.382
(0.233) (0.236) (0.325) (0.397)
Owner 0.135*** -0.130*** 0.152*** -0.144***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
N 8499 8499 8499 8499
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parenthesis
Note:.Standard errors are bootstrapped (200 reps). Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using a linear probability model,
while columns 3 and 4 are estimated using probit regressions and evaluating the effect at the margin. The dependent
variables are binary variables equal to 1 if :(1) (3) the individual voted for the Conservative Party, (2) (4) the individual
voted for the Labour party. "Price shock all(t-1)" is estimated as the residuals of an autoregressive model of order 2
on average house prices at the county level for 53 counties in England and Wales in the period 1995-2007. t-1 refers to
the period before the individual is asked about the voting casted in the last general election. Owner is a binary variable
equal to 1 if the individual is a homeowner and zero if a renter. Sample includes head of households only. Data from
the BHPS wave 5-17 (1995-2007) and from the ONS-HPI. The estimation includes a set of controls: binary variables for
marital status, gender, education level, retirement status, employment status, log hh equivalised income, county, year of
survey and age.
These results show that the first part of the hypothesis being tested is corroborated in my
empirical analysis. In fact, homeowners experiencing an increase in housing wealth become
more likely to support the Conservative party relative to renters.
The next step is to investigate whether this increase in support for the Conservative party
support is accompanied by a change preferences for redistribution. The main results are
reported in the last column of table 4. They shows that homeowners do not become less likely
to support state ownership of public services. In fact, the coefficient for the interaction term of
price shocks and home-ownership status is negative, but not statistically different from zero.
On average, for a ten percent house price positive shock homeowners are 0.3 percentage points
less likely to have pro-public attitudes relative to renters. However, the net effect of a house
price shock for homeowners, of 0.6 percentage points, is not statistically different from zero.
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I test whether this effect changes when looking at the other variables capturing political
beliefs in table 6. None of the coefficients for the interaction term are statistically different
from zero. In line with the literature, homeowners are more likely to have favorable views
towards the role of private enterprises in the economy (column 1), and less likely to have
favorable views towards the government provision of jobs and regulation of wages (columns 2
and 3).
Table 6: The effect of wealth inequality on redistributive attitudes in England and Wales
1995-2007: government's ownership of public services, role of government and private sector
in the economy.
(1) (2) (3)
Private Ent Max wage Govmt Job
Price shock -0.297∗∗ 0.096 -0.266∗
(0.133) (0.156) (0.157)
Price shock x Owner 0.146 0.024 0.217
(0.154) (0.165) (0.159)
Owner 0.061∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15640 16196 16244
Note: All models estimated using OLS. SE bootstrapped(200 reps). The outcome variables are binary variables:(1) equal
to 1 if individual agrees with private ownership of public services, (2) if agrees with government ought to cap maximum
amount one can earn, (3) if agrees with government having to provide jobs. Price shock is estimated as the residuals
of an autoregressive model of order 2 at the county level for England and Wales in the period 1995-2007. Owner is a
binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is a homeowner and zero if a renter. Sample includes head of households only.
Data from the BHPS wave 5-17 (1995-2007) and from the ONS-HPI. All regressions includes a set of controls: binary
variables for marital status, gender, education level, retirement status, employment status, ln of household equivalised
income, county, age and survey year).
1.9 Mechanisms
I explore two mechanisms that might explain the results presented so far. The first one is
that homeowners might have heterogeneous responses to a local house price shock. This can
be due to the fact that richer homeowners will react differently from poorer homeowners.
Thus, the average insignificant effect on preferences for redistribution might hide important
heterogeneous effects. I explore this possibility by using house price data for four different
property types. The second possible explanation is that homeowners value their property
differently from what captured with county-level house price data. I explore this using self-
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reported valuation of one's property.
1.9.1 Heterogeneity in property value
One possible reason driving the results presented in the previous section is the heterogeneity
in political preferences among homeowners. Homeowners of different property types might
be affected differently by an increase in prices. Thus, homeowners of cheaper properties, i.e.
owners of flats, could benefit less from the increase in the value of their housing wealth, and
support redistributive measures more than owners of other properties.
Figure 10, in Appendix 1, shows the probability of supporting the Conservative party by
type of the property owned. On average, owners of detached houses (43 percent) are more likely
to support the Conservative party than owners of other properties (27 percent semidetached,
21 percent terraced, 33 percent flats). Figure 10.a shows that the increase in support for
the Conservative party grew steadily for owners of detached houses starting from 2000. This
descriptive evidence is confirming an heterogeneity among homeowners in terms of support for
the Conservative party. Owners of detached properties agree with State ownership of public
services in 34 percent of the cases, owners of semi-detached properties in 40 percent, owners
of terraced houses in 43 percent and owners of flats in 39 percent. This suggest that owners
of more expensive properties are less likely to favor redistribution compared to owners of less
expensive properties.
Figure 11, in Appendix 1, shows the probability of having pro-public sector attitudes by
type of property owned during the period of interest. This shows that the trend in terms of
support for the public sector has been decreasing for all types of homeowners in the period of
analysis. I estimate whether this heterogeneity is confirmed when using a regression analysis.
I restrict the sample of observations to homeowners only, and use a simple linear probability
model to estimate the correlation between increase in average prices of different properties and
the change in probability of supporting the Conservative party and having pro-public sector




Then I use my preferred specification to estimate the causal effect of a house price shock
at the county level5 on the change in probability of supporting the Conservative party and
having pro-public sector attitudes for homeowners of different properties.
Following equation 6, I estimate the causal effect of an exogenous increase in house prices
at the county level on the political preferences of homeowners for four different property types.
yi,c,t = α+β1shockdetachedc,t+β2shocksemidetachedc,t+β3shockterracedc.t+β4Zi+γc+δt+εi,c,t
(7)
Where yi,c,t is a binary variable equal to one if the individual supports the Conservative
party (Support Conservative) or if agrees with state ownership of public services (Public), as
in the main analysis. I use as a reference category for this estimation homeowners of flats
experiencing an unexpected increase in house prices in their county. β1 measures the effect of
a house prices shock for owners of detached properties, β2 measures the effect for owners of
semi-detached houses, and β3 the effect for owners of terraced houses relative to the baseline
category.
The regression includes the same individual controls used in the rest of the analysis, as
well as age, year and county fixed effects.
5Notice that the house price shock is estimated using an auto-regressive model of order two as in section
3. In this specification, however, the autoregressive model is estimated separately for each property type. In
fact, the ONS house price index provides information on house prices by property types. I then merge the
house price shocks by property type and county to the individual level data in the BHPS. The BHPS contains
information on type of property where each respondents lives. I categorize as detached houses those who report
detached house (31.45 percent), as semidetached those who report semidetached or bungalow (36.52 percent,
as terraced house those who report terraced and end-terrace (26.35 percent), as flats those who report purpose
built flat, converted flat, bedsit (5 percent).
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Table 7: Heterogeneity analysis of the effect of wealth inequality on political preferences in
England and Wales 1995-2007: homeowners only by type of property owned.
Avg Price Price Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Support Public
Conservative Public Conservative
Price Detached 0.103∗∗∗ -0.053
(0.020) (0.033)
Price Semidetached 0.090∗∗∗ -0.034
(0.019) (0.032)
Price Terraced 0.063∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗
(0.018) (0.031)
Detached -1.086∗∗∗ 0.599 0.140∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.234) (0.393) (0.013) (0.022)
Semidetached -1.024∗∗∗ 0.413 0.006 0.048∗∗
(0.221) (0.362) (0.011) (0.022)
Terraced -0.745∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.352) (0.011) (0.021)
Shock Detached 0.218∗∗ -0.114
(0.098) (0.202)
Shock Semidetached 0.185∗∗ -0.208
(0.083) (0.180)
Shock Terraced 0.034 -0.396∗∗
(0.089) (0.181)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 34154 13834 29689 11504
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parenthesis
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 repetitions). All outcome variables are binary variables equal
to 1 if : (1) (3) the individual supports the Conservative party,(2) (4) the individual agrees with state ownership of
public services. Price detached, price semidetached, price terraced are continuous variable indicating the natural log of
the average price at the county level for 53 counties in England and Wales, by property type.Detached, semidetached,
terraced are binary variables equal to 1 if the individual is a homeowner of each different property (baseline category:
flat owners). Shock detached, shock semidetached, shock terraced are continuous variables measuring the shock in house
prices for each property type.The regressions are estimated using a linear probability model. Each regression includes
controls for marital status, education level, household income, gender, employment status, household size and binary
variables for county, age and survey year.
Table 7 shows the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of a OLS regression of
average county-level house prices and political preferences, while columns 3 and 4 show the
results for house price shocks. Fist, I find that average house prices are positively correlated
with support for the Conservative party. The results showed in column 1 of table 7 show that
homeowners of more expensive type of properties are progressively more likely to support the
Conservative party than homeowners of flats. In particular, a one percent increase in house
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prices increases the probability of supporting the Conservative party by 0.1 percentage points
for owners of detached houses relative to owners of flats. This correlation becomes smaller
in magnitude for owners of semidetached properties (0.09 percentage points) and terraced
houses (0.06 percentage points). Looking at column 2, I find a negative correlation between
average house prices of more expensive properties and pro-public sector preferences relative to
preferences of flat owners. The only statistically significant effect is for homeowners of terraced
houses, becoming 0.08 percentage points less likely to favor redistribution than owners of flats.
The results of my preferred specification using exogenous price shocks are reported in
columns 3 and 4 of table 7. These results confirm that owners of detached properties are 2
percentage points more likely to support the Conservative party as a result of a 10 percent
positive shocks in local house prices relative to owners of flats. Similarly, the effect is of 1.8
percentage points for owners of semi-detached properties, while the effect is smaller for owners
of terraced houses. This finding suggests that there is an heterogeneity in the support for
the Conservative party among homeowners. In fact richer homeowners, i.e. owners of more
expensive properties, are more likely to support the Conservative party compared to poorer
ones, i.e. owners of cheaper properties, who experience a positive house price shock at the
county level.
Important heterogeneity can be found when looking at preferences for the state owner-
ship of public services. Column 4 shows that homeowners of all properties are less likely to
favor redistribution compared to owners of flats. However, the effect becomes significant, in
magnitude and statistically, for owners of terraced houses. In particular, owners of terraced
houses are 4 percentage points less likely than owners of flats to agree with the state ownership
of public services as a consequence of a 10 percent positive shock to house prices, while the
reduction is smaller and not statistically significant for owners of semidetached (-2 percentage
points ) and detached properties (-1.1percentage points ). These results show that there is het-
erogeneity across homeowners in terms of preferences for redistribution, but this is statistically
significant only for owners of slightly more expensive properties. This might suggest that the
change in preferences for redistribution interests homeowners at the bottom of the property
value distribution and not home-owners of semi-detached and detached houses. A possible
explanation for this result is that owners of more expensive properties are less dependent on
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public provision of services and a shock to their property's value might have a lower impact
compared to home-owners starting from a lower starting point (in the distribution of property
value).
To conclude, I find evidence in line with the theory tested when exploring heterogeneity
among homeowners, by exploiting variation in the value of property types. I find that political
preferences of richer homeowners are affected differently than those of poorer homeowners. In
particular, the support for the Conservative party becomes stronger for homeowners of more
expensive properties, corroborating the hypothesis tested. Moreover, once these heterogeneity
are explored, I find evidence in support of the hypothesis that richer individuals are less
likely to support redistribution. In fact, I find that homeowners of cheaper properties, here of
flats, are less likely to support the Conservative party and are more likely to agree with state
ownership of public services than homeowners of more expensive properties.
1.9.2 Endowment effects
A second mechanism explaining why the main results do not corroborate the predictions
made in the literature is that homeowners perceive the value of their housing wealth to be
different than the one it has on the market. In this section, I show that when using self-
reported value of one's property of residence as a measure of housing wealth, the results show
a statistically significant decrease in the probability of having pro-redistribution attitudes. A
plausible explanation might be the existence of an endowment effect for homeowners.
Figure 12, in Appendix 1, shows that on average homeowners overestimate the value of
their property relative to the house prices provided by the ONS house price index. It is also
likely that one's perceptions on own house value affect political beliefs differently from official
house price measures. Thus, homeowners might perceive to be richer than they are, and
change their political preferences accordingly. This hypothesis is in line with the literature on
endowment effects and on perceptions of inequality.
To test this mechanism I exploit the following question asked yearly in the BHPS only to
homeowners: About how much would you expect to get for your home if you sold it today?.
The results following in this section present estimation of the following equation:
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yi,c,t = α+ βhsvali,c,t + β4Xi,c,t + γc + δt + εi,c,t (8)
where yi,c,t is a binary variable equal to one if the individual i in county c in year t
supports the Conservative party or if agrees or strongly agrees to each of the statements on
values used in the main analysis, hsval is the log of self-reported house value, X includes a
series of individual characteristics as in previous estimations. β is the coefficient of interest
and measures the effect of a 1 percent increase in house value on the outcome of interest. All
the regressions are estimated using OLS, standard errors are clustered at county level and
include year, age and county fixed-effects.
Table 8: Correlation between self-reported house value and political preferences: homeowners
only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Support Conservative Public Govmt Job Max Wage Private
House Value 0.179∗∗∗ -0.0835∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.0703∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(13.26) (-6.75) (-9.14) (-6.35) (8.96)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 37303 10778 10970 11173 10717
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Clustered Standard Errors in parenthesis
Note: All models estimated using OLS. SE clustered at county level The outcome variable is a binary variable equal
to 1 if: (1) the individual supports the Conservative Party, (2) equal to 1 if individual agrees with state ownership of
public services,(3) if agrees with government provision of jobs (4) if agrees with government ought to cap maximum
amount one can make, (5)private enterprises solving economic problems. Data from the BHPS wave 5-17 (1995-2008).
The estimation includes a set of controls: binary variables for marital status, gender, education level, retirement status,
employment status,log hh equivalised income. Binary variables for age, survey year and county.
Table 8 shows that homeowners reporting higher house values are more likely to support
the Conservative party, in line with the main results. However, differently from what estimated
previously, homeowners reporting higher house values are less likely to be in favor of the public
provision of goods and of the government's intervention in the economy. In line with this, they
are more likely to support private enterprises as being the main solution to economic problems.
All of the coefficients of interest in table 8 are statistically significant and indicate a precisely
estimated correlation between self-reported house value and preferences.
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The contribution of this additional finding is twofold. First, it shows that the perception
of wealth affects beliefs differently than market-value house price shocks. This contributes
to the literature showing that perception of inequality and of the income distribution vary
largely relative to aggregate measures (Gimpelson and Treisman, 2015). It also confirms large
experimental evidence on endowment effects showing that individuals value a good more just
because they own it.
Figure 13, in Appendix 1, corroborates further this idea by showing that homeowners are
remarkably more likely than renters to think that owning a house is important. This finding
suggests that perceived value of one's assets might be a relevant predictor of individuals beliefs
and political preferences.
1.10 Robustness
I conduct several robustness checks to validate the results of the analysis.
First, I exclude from the sample individuals moving across counties between each period
of time. This isolates possible endogeneity between the choice of new location, and house
prices or political preferences. Results for the estimation excluding movers from the sample
are reported in table 25 (in Appendix 1). These results validate the main findings.
Second, I perform the main analysis excluding the county of Greater London. I do this to
check whether the results hold once the biggest outlier in terms of house prices is excluded from
the analysis. The results in table 26, in Appendix 1, remain robust in their sign. However, the
coefficient of the interaction term between house price shocks and homeownership status is
only significant at the ten percent level, and the coefficient on feeling closer to the Conservative
party becomes statistically insignificant. This is plausibly due to a lower variation in house
price shocks away from the area of Greater London. It also suggests important geographical
variation in the probability of supporting the Conservative party. This would be in line with the
predicted hypothesis: homeowners in the area of Greater London are richer than homeowners
in other regions. Hence, for a positive house price shock the probability of supporting the
Conservative party should increase more.
I then estimate the results using data from 1995 to 2008, to include the year of the financial
crisis. Table 27, in Appendix 1, shows that the results are in line with those presented in the
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main analysis. However, the magnitude of the coefficient for supporting the Conservative
party is now smaller. A ten percent house price shock increases of 1.5 percentage points in the
probability of supporting Conservative for homeowners relative to renters. The net effect is
then smaller and of around 0.3 percentage points increase for owners. This suggests that the
financial crisis might have an effect on other factors that influence the support for political
parties.
Moreover, the financial crisis and the austerity measures implemented in the years right
after 2008 have radically changed the political scenario in the United Kingdom (Fetzer, 2019).
As a result of this change in the political scenario and the rise in support for the UKIP party,
it is less clear whether looking at the Conservative party would be a convincing outcome to
capture preferences less favorable towards redistribution. A possible extension of this analysis
would examine how the support for parties changes as a result of the crisis. However, such
analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper of looking at both support for parties and pref-
erences. Moreover, this analysis cannot be implemented as the questions on preferences for
redistribution used in this paper have been discontinued in the Understanding Society dataset
covering the period after 2008 6.
1.11 Conclusions
In this paper I estimate whether an increase in wealth inequality changes individual preferences
for redistribution in line with one's support for political parties.
The findings of this paper contribute to a growing literature on the effect of inequality
on political outcomes, innovating by focusing on wealth inequality, rather than income and
wages. In particular, I test empirically whether increasing wealth inequality affects both the
support for the Conservative party and pro-public sector attitudes, as predicted in the model
on wage inequality formalized by Barth and Moene (2016).
In this analysis, I focus on housing wealth as a measure of individual total wealth. Previous
literature has shown that this constitutes the largest share of individual asset in the context of
analysis (Bastagli and Hills, 2012). Moreover, previous studies identify housing wealth effects
6Understanding Society continues to follow part of the BHPS sample together with a new sample of
households entering the survey in 2009. Additional problems in extending the analysis are linked with the
geographical matching of the house price index with individual level data.
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to have different effects on homeowners relative to renters (Disney et al., 2010; Fichera and
Gathergood, 2016; Disney and Gathergood, 2018). Given the relevance of the effects on labor
supply decisions, consumption smoothing and health care demand, there is room to believe
that these wealth effects also affect political preferences.
Using the house price boom in England and Wales between 1995 and 2007, I identify the
causal effect of wealth inequality on political preferences, moving beyond the cross-country
correlations presented in Barth and Moene (2016). Following Disney et al. (2010), I estimate
an unanticipated change in house prices at the county-level to capture an exogenous shock
to the housing wealth distribution. Then, I estimate whether it affects differently the polit-
ical preferences of homeowners relative to renters. The results corroborate only partly the
mechanisms of interest. In fact, homeowners become more likely than renters to support the
Conservative party as their property unexpectedly increases in value. However, they do not
change their support for government ownership of public services. These results hold after
conducting a series of robustness checks.
I explore two possible mechanisms explaining these results.
First, I show that the effect on support for the public sector is driven by homeowners
of cheaper properties. This is in line with the literature on inequality and preferences for
redistribution, and shows that there is a large heterogeneity across homeowners preferences
in the context of analysis. This is plausibly driven by the large heterogeneity in house value
among homeowners. Second, I provide novel evidence on the relevance of one's own housing
value perception on the formation of political preferences and on political party support. In
particular, when using self-reported house value as a measure of wealth inequality, I find that
the hypothesis tested (Barth and Moene, 2016) is fully corroborated. In fact, homeowners
self-reporting higher values of own property are more likely to support the Conservative party
and less likely to have pro-public sector preferences. This provides additional evidence of the
presence of an endowment effect in the British housing market by showing that the valuation of
homeowners is on average higher than the market value of houses, as well as showing that one's
beliefs are affected by individual perceptions of socioeconomic status rather than aggregate
measures.
Before concluding, I would like to draw the attention of the reader to possible limitations
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of this analysis. In particular, the measure of preferences for redistribution used in this paper
might not fully capture one's redistributive attitudes. Measuring preferences for redistribution
is a challenging task when the empirical method and data collection are not specifically tar-
geted to understanding individual preferences over higher or lower levels of income and wealth
redistribution. To overcome such limitation, several papers in the literature on preferences for
redistribution use survey questions related to the government's intervention in the economy
to capture one's attitude towards public spending and tax pressure. This choice lies on the
assumption that as one prefers a stronger role of the government in the economy, especially
in terms of assistance to poorer shares of the population, she also favours higher transfers of
welfare from richer to poorer individuals via an increase in taxes for the former.
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) measure preferences for redistribution using survey
questions on the role of the State in providing financial security to those in need (e.g. unem-
ployed, poor etc.), Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014)use questions on whether the State should
assist the poor and on the role of hard work versus luck in determining one's economic oppor-
tunities. In line with what done in this paper, Clark et al. (2010) use the same questions from
the BHPS to measure preferences for redistribution, i.e. major services and industries ought
to be owned by the State and the government should put a limit to the maximum amount
one can make. Combined with other questions on the role of private enterprises in solving
economic problems and on the role of the government in providing a job to anyone who needs
one, I believe that the set of questions used in the paper captures individual attitudes more
or less in favour of redistribution.
However, I acknowledge that this measure can have some limitations. In particular, it
would be ideal to have a measure of how much income and wealth one would be willing to
pay in taxes to help poorer sectors of the population or to improve the quality of public
services. In fact, it might well be that one favours redistribution, but opposes State ownership
of public services if she associates this with mismanagement or misallocation of public funding
resulting in poor-quality of the service provided. Although the other questions measuring
one's preferences over the State's assistance to those who lose a job and role in capping
wages help providing a clearer picture, having information that specifically measures individual
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preferences on tax increases7 and wealth transfers would give a more comprehensive and precise
idea on one's preferences over redistribution.
To conclude, this paper shows that wealth inequality has a role in affecting both political
party support and preferences for redistribution. Moreover, it shows that heterogeneity in the
value of one's owned wealth matters in explaining the effects, as it does one's perception of
own property's value.
7For the purpose of this paper, information over preferences for changes in the council tax for more expensive
properties would be particularly useful to measure one's preferences for, specifically, wealth redistribution. This
information is not available in the BHPS, but future work might be carried out using information on changes
to the council tax and political preferences.
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2 The effect of conscription on political ideology, voting partic-
ipation and national identity.
2.1 Introduction
This paper aims at evaluating the effect of conscription in shaping individual political ideology,
voting participation and national identity.
The idea that conscription is associated with civic duty and national cohesion is not new.
It was with this aim that conscription was introduced in France in 1798 (Jourdan law). Since
then, conscription has been present in Europe and around the world in one form or another, un-
til the end of the Cold War brought most European countries to move towards a fully-volunteer
professional army. In recent years, however, an active policy discussion has culminated with
reforms aimed at bringing back national mandatory service. In 2018, Sweden passed a law
re-introducing conscription for eighteen years old men, and in the same year a law introducing
a one-month long national service was approved by parliament in France.
The motivations behind such reforms are varied, from pure defense strategy to the promo-
tion of civic engagement and national cohesion (this was the case in E. Macron presidential
campaign, see: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44625625). Aside from Emmanuel
Macron, other policy-makers share the idea that re-introducing conscription will positively
affect civic values. Matteo Salvini, Italy's former Interior Minister, has declared that con-
scription would be good for democracy and educational for young men and women (for
M. Salvini's declaration see: http://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2018/02/07/military-
service-should-return-salvini-2_39b7af17-1fa9-4a05-b2dd-24ba443769b5.html). Germany's cur-
rent Ministry of Defense, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (CDU), has been open to discussing
the possibility of bringing back conscription in Germany seven years after the country decided
to abolish it (for more information on the German political discussion, see https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/06/germany-
debates-return-national-service-amid-serious-military/). Additionally, the re-introduction of
conscription is part of the electoral program of the far right-wing party Alternative für Deutsch-
land.
Notwithstanding this renewed interest in the benefits of conscription, the costs associated
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with such policy are non-trivial.
First, a conscript-based army is less cost-efficient than a fully-professional army (Poutvaara
and Wagener, 2007). Although the stipend paid to conscript is lower, having a conscript-
based army still constitutes a considerable burden on the government's budget as it is the
State who stipends conscripts, provides food, accommodation and transportation back home
during service. Cutting down on these costs was one of the drivers of the abolition of con-
scription in Germany, for example, where it resulted in saving around 8.3bn euros (as reported:
https://www.dw.com/en/german-military-cuts-to-put-effective-end-to-conscription/a-5909841).
Second, there is a large economic literature assessing the direct and indirect costs of conscrip-
tion. Military service delays entry in the labor market and reduces wages in the short-run (An-
grist, 1990; Angrist and Krueger, 1994; Imbens and Klaauw, 1995), increases crime (Galiani
et al., 2011) and has mixed effects on the demand for higher education (Cipollone and Rosolia,
2007; Card and Lemieux, 2001; Bauer et al., 2014). In light of such costs, a rigorous analysis
of the effectiveness of conscription in shaping citizenship values is needed to motivate policies
aimed at bringing conscription back. The main contribution of this paper is to provide such
analysis and evidence on the causal effect of conscription on political preferences.
Conscription might affect political ideology, voting participation and national identity in
opposite ways. By teaching discipline and obedience to duty it might increase voting partic-
ipation, but its mandatory nature might reduce civic engagement if it generates antagonism
against the State. Its strong hierarchical and authoritative structure might recall values em-
bodied in more right-wing parties and affect political ideology (Roghmann and Sodeur, 1972).
Lastly, by relying on a strong sense of identity with one's nation it might make individuals
more likely to identify with their country (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). Evaluating the di-
rection of these mechanisms is an empirical question, which I address in this analysis using
a regression discontinuity design and data for West Germany and Spain. The main result of
this paper is that I do not find statistically significant evidence of an effect of conscription in
shaping voting participation, political ideology nor national identity.
I start by evaluating the long-run effect of the introduction of conscription in West Germany
on individual political preferences. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, I
estimate the effect of peacetime conscription on the probability of having more right-wing
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political ideology than the median, and on the probability of going to vote in parliamentary
elections. Following previous literature (Bauer et al., 2012, Bauer et al., 2014), I exploit the
introduction of conscription in 1955 to identify an exogenous change in the probability of being
drafted for men turning eighteen in that year. Following from the de-militarization sanctions
imposed to Germany after WWII, the probability of being conscripted for men turning eighteen
before the reform is close to zero. Compared to men too young to have fought in the second
World War and too old to be eligible for conscription, men born right after the reform are
between 25 and 40 percentage points more likely to having been conscripted.
After showing that the treated and control groups are comparable, I estimate the treatment
effect of the reform by looking at the difference in political attitudes between the two groups.
The introduction of conscription coincided with several political transformations in the context
of analysis: the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany in the NATO, for example, and
other policies that where carried out to mark a political detachment from the past decades
of Nazi dictatorship. Although, these structural transformations should not threaten the
validity of the analysis as they are likely to affect both the treated and the control, this paper
contributes further by conducting the analysis in a different context. As a robustness check, I
evaluate the effect of conscription in Spain on the political preferences of men turning eighteen
just before and just after 1997. Announced in 1996 by Prime Minister J.M.Aznár, this reform
affected men born in or after 1979 and turning eighteen at the time of the reform, who were
no longer eligible to be drafted. The advantages of conducting the analysis using Spanish data
are threefold.
First, it allows me to show evidence of the external validity of the results, absence of which
is often considered as one of the main limitations of using regression discontinuity design.
Second, it allows me to study short-term effects of conscription as data is available for a
period much closer to the implementation of the reform compared to the German case. Third,
data availability on national identity allows me to explore a salient component of the current
policy debate around the re-introduction of conscription. I find that there is no statistically
significant evidence corroborating the hypothesis that conscription affects political ideology,
voting participation or national identity. These results are robust to a series of specification
and are comparable in sign and magnitude in the two countries of analysis.
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This paper contributes to several branches of literature.
First, it contributes to a long standing literature in economics on the effects of wartime
and peacetime conscription. Angrist (1990) seminal work first showed evidence of lower wages
for Vietnam era draftees compared to non-draftees. Similar findings of lower earnings for
conscripts have been backed up by analysis conducted in other countries, e.g. the Netherlands
(Imbens and Klaauw, 1995). Later research on the effect on wages, shows mixed evidence.
Updated results on Vietnam veterans find that earnings differentials converge to zero in the
long run (Angrist et al., 2011), Albrecht et al. (1999) find positive effects of service on earnings
in Sweden, while Grenet et al. (2011) find zero effect for British conscripts.
Moreover, the literature finds strong heterogeneity in the effects of peacetime conscription
on earnings based on conscripts socio-economic background. Card and Cardoso (2012) find
that in Portugal men with lower levels of education benefited from peacetime conscription, as
their wages are 4 to 5 percent higher than comparable non-conscripts. This finding validates
the hypothesis that conscription might have positive effects driven by the acquisition of new
skills and the possibility to access a better social network during service.
The opposite is also possible. The literature on the effect of military service and crime
shows that conscription during peacetime increases crime rates (Galiani et al., 2011). Hjal-
marsson and Lindquist (2016) find similar results and strong heterogeneous effects, showing
that conscripts from lower socio-economic backgrounds (proxied with father's education) are
more likely to commit post-service crime, even more so if they had a criminal history before
being drafted. These results validate the hypothesis that during conscription men might be
exposed to the use of violence and weapons, as well as to worse social-networks.
Following from these results, the question of whether conscription might have positive
effects on citizenship values is an empirical one. By teaching discipline and civic duty con-
scription might increase civic engagement and voting participation post-service. At the same
time, it might also contribute to foster more authoritarian political views. Although the po-
litical science literature does not find evidence in support of this hypothesis (Campbell and
McCormack, 1957; Roghmann and Sodeur, 1972), it has been hypothesized that the isolation
from civil society and the strict disciplinary approach can contribute to shape political views
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). Moreover, the fact that more right-wing parties support the
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re-introduction of conscription might suggest a right-wing partisanship of such reform.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the formation of political ideology,
political preferences and their effect on voting behavior. This literature has shown that differ-
ent institutions, economic growth and inequality affect the formation of political preferences
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). In particular, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) provide evidence
that being exposed to negative shocks during the impressionable years affects the formation
of preferences for redistribution more than when in other age periods, and that these effects
last over time. The impressionable years hypothesis is a well-documented psychological theory
(Krosnick and Alwin, 1989) stating that individuals form their political and social values in the
period between 18 and 25 years of age. Being this the age period when individuals experience
conscription, there is room to believe that if conscription has an effect in shaping political
preferences, this effect will be long-lasting.
Additionally, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show that a change in preferences for redis-
tribution is associated with changing support for a party or another and with changing political
values as more or less liberal, and Caprettini et al. (2019) find evidence that individuals stick
to their voting preferences for a period of up to four decades. Following a similar rationale
Barth and Moene (2016) show that a change in beliefs affects the probability to vote for a
more or less right-wing party. In light of the recent electoral success of populist/far-right/anti-
immigrant parties, a growing literature has been moving beyond the analysis of preferences
for redistribution and has started to investigate the determinants of voting for those parties
(Acemoglu et al., 2013; Rodrik, 2018; Fetzer, 2019). This paper contributes to this literature
by investigating whether conscription plays a role in shaping such preferences.
Lastly, this paper contributes to the literature on the formation of identity (Kranton, 2016
for a review). Stronger identity with one's group has been proved to be relevant for the
efficient functioning of economic organizations (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005) as it increases the
probability that an individual exerts effort on the workplace. This is particularly true in the
military context, where an individual efficiency on the battlefield depends on how much he
identifies with the organization he is fighting for, i.e. the State. Empirical evidence supports
the relevance of identity formation. Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) provide evidence of the
effect of being taught in Catalan language on one's national identity. In particular, individuals
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exposed to mandatory education in Catalan language are less likely to identify with Spain as
a nation, more likely to want more independence from Spain, and more likely to support
regionalist parties. This paper provides novel evidence in this field by using Spanish data on
national identity as an alternative outcome affected by conscription.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper relates to three strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the economic
literature on the effects of conscription. This literature has mostly looked at the effects of
conscription on labor market outcomes. Angrist (1990)seminal work on the effect of wartime
conscription on Vietnam draftees wages finds that, ten years after the war ended, wages are
15 percent lower for white veterans compared to those of non-veterans. Similarly, Imbens and
Klaauw (1995) find that conscripts in the Netherlands earn 5 percent less than non-conscript
and Angrist and Krueger (1994) find that World War II veterans do not earn more than
comparable non-veterans in the long-run.
More recent studies show mixed evidence of the effect of conscription on wages. Angrist
et al. (2011) provide an update of the effect on Vietnam veterans wages, showing that the
differential with non-veterans tends to zero in the longer run. Card and Cardoso (2012) show
that, although, the average difference in wages between Portuguese peacetime conscript and
non-conscript is not different from zero, this difference turns positive when looking at less-
educated men. This finding shows that the military service might provide valuable skills in
the workplace for men coming from poorer socio-economic backgrounds. Siminski (2013) finds
strong negative effects of military service on labor force participation for Australian veterans.
Bauer et al. (2012) find that, once selection bias is accounted for, the wages and number of
days of employment of German conscript do not differ from those of non-conscript.
A second set of papers looks at the effect of conscription on human capital formation.
Usually, conscription is carried out during early adulthood, and in a period of time coincid-
ing with the decision to invest in tertiary education. The findings on the effect of conscription
on education are also mixed. Card and Lemieux (2001) find that, thanks to the possibility
of avoiding conscription if enrolled in college, men were 4-6 percentage points more likely to
be enrolled. Bauer et al. (2014) find that men born after the introduction of conscription in
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Germany are 15 percentage points more likely to hold a university degree, corroborating the
finding that men might decide to enroll to university to avoid the draft. Oppositely, Cipollone
and Rosolia (2007) find that men exempted from compulsory military service were 2 percentage
points more likely to graduate from high-school in Italy, while Di Pietro (2013) finds that later
on the abolition of conscription had no effect on university enrollment in the same country.
More unanimous results on the direction of the effects of conscription come from the
literature on health and crime. Bedard and Deschênes (2006) find that early mortality is higher
among World War II and Korean War veterans. These findings on mortality are corroborated
by Johnston et al. (2016), who find strong negative effects of military service on mental and
physical dysfunction for Australian Vietnam veterans. Autor et al. (2011) find that Vietnam
veterans are more likely to obtain disability-related transfer income, and that the recipient of
these transfers are more likely to be affected by Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Galiani et al. (2011) find strong causal evidence of the effect of conscription on the prob-
ability of men having post-service criminal records. Differently from most of the findings
on health outcomes, these effects are robust for conscripts serving both during wartime and
during peacetime. Similarly, Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2016) find that peacetime military
conscription increases the probability of committing crime after service for men between 23
and 30. Overall, this first literature shows mixed effects on the costs of conscription. However,
these evidence should be taken into account when advancing policies aiming at keeping or
returning to a conscription based army. In particular, benefits coming from the hypothesized
increase in civic engagement should offset the costs of conscription in terms of human capital
and crime.
The second contribution of this paper is to the literature on the formation of political ide-
ology and voting participation. Being conscripted might affect individual political preferences
in several ways. Conscription is carried out during early adulthood, when political and social
values are formed. Being trained to discipline, to respect the authority and to identify with
the military might make one more likely to engage in civic life and to obey to civic duties,
e.g. by going to vote. At the same time, this experience might shape preferences and ideology
towards more authoritarian positions.
The economic literature on political preferences shows that political ideology matters in
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shaping preferences for redistribution and taxation (for a review see Alesina and Giuliano,
2009). Different institutional contexts (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Alesina et al.,
2004), macro-economic shocks during early adulthood (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014) are
only some of the factors that might make one more favorable towards higher levels of redistri-
bution and lower levels of inequality. In fact, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) find that if an
individual is exposed to a macroeconomic recession during the age period between eighteen
and twenty-five, she is more likely to support redistribution and to vote for left-wing parties.
For their identification, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) rely on the impressionable years the-
ory (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989) stating that individuals form their political and social values
during this period of time, and that this values change little over time.
In line with the impressionable years hypothesis, empirical evidence finds that voting pat-
ters tend to be sticky over time. Caprettini et al. (2019) find that individuals in Italy became
more likely to vote for the Democristian party as a result of land redistribution reforms, and
that this effect persists for forty years after the reform is implemented. Differences in political
ideology and preferences for redistribution determine the support for political parties (Giuliano
and Spilimbergo, 2014; Barth and Moene, 2016). Traditionally, more left-wing party would
support political agendas with higher levels of public spending and more progressive taxation
than more right-wing parties.
The literature on the formation of political preferences and voting behavior has recently
gained new interest by economists. Mounting empirical evidence and the recent electoral suc-
cess of extremist parties suggest that other factors might determine the formation of political
preferences and the support for parties in elections. Education is correlated with supporting
more left-wing parties embodying more tolerant views towards cultural and economic interna-
tionalization (Piketty, 2018), globalization and the pressure put on wages exposed to higher
competition because of trade lead to an increasing preference for Republicans in the U.S. (Ro-
drik, 2018; Autor et al., 2016), austerity policies determined the growing success of UKIP in
the U.K. (Fetzer, 2019). The findings presented in this paper investigate both possible effects
of conscription on political preferences, which might matter for voting behavior, and additional
evidence on the long-run effects of policies affecting individuals in their impressionable years.
An additional contribution of the paper is to the political science literature. Campbell
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and McCormack (1957) and Roghmann and Sodeur (1972) put forward the hypothesis that
exposure to the use of weapons, and to a discipline-based training might lead conscripts
to having more right-wing ideology. However, the findings suggest no correlations between
conscription and ideology. The contribution of this paper is to test this mechanism using
a rigorous econometric analysis and exploiting a regression discontinuity design to identify
a causal effect. Moreover, this paper looks at the effects of conscription directly on voting
participation as a measure of civic engagement. Thus, it contributes to the social capital
literature often using voting participation as a determinant of social cohesion, trust, political
accountability and well-being (Putnam, 2000; Nannicini et al., 2013; Butler et al., 2016).
Thirdly, section 2.7.1 shows evidence of the effect of conscription on the formation of
national identity. Kranton (2016) reviews the literature on the formation of identity and
its effect on education, labor supply, work effort and consumption. In particular, Akerlof
and Kranton (2005) provide a good example of how conscription and being a member of the
armed forces can shape identity. During this experience, individuals are isolated from the rest
of society, they share the goal of maximizing their efficiency on the battlefield by incurring
potentially the highest cost. Thus, the role of identity with the armed forces and, more in
general, with the State is crucial for individuals to exert the effort needed to maximize their
efficiency. This model is obviously more related to professionals being part of the armed forces.
However, the type and objective of military training are similar to those of conscription.
Empirical evidence on what shapes identity, and in particular national identity, is still
scarce (Clots-Figueras and Masella, 2013). In this paper, I present evidence on the effect of
conscription on the formation of Spanish identity. The context of Spain is of particular interest
when studying what shapes identity. The presence of strong separatist movements has always
been present in Spanish politics and has culminated in more (ETA terrorist group attacks)
or less (turmoil post- Catalan referendum) violent episodes of conflict, with negative effects
on the economic performance in the country (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). The literature
on this presents evidence of the effect of different reforms on the probability of having more
separatist attitudes. Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) show that being taught in Catalan
language makes one's identity as Catalan stronger and increases the probability to vote for
Catalan parties. However, additional empirical studies are rare. Thus, the contribution of this
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paper is to show whether conscription might contribute to strengthen national identity.
2.3 Context and data
Conscription was introduced in the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter, West Germany
or Germany) in 1955. This reform coincided with the admission of West Germany in NATO
and with the creation of the Bundeswehr (national army).
The law regulating the formation of the national army is the Wehrpflichtgesetz. Differently
from what happened 6 months later in the German Democratic Republic, this law rules that
the national army should be mostly formed by conscripted men. The law ruled that fit-to-serve
men born in or after the 1st July 1937 had to serve in the armed forces for a period of twelve
months when turning eighteen, and that the first cohort to be drafted would start serving in
May 1955. Women were exempted from the draft until 2001. An alternative type of service
was available for conscientious objectors since the introduction of conscription. However, the
sample size is negligible for the cohorts used in this analysis, and remained so until the 1970s
(Bauer et al., 2012). The introduction of conscription followed from the post-WWII sanction of
de-militarization imposed to Germany. Thus, the introduction of this reform lends itself to be
evaluated using regression discontinuity design thanks to the clear-cut jump in the probability
of having been conscripted for men eligible to be drafted after the reform was enacted. In fact,
the probability of having being drafted increases exogenously for men born after the cutoff
date compared to men who never served because younger than 18 at the end of WWII and
born before July 1937.
The main analysis is conducted using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (here-
after, SOEP). The SOEP runs yearly since 1984 and collects information at the individual
level on biographic characteristics, on political preferences and voting participation in federal
parliamentary elections. The key information needed to perform the analysis of this paper is
on individual date of birth of the individuals. Individual level information on date of birth
measured in months is collected in the biographic questionnaire. This was first run in 2001 and
asked once and retrospectively to all individuals surveyed in that year and in following waves.
The same questionnaire can be used to derive information on the probability that an individual
was conscripted. In fact, among other information on socialization experiences during youth
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this questionnaire includes the question Did you do the military/civil service?. Information
on military or civil service is available for 15,534 individuals. The sample is restricted to only
men and to men residing in West Germany in 1989. Information on whether the individ-
ual was living in West Germany before re-unification is asked yearly in the individual level
questionnaire of the SOEP.
The final sample is of 11,137 men for which there is information on month of birth, military
service and place of residence before 1989. Finally, the sample used in the analysis is composed
of men born 48 months before and after the cutoff date of interest. The size of the sample
decreases further when it is matched to information on the outcome variables of interest. In
fact, to measure right-wing ideology I use the question on political ideology that was asked
only in three waves of the survey (2005, 2009, 2014).
The survey asks the respondent In politics, people often talk about "left" and "right"
when describing different political views. When you think about your own political views,
how would you rate them on the scale below?. The individual can answer reporting political
views to be on a scale from zero Far left to ten Far right. The median value in the sample is
five. Thus, the analysis on right-wing ideology is conducted on a binary variable, Rightwing
equal to 1 if the individual reports values above the median, i.e. values from six to ten inclusive.
As a robustness check I present results for a trimmed version of this variable, by dropping
observations in the the top and bottom ten percent of the original political attitudes variable,
i.e. excluding values lower than three and higher than seven. I also present the results obtained
by keeping the outcome variable in its original format. The question on voting participation
was asked in the two waves following the general elections of 2009 and 2013. The variable
of interest for the analysis is a binary variable equal to one if the individual reports to have
voted in either of the two elections.
As robustness checks to the main analysis, I explore whether conscription affected other
activities that can measure civic engagement, namely participation in local politics and volun-
teering activity. In waves 2003, 2008 and 2013 the survey included a section on participation
in local activities and organizations. Following the literature on social capital (Knack and
Keefer, 1997), I construct two additional binary variables. The original question used asks
Now some questions about your free-time. Please indicate how often you take part in each
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activity: daily, at least once a week, at least once a month, seldom or never for a series of
activities, including Participation in public initiatives, in political parties, local government
and perform volunteer work. The two variables derived from this question, i.e. local politics
and volunteers, take the value of zero if the individual reports never and one otherwise.
Lastly, an additional analysis is run on the individual's stated support for the two main
political parties in Germany: SPD and the coalition of CDU (Christian Democratic Union)
and CSU (Christian Social Union in Bavaria). Table 9 contains information on the support for
these parties. The SOEP survey asks yearly Which party do you lean toward? and presents
a list of the major parties in Germany. Given that the CSU is a regional party for Bavaria,
the analysis on support for CDU/CSU is conducted on an outcome variable equal to one if the
individual states to support either of these parties and zero otherwise. Similarly, the SPD
variable is equal to one if the individual reports to support the Social Democratic Party and
zero otherwise.
2.4 Identification Strategy and methodology
I use the introduction of mandatory military service as an exogenous shock to the probability
of having been conscripted for men born right after its introduction compared to men born
right before. Provided that these two groups are comparable, I can identify the causal effect
of conscription on political attitudes by looking at the difference in the outcome for these two
groups.
I use a regression discontinuity design to analyze the effect of conscription on the political
attitudes of individuals residing in West Germany at the time of the reform. The fundamental
identifying assumption is that the probability of being drafted for men born before and after
the reform date depends only on one's date of birth, and not from individual characteristics,
i.e. I can rule out selection into treatment. Thus, using a regression discontinuity design I
can estimate the probability of having been drafted as a function of date of birth for a small
number of cohorts born just before and just after the change in reform. Restricting the sample
to cohorts born just before and just after the reform allows to claim that the difference between
the treatment group (affected by the reform) and the control group (those not affected) are
not statistically different from zero. If these two groups are comparable in the observable
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and unobservable characteristics, if the reform was binding and if the density of the running
variable is continuous around the cutoff date, the only difference between the treated and
control groups is the treatment effect.
First, I estimate the probability of having been conscripted for men born in or after the
1st July 1937 compared to men born before this cutoff date. Thus, the treated group affected
by the reform are men eligible for conscription, while the control group are men older than
eighteen at the time of the reform (and who did not fight in World War II) and no longer eligible
to be drafted. I estimate the following set of regressions using parametric and non-parametric
techniques (Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Calonico et al., 2014a). I indicate the treatment status
using a binary variable which is equal to one if the individual was born in or after the cutoff
date. I define the cutoff c¯ to be the date at which the reform was enacted. Thus :
Treatedi

Borni ≥ c¯ Di = 1
Borni < c¯ Di = 0
Then, I use the following equation to estimate the probability of having done military
service for men born before or after the cutoff date:
conscriptioni,t = α0 + α1Treatedi + α2AgeAtReformit + α3Xi,t + εit (9)
where conscriptioni,t is the probability of having been conscripted. Treatedi is a dummy
variable equal to one if the individual was born after the change in reform and zero otherwise.
Hence, the sign of α1 is expected to be positive, indicating an increase in the probability
of having been conscripted, and α1 measures the probability of having been conscripted for
cohorts born after the change in reform of military service. The reduced form equation is:
yit = γ0 + γ1Treatedi + γ2AgeAtReformit + γ3Xit + ηit (10)
While the second stage equation estimating the causal effect of conscription, instrumented
with the treatment variable, on the outcome of interest is as follows:
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yit = β0 + β1 ˆconscriptioni,t + β2AgeAtReformit + β3Xit + θit (11)
where yit is a binary variable indicating political attitudes and voting participation.
ˆconscriptioni,t is the probability of having been conscripted instrumented with individual's
date of birth estimated using equation 9. All regressions include the same set of individual
level variables Xitto control for: year and region of residence, marital status, labor force
status, years of schooling, place of residence during childhood and parental education. β1 is
the coefficient of interest and measures the causal effect of conscription on the outcome of
interest.
I restrict the sample of analysis to men born in just before and just after the cutoff data.
I use data driven techniques as in Calonico et al. (2014a) to define the optimal bandwidth
around the cutoff, which allows to optimize the trade-off between sample size and precision
of the estimates. I then use the same optimal bandwidth in the estimation of parametric
regressions. For the parametric estimation I estimate equations 9,10 and 11 using interacted
polynomials of the running variable, measured in month of birth. Using interactions of the
running variable function allows to control for a change in the slope of such function on the
left-hand side and on the right-hand side of the cutoff.
I conduct the estimation using both a quadratic and a linear specification to test the
sensitivity of the results to higher order polynomials (Gelman and Imbens, 2019; Lee and
Lemieux, 2010). It is worth mentioning at this point that the main analysis is conducted
on West Germany because the information on individual date of birth is available at the
month of birth level, while the data for Spain only contains information on year of birth.
The advantages of having information on the month of birth are twofold. First it allows to
conduct the analysis using non-parametric data driven techniques. These methods, as detailed
in Lee and Lemieux (2010), use data driven techniques and data points close to the cutoff to
estimate the coefficients without knowing the functional form of the running variable. Using
an incorrect functional form is particularly problematic in the case of Regression Discontinuity
Design, as the jump in the function might vary substantially depending on the functional form
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used in the regression, leading to biased estimates. Thus, running both parametric and non-
parametric regressions is key to test whether the results depend on the functional form of
the running variable. In order to estimate the regressions using non-parametric techniques
for a small bandwidth around the cutoff, researchers face a trade-off between sample size and
precision of the estimates (see pp. 314-318 in Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
It is, then, necessary that the number of observation close to the cutoff is high enough to
produce precise estimates. Moreover, the finer the unit of measurement of the running variable
the more similar units on the left and on the right of the cutoff can be claimed to be. For
these reasons, when having only information on year of birth, the optimal bandwidth needed to
estimate the non-parametric regressions might be too large and the treatment effect for that
bandwidth will be biased. Following from this discussion, when estimating the regressions
using Spanish data I will only implement parametric techniques.
The remaining of this section aims at presenting graphical evidence of the internal validity
of the identification strategy. To do this I provide evidence of the first stage discontinuity
by showing a jump in the probability of having been conscripted for the treatment group
compared to the control. Figure 3 shows the discontinuity at the cutoff for men born before
and after the introduction of conscription in Germany. Additional evidence is needed to show
the continuity of the running variable density around the cutoff. Figure 14, in Appendix 2,
shows graphical evidence of the Mc Crary test for the discontinuity of the running variable
(McCrary, 2008). This shows that there is not a statistically significant jump in the probability
of being born after the reform.
To test for manipulation around the cutoff, figure 15 (in Appendix 2) shows graphical
evidence that the discontinuity in the probability of having been conscripted is not present
one year before or one year after the implementation of the reform used in the analysis. This
suggests that the reform was effective and there were not significant anticipation or delay
effects in the implementation of the reform. These evidence is corroborated by the regression
analysis presented in section 2.7.
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Figure 3: Discontinuity in the probability of having been conscripted by month of birth for men
born within 48 months before and 48 after the introduction of conscription: West Germany.
2.5 Summary statistics
The main objective of this section is to outline the characteristics of the treatment and con-
trol group. This information allows to verify whether the treatment and control groups are
comparable in terms of observable characteristics. It also informs on whether the sample of
analysis is representative of the whole population.
Table 9 summarizes the characteristics of the full sample (column 1), of the sample used
in the analysis and born 48 months before and after the introduction of conscription (col-
umn 2), of the treated group born after the cutoff date (column 3) and of the control group
born before the cutoff date (column 4). Column 5 presents the difference in means for each
variable by treatment status. First, table 9 shows the difference in the probability of having
been conscripted for the treatment and the control group. In particular, men born within 48
months after the introduction of conscription are 27 percent more likely to have been con-
scripted compared to men born 48 months before. The table also shows that the proportion of
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individuals carrying out civil service is marginal in the sample of analysis. This is in line with
findings in the literature stating that conscientious objector started constituting a consistent
group of conscripts only since the early 1960s (Bauer et al., 2012). Second, table 9 shows the
difference in age for men in the treatment and control group. This difference is the mechanical
consequence of the identification assumption, i.e. one's date of birth, resulting in men in the
treatment group to be 4 years younger on average. As discussed in the previous section the
bandwidth of 48 months is estimated using non-parametric techniques.
Then, column 5 shows that the treated and control group are comparable on average in
terms of individual characteristics, with the exception of home-ownership status being higher
for the treated group. In terms of comparability with the full sample. I observe that the
sample used in the analysis is around 20 years older than the average, less likely to have been
conscripted, and more likely to be out of the labor force. However, it is representative of the
population in terms of average household income, and schooling.
One of the advantages of the SOEP data is the availability of retrospective information in
the biographic questionnaire on pre-treatment individual characteristics. Table 9 presents this
information. I use questions on place of residence during childhood and parental education.
The variable on place of residence during childhood takes four values for: outside urban areas
(baseline category), small city, medium-sized city and big city. I recode the original variable
to obtain four binary variables to be included in the regressions as controls. This is to control
for potential unobservables that determine the probability of being conscripted based on the
place of residence. Similarly, including controls for parental education helps controlling for
socio-economic background of conscripts and non-conscripts.
The literature on conscription finds that pre-treatment socio-economic characteristics are
one of the key determinants of heterogeneous effects of service on wages (Card and Cardoso,
2012) and crime (Hjalmarsson and Lindquist, 2016). Hence, I include parental education to
both account for a direct effect of this variable on the probability of being conscripted (more
educated parents might decide to send their children to university, for example, or transmit
different political values), and to use education as a proxy of parental income. Since almost
the full sample has German parents, I exclude this control from the analysis. Although con-
trolling for these characteristics should account for unobservable and observable pre-treatment
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differences, it is worth commenting on the statistical significant differences in pre-treatment
characteristics.
I notice that there is a statistical significant difference in the probability of having lived
in a medium or big city. However, if there was an issue of selection such that men residing
in bigger urban areas (plausibly characterized by different civic and social values compared to
smaller cities), were less likely to be conscripted the sign of this difference would be negative
and increasing in magnitude for the binary variables SmallCity, MidCity and BigCity, but
this is not the case for the second. Similarly, I fail to detect a pattern suggesting selection into
treatment when looking at parental education. Moreover, the differences statistically different
from zero are of very small magnitude throughout column 5 in table 9.
The bottom part of table 9 shows the summary statistics for the outcome variables included
in the main analysis and in the robustness checks. It is worth noting that the proportion of
individuals that voted in the federal parliamentary elections of 2009 or in those of 2013 is very
high in the whole sample, with a turnout of 89 percent. This proportion is even higher among
the sample used in the analysis, plausibly showing a higher tendency for older generations to
go to vote. This high level of turnout should be kept in mind when interpreting the results and
when proposing policy implications, as there is limited scope to increase turnout further. The
sample sizes in the last line of table 9 are indicative. They correspond to the cross-sectional
sample of individuals for which information on month of birth and conscription is available.
However, the sample size will vary in the regression analysis depending on the outcome variable
analyzed, and on whether the panel component is used in the analysis.
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Table 9: Summary statistics of the sample individual characteristics for men only in Germany:
full sample, born 48 months before and after the cutoff, and by treatment status.
RD sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All +/-48 Months Treated Control Diff
Individual characteristics
Conscription 0.52 0.24 0.35 0.08 0.272 ***
Treated 0.89 0.59 1.00 0.00 1.000
Civil service 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.011
Age 51.83 71.44 69.96 73.60 -3.643 ***
Couple 0.70 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.009
Working 0.67 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.029 *
Homeowner 0.63 0.73 0.74 0.70 0.045 *
HH Income 7.97 7.81 7.81 7.80 0.014
No School cert. 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.007
Elementary 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.000
Higher 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 -0.001
Years Schooling 12.88 12.46 12.45 12.48 -0.026
Baseline characteristics
Residence in childhood
- Big city 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.30 -0.050 **
-Mid city 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.034 *
-Small city 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.21 -0.020
-Out city 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.036
Father's education:
- No School 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.002
- Secondary School 0.68 0.75 0.74 0.77 -0.035 ***
- Middle School 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.014
- Higher 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.013
Mother's education:
- No School 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.010
- Secondary School 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.80 -0.016
- Middle School 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.14 -0.015
- Higher 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.022 *
Father German citiz. 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.004
Mother German citiz. 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.98 -0.003
Outcome variables
Rightwing 0.31 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.044
Voted 0.89 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.001
CDU/CSU 0.44 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.003
SPD 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.36 -0.005
Volunteers 0.33 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.009
Local politics 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.010
N 11,137 1,312 533 779
Note: Summary statistics for the sample used in the main analysis. Column 1 presents the
mean value of each variable for the whole population. Column 2 presents the mean value of
each variable for the sample used in the analysis. Column 3 and 4 provide information for
the treated and control group. Treated is a binary variable equal to one if the individual is
eligible to be drafted in 1955. Column 5 presents the difference in means between the treated
and control average values.
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2.6 Results
This section presents the results of the analysis.
Before moving to the results of the estimation of the causal effect of conscription on political
attitudes, this section shows qualitative evidence of the correlation between conscription and
the outcomes of interest. This proves useful as these correlations differ consistently from the
estimated causal effects, which are then validated by a series of robustness checks. Following
from the results presented in this section, I conclude two things. First, that looking at simple
correlations produces biased results and misleading policy implications. Second, that I cannot
find statistical significant evidence of a causal effect of conscription on either political ideology
or voting participation.
Table 10 shows the results of a simple OLS regression of the binary variable, indicating
whether the individual was conscripted8, and the outcomes of interest. This naive regression
estimates the correlation between having been conscripted and all the outcome variables later
used in the analysis. The results presented in table 10 include all the controls used in the
analysis: year of survey, region of residence, age, marital status, homeownership status and
labor force status, and the baseline covariates controlling for place of residence during child-
hood and parental education. The regressions are run on the whole sample, regardless of the
year of birth, and show that conscripts are around 2 percentage points less likely to have more
right-wing political attitudes (column 1), and this is insensitive to trimming the outcome vari-
able at the top and bottom ten percent (column 3). Conscripts are also 2 percentage points
more likely to vote. However, there is no correlation between conscription and participating in
local politics (column 4), volunteering (column 5) or supporting the main political parties in
Germany (columns 6 and 7). Thus, by just looking at these correlation I might conclude that
conscription is effective, although this effect is small, in increasing civic engagement measured
with voting participation, while it does not increase the probability of being more right-wing.
I explore this second correlation further by looking at the different correlation between
mandatory military service and political attitudes, relative to civil service. Table 28, in Ap-
pendix 2, shows the correlation between having done military service as opposed to civil service
8In this case, since I am using the whole sample, individuals might have opted both for the military and
for the civil service.
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(around 20 percent of the full sample opted for civil service, see table 9). Alternative types
of service were available to conscientious objectors, mainly in the form of health-care sector
activities. However, the first conscientious objectors started service in 1961 (Bauer et al.,
2012). Thus, looking at heterogeneity by type of service is only possible in the correlation
analysis. The results in table 28, in Appendix 2, show that men who did the military service
are 15 percentage points more likely to have right-wing ideology and 14 percentage points
more likely to support the coalition of CDU/CSU relative to men who did the civil service,
suggesting that the average negative result of 2 percentage points reported in table 10 hides
an important heterogeneity between these two groups.
Although these correlations should be interpreted with care, they show a relationship be-
tween the type of service and political attitude. Relationship that might be present before the
treatment and hide selection issues, further undermining the correlations presented in table 10.
Following from this correlation analysis, I conclude two things. First, the correlation between
conscription and political outcomes differs by type of service, suggesting that the correlations
presented in table 10 might be affected by selection issues. Second, and more relevantly, these
correlations suggest a positive and statistical significant relationship with voting participation
and a negative relationship with right-wing ideology. I show in the remaining of this section
that such relationship are not causal and cannot be used to inform policy recommendations.
Table 10: Regression analysis of the correlations between conscription and political ideology,
party support and civic engagement measures in West Germany: full sample of men.
Rightwing Voted Rightwing: trim Local politics Volunteers CDU/CSU SPD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Conscription -0.025** 0.026*** -0.025** -0.008 -0.011 0.002 -0.018
( 0.011 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.009) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.015 ) (0.016 )
Year + Age Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 6115 4518 5262 5213 5226 3831 3831
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression. Rightwing is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
individual reports to have a political ideology more rightwing than the median. Voted is a binary variable equal to
1 if the individual voted in the last general election. Conscription is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual
was conscripted. All regressions include controls for: year of the survey, age and region of residence at the time
of the survey, marital status, labor force participation, years of schooling, place of residence during childhood and
parental education. SE clustered at month of birth
There are several reasons to move beyond these correlation analysis and explore the causal
65
estimates of conscription on political attitudes.
Conscription might not be randomly allocated across individuals, and this would produce
biased estimates of the effects of conscription on the political outcomes considered. Individuals
might be more likely to be conscripted based on pre-treatment socio-economic characteristics.
This would mean that the correlations presented in table 10 are biased and might be driven
by the correlation between pre-treatment characteristics (e.g. parental income), rather than
conscription, and political attitudes. Other observable and unobservable factors might be
correlated with a higher probability of been conscripted and with the outcome variables of
interest. To overcome these limitations, I estimate the effect of conscription on political
attitudes using the methodology outlined in section 2.4.
As standard in the regression discontinuity literature (Lee and Lemieux, 2010), I first
explore the tested hypotheses using graphical evidence. Figure 3 shows the jump in the
probability of being conscripted for men born right before and right after the reform. I
provide similar evidence for the main outcome variables, figure 4 shows the discontinuity in
right-wing ideology and voting participation for men affected by the reform compared to men
who were not. In both cases the jump in the probability is positive, confirming the correlation
analysis and the hypothesis put forward by policy-makers for which conscription increases civic
engagement, and by political scientists for which it also increases the probability of having
right-wing ideology.
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Figure 4: Discontinuity in the outcome variables by month of birth for men born within the




Table 11: The effect of conscription on right-wing ideology in West Germany: main results
estimated using non parametric and parametric methods.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FS RF FS RF FS RF
SS SS SS
Panel A: Non-Parametric
Treated 0.224 *** 0.045 0.217 *** 0.047 0.196 *** 0.038
( 0.060) ( 0.055) ( 0.059) ( 0.055) ( 0.054) ( 0.055)
Conscription 0.203 0.216 0.216
( 0.245) ( 0.252) ( 0.275)
Year+ Age N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N Y Y
Bandwidth 50.5 49.1 60.2
N 7397 7397 6104
N Eff. obs. 867 849 936
Panel B: Parametric with interactions
Treated 0.198 *** 0.010 0.195 *** 0.004 0.189 *** 0.015
( 0.055) ( 0.059) ( 0.053) ( 0.058) ( 0.054) ( 0.064)
Conscription 0.048 0.021 0.021
( 0.293) ( 0.294) ( 0.330)
Year+ Age N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N Y Y
Window 48 months 48 months 48 months
Pol. Order 1 1 1
F-Stat 12.7 13.7 12.1
N 829 829 756
Treated 0.272 *** 0.114 0.267 *** 0.110 0.258 *** 0.090
( 0.083) ( 0.074) ( 0.080) ( 0.076) ( 0.081) ( 0.084)
Conscription 0.419 0.411 0.411
( 0.286) ( 0.296) ( 0.324)
Year+ Age N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N Y Y
Window 48 months 48 months 48 months
Pol. Order 2 2 2
F-Stat 10.9 11.1 10.2
N 829 829 756
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression. Rightwing is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
individual reports to have a political ideology more rightwing than the median. Treated is a binary equal to 1 if
the individual was born after the introduction of mandatory conscription, i.e. in or after July 1937. Conscription
is the predicted probability of having done military service estimated from the FS regression. Panel A presents the
coefficients of the estimation with non-parametric methods around the optimal bandwidth (Calonico et al. 2014).
Panebl B presents the coefficients of the parametric estimation with interactions of the running variable before and
after the cutoff date. All regressions include controls for: year of the survey, age and region of residence at the
time of the survey, marital status, labor force participation, years of schooling, place of residence during childhood
and parental education. Regressions include interacted second order polynomials of the running variable (month of
birth). Standard errors are clustered at the month of birth.
Table 11 shows the results of the estimation of the effect of conscription on the probability
of having more right-wing political ideology than the median. The results are presented as
follows. Column 1 and 2 present the results when no additional controls are included in the
regression. Columns 3 and 4 include controls for year of the survey and age. Columns 5 and
6, show the preferred specification and includes the full set of controls outlined in section 2.5.
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Standard errors are clustered at the month of birth.
Panel A in table 11 shows the results of the estimation of equations 9, 10 and 11 using
non-parametric techniques for the optimal bandwidth around the cutoff as in Calonico et al.
(2014b). The odd-numbered columns in the top line show estimates for the first stage equa-
tions. These show that individuals born after the introduction of conscription are around 21
percentage points (with estimates ranging from 18.9 to 22.4 percentage points) more likely to
have been conscripted compared to men born before the change in reform. These results are
calculated for an optimal bandwidth of 49 to 60 months9 before and after the cutoff date, and
remain stable across the different specifications. The reduced form shows that the effect of the
reform on right-wing ideology is of around 4 percentage points and not statistically different
from zero. The second row of Panel A shows the results of interest, i.e. the effect of conscrip-
tion on right-wing ideology. Here Conscription is the predicted probability of having been
conscripted instrumented with the treatment binary variable being equal to 1 if the individual
was born in or after the 1st July 1937. The effect is positive and of around 21 percentage
points, but not statistically different from zero.
Panel B in table 11 shows the results of the estimation of equations 9,10 and 11 using para-
metric techniques for the optimal bandwidth around the cutoff date. To ensure comparability
and consistency throughout the estimations of this analysis, the bandwidth of the parametric
estimation is approximated to 48 months before and after the reform was implemented. The
treatment group is thus men born 48 months after the 30th June 1937, while the control group
are men in the 48 months before the reform. The parametric estimation is run using linear
(first set of results in Panel B) and quadratic (second set of results in Panel B) polynomials
of the running variable, i.e. age at the time of the reform measured in months.
The first row of Panel B in table 11 shows that the first stage estimates are in line with
those found in the non-parametric analysis. The effect of the reform was to increase the
probability of having been conscripted by 19 percentage points for men in the treatment
group. The second stage estimates are presented in the following line and show that the
effect of conscription on right-wing ideology is positive and non statistically significant. The
magnitude of these effects varies in the two specifications but bounces around the average of 21
9The width of the bandwidth changes as I include more control variables in the estimation.
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percentage points estimated in the non-parametric analysis. In particular, when using linear
function of the month of birth the effect is an increase of between 2 and 4.8 percentage points
in the probability of being right-wing, while it jumps to 41 percentage points when including
quadratic polynomials.
Overall, the results for right-wing ideology show a positive but not statistically significant
effect of conscription. The magnitude of the coefficients is estimated to be of around 20
percentage points. However, the estimation of the coefficient is not precise and shows very large
confidence intervals. This issue is recurrent throughout the analysis, however, the estimates
on rightwing ideology presented in table 11are those presenting a higher variation in the
magnitude of the coefficients and in the standard errors. I will partly address this issue in the
next section when presenting the robustness checks of this analysis. There I will be able to
rule out that the effects are as high as those presented in panel B, but I will face similar issues
in terms of interpretation of the magnitude and sign of the effect. Given the strong and stable
first-stage results and the robustness checks conducted in the following section, I conclude
that this is plausibly indicating the absence of a consistent effect of conscription on right-wing
ideology. Thus, the policy recommendation that can be drawn from these results is not as clear
as if I could estimate a precise coefficient of a zero effect. However, given the costs associated
with this policy, basing its re-introduction on an imprecisely estimated positive effect would
come with a high risk of the policy to be ineffective. This same reasoning should be kept in
mind also when interpreting the results on voting participation. In fact, although the range
around the coefficients is narrower, the estimated effects could also be negative suggesting that
conscription might reduce the probability of going to vote.
Table 12 shows the results of the analysis on the effect of conscription on voting partici-
pation in the general elections of 2009 and 2013. The outcome variable is a binary variable
equal to 1 if the individual reports to have voted either in 2009 or in 2013. Column 1 and 2
present the results when no additional controls are included in the regression, columns 3 and 4
include controls for year of the survey and columns 5 and 6 include controls for year of survey
and age of the individual at the time of the survey. Panel A presents the results estimated
with non-parametric methods, while Panel B presents the parametric specification using, first,
linear and, second, quadratic interacted polynomials of the running variable.
70
Table 12: The effect of conscription on voting participation in West Germany: main results
estimated using non parametric and parametric methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FS RF FS RF FS RF
SS SS SS
Panel A: Non-Parametric
Treated 0.334 *** 0.040 0.292 *** 0.044 0.282 *** 0.036
( 0.070) ( 0.045) ( 0.062) ( 0.039) ( 0.063) ( 0.035)
Conscription 0.106 0.135 0.135
( 0.124) ( 0.125) ( 0.115)
Year+Age N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N Y Y
Bandwidth 47.7 59.5 58.1
N 5385 5385 4514
N Eff. obs. 605 742 666
Panel B: Parametric with interactions
Treated 0.283 *** 0.041 0.281 *** 0.034 0.265 *** 0.052
( 0.065) ( 0.040) ( 0.062) ( 0.039) ( 0.063) ( 0.038)
Conscription 0.139 0.160 0.160
( 0.133) ( 0.135) ( 0.126)
Year+Age N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N Y Y
Window 48 months 48 months 48 months
Pol. Order 1 1 1
F-Stat 21.1 24.1 22.4
N 609 609 559
Treated 0.411 *** 0.047 0.408 *** 0.064 0.382 *** 0.070
( 0.092) ( 0.063) ( 0.089) ( 0.062) ( 0.089) ( 0.062)
Conscription 0.074 0.092 0.046
( 0.134) ( 0.136) ( 0.130)
Year+Age N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N Y Y
Window 48 months 48 months 48 months
Pol. Order 2 2 2
F-Stat 23.6 25.8 23.0
N 610 610 560
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression. Voted is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual
reports to have voted in the 2009 and 2013 elections. Treated is a binary equal to 1 if the individual was born after the
introduction of mandatory conscription, i.e. in or after July 1937. Conscription is the predicted probability of having
done military service estimated from the FS regression. Panel A presents the coefficients of the estimation with
non-parametric methods around the optimal bandwidth (Calonico et al. 2014). Panebl B presents the coefficients of
the parametric estimation with interactions of the running variable before and after the cutoff date. All regressions
include controls for: year of the survey, age and region of residence at the time of the survey, marital status, labor
force participation, years of schooling, place of residence during childhood and parental education. Regressions
include interacted second order polynomials of the running variable (month of birth). Standard errors are clustered
at the month of birth.
Panel A in table 12 shows the results obtained when using non-parametric techniques for
the optimal bandwidth around the cutoff. These show that the effect of conscription on voting
participation is not statistically significant, but positive and robust to the inclusion of controls
for year of survey and age of the respondent. The results of the first stage show a stronger
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effect of the reform for the sample used in this analysis10. The effect of the reform is an
increase in the probability of having been conscripted of around 30 percentage points for men
in the treatment group compared to men in the control group.
The optimal bandwidth when no additional controls are included is of 47.7 months, but
it increases to 58 when adding the full set of controls. This happens because information on
some of the covariates is missing and the drop in sample size makes it so that, when using non-
parametric techniques, the bandwidth needed to estimate the coefficients becomes larger. The
second stage estimates remain stable across the different specifications and show a statistically
insignificant increase in the probability of having voted for men born after the introduction of
conscription. The sign of the coefficient is positive and of around 12 percentage points (with
coefficients ranging from 10.6 to 13.5 percentage points) across the different specifications for
the treated, but again this effect is not statistically different from zero.
Panel B shows that the results obtained when using linear and quadratic parametric speci-
fications are consistent with the ones of the non-parametric analysis. The effect of conscription
is positive and between 7 and 13 percentage points on average when no controls are included
in the estimation, but not statistically different from zero. It is worth noting that including
the full set of controls in the regressions does not change the estimated coefficients by signifi-
cant amounts, pointing to the fact that no other factors affect either the probability of being
conscripted nor the outcomes of interest.
As for the estimates presented in table 11, the results presented in table 12 show very large
confidence intervals. Differently from the former, however, the results for voting participation
estimated with non-parametric and linear specifications show that the effect is surely positive
or very close to zero. When using quadratic polynomials of the running variable the coefficients
decrease in magnitude, but still show large standard errors possibly hiding a negative effect,
but still with a magnitude closer to zero. Overall, the estimated effect of conscription on
voting participation ranges from a negative effect of 8 percentage points to an increase of
28 percentage points. These estimates show less variation compared to those on right-wing
ideology (ranging from -0.30 to 0.69 percentage points), but again do not allow me to identify
10Notice that the difference in the first-stage estimates depends on the fact that voting participation ques-
tions are asked in less waves and that the sample size is smaller than the one used in the analysis for right-wing
ideology.
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whether the effect of the policy is zero.
To conclude, the analysis presented so far does not corroborate the hypothesis that con-
scription has long-term effects on voting participation or right-wing ideology. Although the
results on voting participation show a positive effect, this is not statistically different from
zero. Hence, policies aimed at re-introducing conscription with the motivation of increasing
civic engagement of citizens are not backed up by these empirical findings. At the same time,
these findings do not show a change in political ideology. Although all of the estimates suffer
from the limitation of being imprecisely estimated, they rule out that conscription has a sig-
nificant and clear-cut effect on political attitudes, which is what would be needed to motivate
costly policies aimed at bringing conscription back.
2.7 Robustness checks
I carry out three robustness checks to test the validity of the main results.
First, table 29 (Appendix 2), shows results for different measures of civic engagement
and political ideology. Columns 1 and 2 show the results when using the original variable of
political ideology as an outcome, i.e. a discrete variable on a scale from one (extreme left)
to ten (extreme right). The results are consistent with those of the main estimation and
find that conscription increases the probability of having more right-wing ideology, but the
coefficients are not statistically different from zero. It should also be noted that the results
of this specification help shedding light on the direction of the effect. In fact, although still
imprecisely estimated, the standard errors for the coefficient of the second stage are smaller
than the coefficient itself pointing to either an estimate very close to zero or to a positive effect
of around 1.4 units in the ideology scale. Columns 3 and 4 show the results for right-wing
ideology when the top and bottom 10 percent of the political attitudes scale are trimmed. I
conduct this second test to check whether the results are biased by the presence of outliers.
The results show similar magnitude (between 22 and 32 percentage points on average) and
sign of the coefficients as those presented in table 11. Conscription has a positive effect on
having more right-wing ideology, but the effect is not statistically significant. The remaining
of the results presented in table 29 investigate whether different types of civic engagement,
other than voting participation, might be positively affected by conscription. Columns 5 and 6
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show that men born in the 48 months after the introduction of conscription are not more likely
to participate in local politics. This effect is not statistically significant and, if something, it
has a negative sign. Columns 7 and 8 do corroborate the absence of statistically significant
effects when looking at whether individuals participate in volunteering activities.
I then look at support for the two main political parties in Germany. Table 30 (Appendix
2), shows the results for political party supported. These show that conscription does no
change the probability of supporting either SPD or the CDU/CSU coalition. These results
show that there is no effect of conscription on other measures of political engagement. The
robustness checks conducted so far show that the effect of conscription is not only statistically
insignificant when looking at voting participation and ideology, but also when looking at
different outcomes and when increasing the sample size to gain power in the estimation.
Second, I address possible issues in the estimation of the main results. The coefficients in
table 11, for example, bounce around the average effect of 21 percentage points depending on
the functional form used in the parametric estimation, suggesting an imprecise estimation of
the second stage regression once higher-order polynomials are used in the regression. One of
the possible limitations behind these results is that the sample size for the optimal bandwidth
is too small and I do not have enough power to estimate the coefficients precisely11. To
overcome this limitation, I conduct two robustness checks.
First, the results presented in table 31 (Appendix 2), keep the panel-component of the
SOEP sample, i.e. repeated observations for the sample of men for which information on
conscription and month of birth is available. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), the use of
panel data as pooled cross-section is correct provided that within-individual correlations are
accounted for with individual-level clustered standard errors. Hence, this is the approach
followed to estimate these results.
Columns 1-4 in table 31 present the estimation for right-wing ideology and columns 5-8
the results for voting participation. All the regressions control for year of the survey, and the
specifications in columns 3,4,7 and 8 include controls for age of the individual at the time of the
survey. The findings remain in line with those of the main analysis. However, the magnitude of
11It should be noted, however, that this is possibly driven by the absence of a clear effect of this policy, rather
than a problem with the data or the estimation as the estimation of the first stage is consistent throughout
the different models and show a strong internal validity of the instrument used.
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the coefficients for right-wing ideology is much smaller and comparable in the non-parametric
(Panel A) and parametric (Panel B) specification. These results still show a positive and non
statistically significant effect on right-wing ideology, but the magnitude of the effect is between
4 and 14 percentage points for men born after the introduction of conscription. These results
address the variation in the magnitude of the second-stage regressions coefficients presented in
panel B of table 11. However, the confidence intervals around these coefficients remains very
large and spanning from a negative effect of -26 to a positive effect of 50 percentage points.
The coefficients for voting participation remain of the same sign and magnitude as those
presented in the main analysis and, although remaining imprecisely estimated, continue to
show narrower confidence intervals (with an effect estimated to be positive or very close to
zero). Column 6 in table 31 shows that, when controlling for year of survey and age, con-
scription increases voting participation of 18 percentage points on average and this result is
statistically significant at the 10 percent. However, this result is not robust when including
the whole set of controls nor when using parametric methods in the estimation, suggesting
that the statistical significance of one coefficient is not enough to provide clear evidence of the
effectiveness of conscription.
Second, I reduce the bandwidth around the cutoff to 36 months. The regressions are
estimated using linear interacted polynomials of the month of birth. Table 32 (Appendix
2) shows that the results hold when estimating the effect of conscription on ideology and
voting participation on men born within the 36 months after the introduction of conscription
compared to men born in the 36 months before. Moreover, the coefficients estimated using
this bandwidth are more precisely estimated and allow me to say something more on the upper
and lower bounds of the effects, especially for right-wing ideology. Columns 2 and 4 in table
32 show that the effect of conscription on right-wing ideology and voting participation is either
positive or very close to zero even if imprecisely estimated. The more controls are added in the
estimation the wider the confidence intervals around the coefficients, but looking at the results
of the simpler models allows me to be more confident on the sign of the estimated effects.
Lastly, I check that the policy was binding and there are no other jumps in the probability
of been conscripted away from the cutoff. Following from the graphical evidence presented in
figure 15 (Appendix 2) the results confirm the absence of anticipation or delays in the imple-
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mentation of the reform. This is important as, for example, if a delay in the implementation
of the reform is correlated with individual characteristics, e.g. less right-wing individuals were
more likely to postpone their conscription, the estimates might be biased. Table 33 shows
the results of the estimations when the cutoff date is postponed to 12 months after the actual
introduction of conscription. I define a placebo treatment equal to one if the individual was
born after July 1938 and equal to zero otherwise. The results of the first stage estimation
show that there are no jumps in the probability of having been conscripted if the cutoff is set
to a different date.
To conclude, I do not find evidence of delays in the implementation of the reform when
looking at jumps in the probability of being conscripted away from the cutoff. Moreover,
restricting the bandwidth around the cutoff does not affect the results presented in the main
analysis. I now conduct a final check of the results that provides evidence of the external
validity of this analysis.
2.7.1 Spain
This section completes the analysis on the effect of conscription on political attitudes by
implementing the same methodology used so far in a different context and using a different
dataset. I do this evaluating the effect of the abolition of conscription in Spain. This allows
me to show the external validity of the results presented so far, as well as to show shorter-term
effects of conscription and to explore the effect of conscription on the formation of Spanish
national identity.
I start by outlining the details of the reform used in the analysis, which mirrors the one
used in the analysis for Germany. After the end of Franco's regime in 1975, Spain incorpo-
rated several changes to conscription both in terms of the duration of the service and in the
introduction of alternative forms of service for conscientious objectors. The topic of abolishing
conscription was particularly debated in the country, as in all Western Europe, after the end of
the Cold War. In 1991, the Netherlands were the first country to abolish conscription, followed
by Belgium, France and in the same year, Spain. In 1996, the newly elected prime minister
Jose Maria Aznar (Partido Popular) announced that the military forces of the country will
move to a fully voluntary basis armed force. Thus, although the reform was fully enacted
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and passed as law in 2002, men turning eighteen in 1997 were not obliged to be drafted. Al-
though, there was the possibility of delaying the military service for reasons of study or to
have an exemption, the data used in the analysis allow to conduct placebo analysis to control
for anticipation or delays in the implementation of the reform.
The analysis on Spain uses data collected by the Center for Sociological Research (CIS-
Centro Investigaciones Sociologicas) in the survey on National Defense and the Armed Forces
(Defensa Nacional y de las Fuerzas Armadas). The survey was conducted in eleven years in
the period of time between 1997 and 2015. The full dataset is composed of repeated cross-
sectional data representative at the national level and collecting information for approximately
2500 men and women in each wave. I use half of this sample as conscription was mandatory
only for men. The objective of the survey was to assess the attitudes and opinions of the
Spanish population towards the Armed Forces and the national military service. Of interest
for this research is the fact that the survey asks all respondents whether they completed the
military service.
The sample with information on military service is of 11,333 men who were at least eighteen
at the time of the survey. The variable measuring military service is equal to one if the
individual reports to have done or be doing the military service. Notice that while in the
1997-2000 waves the question asked was Did you do the mandatory military service?, from
2005 the question asks What is your relationship with the Armed Forces? and the military
service variable is equal to one if the individual reports I did the mandatory military service.
The outcome variables of interest are asked yearly in the Spanish survey and are very
similar to the German counterpart. This allows to construct comparable measures of right-
wing ideology and voting participation to the ones used so far. In fact, the survey asks each
individual When talking about politics, usually terms like right and left-wing are used. You
can find a scale from zero to ten below, where would you place your political views, the
individual can then choose a value from 1 Left to 10 Right. In the analysis the variable
Rightwing is transformed to be equal to 1 if the individual has right-wing views above the
median and zero otherwise. The question on voting participation asks Did you vote in the past
general election?, the variable used in the analysis is equal to one if the individual reported
to have gone to vote and zero otherwise, missing values are attributed to men who report to
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have been too young to vote at the moment of election.
Additionally, the questionnaire asked in 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015 whether the individual
Which of these sentences better expresses your feeling? (1) I feel only Spanish, (2) I feel more
Spanish thanx, (3) I feel as Spanish as x, I feel more x than Spanish, I feel only as x. where
x identifies the regional origin of the surveyed, e.g. Catalan if the individual reports to be
form Catalonia. I follow Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) and define a variable for Spanish
Identity to be equal to one if the individual chooses options (1) to (3) from the ones listed
above, and zero otherwise.
In the empirical analysis, I use this reform to estimate the probability of having been
conscripted for men turning eighteen right before and right after the reform. In particular, I
define as my treatment group men born in or after 1979 and turning eighteen in 1997, when
the suspension of conscription was enacted, and no longer eligible for conscription. When
estimating the first-stage equation (using equation 9), Treatedi in the Spanish analysis is a
binary variable equal to one if the individual was born in or after 1979 and zero if born before
that year. The sign of α1 is expected to be negative in this second case, indicating a decrease
in the probability of having been conscripted as a result of the reform.
In line with this prediction, figure 5shows the discontinuity in the probability of doing
military service for men born before and after the cutoff date. I provide further evidence of
the internal validity of the identification strategy in figures 16 (McCrary test) and 17 (change
in cutoff year) in Appendix 2. The main difference with the main analysis is that the CIS data
provide information of individual date of birth only measured in years. Thus, the analysis is
performed only using parametric methods with interactions of the linear function of year of
birth before and after the reform. This is because in absence of information at the month of
birth, using non-parametric estimation is likely to produce biased estimates as it needs to use
a wider bandwidth around the cutoff to include more point estimates in the regression (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010).
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Figure 5: Discontinuity in the probability of having been conscripted by month of birth for
men born 4 years before and after the abolition of conscription in Spain
Table 13 presents the summary statistics for the Spanish data.
The first two columns present information on the whole sample of men for which military
service information is available. The last two columns contain information for the sample used
in the analysis and born in the four years before and in the four years after the abolition of
military service (i.e. born between 1975 and 1982). These statistics show that the sample in
the analysis is younger than the rest of the population, and that 44 percent of those in the
sample of analysis were born after the change of reform. They are less likely to be right-wing,
less likely to identify with Spain and less likely to have voted. Additionally, they are more
educated than average for the whole population.
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Table 13: Summary statistics of the individual characteristic in Spain: full sample of men and
sample used in RD estimation.
All RD sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd mean sd
Conscription 0.58 0.49 0.28 0.45
Born Post 1979 0.19 0.39 0.44 0.50
Age 43.94 18.07 26.43 6.20
Ideology (1left-10right) 4.74 1.92 4.56 1.86
Rightwing 1/0 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.50
National identity (1-5) 3.22 1.07 3.06 1.06
Spanish Identity 0.82 0.39 0.77 0.42
Voted in last GE 0.81 0.39 0.72 0.45
No education 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.05
Primary edu 0.30 0.46 0.14 0.34
Secondary edu 0.42 0.49 0.63 0.48
University degree 0.21 0.40 0.23 0.42
Unemployed 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.38
N 11333 11333 2211 2211
Note: Summary statistics of individual characteristics. Data from the CIS survey on National Defence and Armed
forces. Columns 1 and 2 show the summary statistics for the whole sample. Columns 3 and 4 show the summary
statistics for the sample used in the analysis.
As in the main analysis, I provide graphical evidence of the discontinuity in the probability
of having more right-wing ideology and of having voted in general elections (figure 18 in
Appendix 2). The graphical evidence is in line with the causal effects identified in the regression
analysis. Table 14 shows the results of this analysis and estimates equations 9-11 using Spanish
data. Panel A in table 14 shows the results obtained when no controls are included in the
analysis, while Panel B includes controls for year of the survey. All estimations are run using
parametric methods and linear polynomial functions of the running variable interacted with
the treatment dummy to allow for a change in slope of the function.
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Table 14: The effect of mandatory conscription on voting participation, right-wing ideology
and Spanish identity: linear parametric estimation with interactions.
Voted in GE Righwing Spanish Identity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FS RF FS RF FS RF
SS SS SS
Panel A
Treated -0.222 ** 0.033 -0.164 *** 0.032 -0.164 *** 0.024
( 0.064) ( 0.022) ( 0.046) ( 0.035) (0.040) ( 0.125)
Conscription -0.128 ** -0.182 -0.263
( 0.056) ( 0.146) ( 1.048)
Controls No No No No No No
Panel B
Treated -0.167 *** 0.007 -0.167 *** 0.034 -0.167 *** 0.014
( 0.047) ( 0.027) ( 0.047) ( 0.036) (0.047) ( 0.127)
Conscription -0.028 -0.192 -0.159
( 0.097) ( 0.144) ( 1.204)
Controls Year Year Year Year Year Year
Window 4 Years 4 Years 4 Years
Pol. Order 1 1 1
N 1684 1695 720
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression. Treated is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
individual was born in or after 1979 and turned 18 in the year of abolition of mandatory conscription in Spain.
Conscription is the predicted probability of having done military service estimated from the FS regression. Voted
in GE is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual states to have voted in the last general election. Rightwing is
a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual reports to have a political ideology more rightwing than the median.
Spanish Identity is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual reports to feel more identified with Spain than
with his region of origin. Panel A shows the results of the estimation when no controls are included, while panel
B includes controls for year of the survey. All regressions are run using parametric methods and interacted linear
function of the running variable, i.e. year of birth. Standard errors are clustered at the running variable level
Columns 1 and 2 in table 14 show the results for voting participation. The first stage and
reduced form equation results are reported in the first row. The first-stage results show that
men in the treatment group are on average 16 percentage points less likely12 to have been
conscripted relative to men born in the four years before the change in reform (column 1).
The results of the second stage regression are presented in the second row of column 2. They
show that the abolition of conscription decreases by 12 percentage points the probability of
having voted in the last general election. The coefficient on voting participation has similar
sign and magnitude compare to the German analysis. In Panel A the coefficient for voting
12Notice that the sign of the coefficients in the first-stage regressions is now negative as I am evaluating
the probability of having been conscripted after the abolition of conscription, as opposed to the German case
where I exploit the variation in this probability caused by the introduction of military service.
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participation is significant at the 5 percent level. However when controlling for year of the
survey this significance disappears and the magnitude of the coefficients drops to 2 percentage
points, but remains negative. Columns 3 and 4 in table 14 show the results for right-wing
ideology. These coefficients have the same sign and magnitude of those presented in the main
analysis. In fact, the abolition of conscription decreases by 18 percentage points the probability
of having right-wing ideology above the median.
Lastly, columns 5 and 6 show novel evidence of the effect of conscription on Spanish
identity. These results indicate that conscription has a positive effect (of between 15.9 and
26.3 percentage points) on the probability of feeling identified with Spain, but again the effect
is not statistically different from zero. The negative sign of the effect of the abolition of
conscription, however, is in line with the hypothesis that conscription might reinforce national
identity.
2.8 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effect of conscription on political ideology, voting participation and
national identity.
Following from a renewed policy interest in re-introducing conscription, the aim of this
paper is to provide rigorous empirical evidence of the causal effect of conscription in changing
political attitudes and national identity. This analysis aims at informing policy makers that
propose such reform as a way to promote civic duty and national cohesion among the youth.
The economic costs of conscription are non-negligible and a large literature identifies both
public and private costs associated with peace- and war-time conscription. In light of these
costs, this paper aims at evaluating the effectiveness of conscription in achieving its proposed
goal.
The analysis is conducted using a regression discontinuity design. Using individual level
data from West Germany (and Spain), it exploit the introduction (and abolition) of conscrip-
tion as an exogenous shock to the probability of being conscripted for men turning eighteen
right before and right after this change in reform. I use this exogenous shock to evaluate the
causal treatment effect of conscription on a series of outcomes measuring political ideology
and voting participation. In the main analysis, I use the introduction of conscription in West
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Germany in 1955 to define the treatment group as men born in or after the 1 July 1937 and
turning eighteen at the time of the reform, and the control group as men born before this
cutoff date. Restricting the analysis to cohorts born in the 48 month before and after this
cutoff, I obtain comparable treatment and control groups and evaluate the long-term effect of
conscription on political ideology and voting participation.
The key findings are that conscription does not affect political ideology nor voting partic-
ipation. The effect on right-wing ideology is positive, as well the one on the probability of
having voted in parliamentary elections. However, these effects are not statistically different
from zero and the coefficients are imprecisely estimated. These findings are robust to a se-
ries of robustness checks, including performing the analysis on the effect of the abolition of
conscription in Spain on similar outcomes. Exploiting the abolition of conscription in 1997, I
compare men turning eighteen in that year (and no longer eligible to be conscripted) to men
turning eighteen right before the cutoff year to evaluate the treatment effect of conscription
on ideology, voting and national identity. I find similar results to those presented in the main
analysis for right-wing ideology and voting participation. I also find a positive and statistically
insignificant effect of conscription on Spanish identity.
Before concluding, I would like to draw the attention of the reader to the main limitation
of this empirical analysis. This is the estimation of the second stage coefficients measuring the
effect of conscription on the outcomes of interest. In most estimations the coefficients show
large confidence intervals leading to an imprecise estimation of the effects and in some speci-
fication to an ambiguity regarding the sign and the magnitude of the effects. The coefficients
showing the highest variation are those presented in the most demanding specifications pre-
sented in the main analysis and, especially, the estimates on rightwing ideology. I address part
of this issue in section 2.7 when presenting the robustness checks. In particular, restricting
the bandwidth closer to the cutoff date and using only linear polynomials in the estimation
allows me to restrict the lower and upper bounds of the effect to be very close to zero and
positive, rather than ranging from a negative to a positive effect. Still, the effects estimated
in this analysis do not allow me to say that the policy has no effect on the outcomes con-
sidered, rather that this effect cannot be precisely estimated. Oppositely, the estimation of
the first stage and of the validity of the instrument is very strong and consistently estimated
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throughout the analysis leading me to conclude that this issue is not driven by data issues
or by lack of statistical power. The consequence of the lack of precision in the estimation of
the second-stage coefficients affects the type of policy recommendation we can put forward
from this analysis. In fact, I am only able to say that the policy does not have a statistically
significant effect rather than this effect is equal to zero.
To conclude, I do not find statistical significant evidence of a causal effect of conscription
on the formation of political preferences nor on voting participation. Although some of the
mechanisms suggested by the literature and by policy-makers are corroborated by the sign
of the effects, none of these is statistically different from zero nor precisely estimated to have
positive effects. Hence, given the costs involved with conscription, both in terms of government
spending and in terms of individual labor outcomes|, this paper does not find evidence proving
the effectiveness of conscription in shaping individual civic participation. Thus, based on
these findings, I would not be able to recommend the re-introduction of conscription as a
cost-effective policy to achieve this goal.
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3 The effect of migration on household consumption: evidence
from rural Ethiopia.
3.1 Introduction
Migration is at the center of the political and development agenda for the coming decade
(Sustainable Development Goals 2030, see here). The latest UN estimates show that there
are around 272 million international migrants in the world, with around 40 percent of them
migrating in the global South (UNPD 2019, see here). Moreover, these numbers do not
include internal migrants, more difficult to count, and estimated to be three times as much
when using a conservative estimate (Skeldon, 2018). Most migration, especially in the form
of labor mobility of the poor, takes place within and between developing countries (Mendola,
2012). This is also true in African countries, simultaneously serving as source and hosts to
large shares of migrants (Lucas, 2006).
Individuals migrate to improve their economic condition, moving to a location where they
expect to receive higher incomes (Harris and Todaro, 1970) and to countries where they can
have better economic opportunities (Borjas, 1989). However, migrant's income maximization
motives are not enough to explain the decision to migrate and do not account for the effects of
migration on migrant-sending households. In fact, as migrants continue to send remittances
back home for extended periods of time after they move, a large literature investigates the
direct and indirect effects that this income channel has on origin household welfare (Mendola,
2012).
Seminal work in this field (Stark and Bloom, 1985) has led to developing The New Eco-
nomics of Labor Migration, which focuses on the role played by origin households in the
decision of one of their members to migrate and highlights the role of migration as a way
for the migrant-sending household to better manage risk, diversify income and alleviate liq-
uidity constraints. These positive effects on origin household welfare are often linked to the
inflow of remittances sent back home by migrants (Stark and Levhari, 1982). In rural con-
texts, receiving remittances might reduce poverty as it allows the household to insure itself
against the risky nature of agricultural production (Rosenzweig, 1988; Yang and Choi, 2007)
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by both increasing household liquidity (Katz and Stark, 1986; Yang and Martinez, 2006) and
by increasing household's productive investments (Yang, 2008).
Empirical research shows evidence in line with these predictions and calculates the welfare
gains from migration to be considerably larger than other development interventions (Clemens
and Ogden, 2014), with direct positive effects on origin household's income and consumption
(Gibson and McKenzie, 2014, Bryan et al., 2014), human capital investment and savings (Yang,
2008; Clemens and Tiongson, 2017). Moreover, migration can have effects on the household
welfare that work beyond the income channel, e.g. transmission of social norms and of health
practices (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007;Sasin and McKenzie, 2007; Clemens et al., 2014). A
large part of this empirical literature focuses on the effect of migration on migrant's welfare,
on economic outcomes in host countries and on the effects of international migration (Clemens
et al.), with several studies looking at the consequences of migratory flows from Mexico to the
U.S. (Mendola, 2012). Less is known on the effects of migration, and in particular internal
migration, on origin households in developing countries (Klugman, 2009). This paper aims at
contributing to this literature by providing evidence of the effect of migration on household
consumption in rural Ethiopia.
The existing empirical evidence on Ethiopia confirms that migration has been effective in
increasing migrant's welfare and in reducing poverty (de Brauw et al., 2017; Blunch and Lader-
chi, 2015). This is of particular relevance as Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the
world, with most of its poorer population living in rural areas. However, and notwithstanding
these positive effects, the migration rate in Ethiopia is considerably lower than in the rest of
the region (De Brauw and Mueller, 2012). To explain this, de Brauw et al. (2017) conclude
that leaving one's household is particularly costly in this context and that this prevents larger
shares of households to have access to migration (Kosec et al., 2017; De Brauw and Mueller,
2012). Reforms aimed at lowering such costs might allow more households to invest in mi-
gration as a income diversification strategy (Clemens, 2010). Moreover, to the best of this
author's knowledge the literature on migration in Ethiopia investigates the effect of migration
on migrant's welfare (de Brauw et al., 2017), its relationship with land availability and youth
unemployment (De Brauw and Mueller, 2012; Mueller et al., 2018), but little is known on the
direct effect of migration on household welfare. This paper aims at contributing to this gap
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in the literature.
The analysis uses panel data for 1200 households in the Amhara, Oromyia, Tigray and
SNNP regions of Ethiopia between 2014 and 2018. By using variation over time and a rich
set of covariates, I investigate the effect of having at least one migrant in the household
on total, food and non-food consumption. The definition of migration used in the analysis
follows from the challenges in measuring this phenomenon. In fact, households might have
very different migration experiences, each producing different effects on consumption: e.g.
households might have more than one migrant, have migrants returning to the household
between waves, have only international or both internal and international migrants etc.. To
summarize this information in a more generalized measure, I define the treatment to be whether
the household has at least one migrant away.
As the data show enough variation over time in this migration status and the attrition rate
in the panel is very low, I conduct the analysis separately for households treated in both waves
or in just one period and compare them to households that never had a migrant. This allows
me, first, to reduce the heterogeneity in the treatment group, and, second, to show evidence
on the effects of migration on consumption for three types of households: households with at
least a migrant in both waves, with a migrant only in 2014 and with a migrant only in 2018.
This strategy partly overcomes the initial loss of information of defining migration using a
more generalized measure, as it allows me to partly capture the effect of different migration
experiences.
I find that having at least one migrant away affects household food and non-food consump-
tion. I find that household per capita consumption decreases by around 20 percentage points
for households treated in both waves and for those treated only at follow-up when compared
to households that never had a migrant. I also find that overall household-level consumption
increases for these two groups. An increase in household size, number of adults and number
of men emerges as a possible explanation of these results. This finding is in line with previous
empirical evidence from Ethiopia showing that it is usually more productive and young head
of household's children who migrate. This leads to a change in the household composition and
a change in the distribution of labor supply within the origin household (Mueller et al., 2018).
I combine this explanation with additional qualitative evidence on the changes in mi-
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grant's destination and in the flow of remittances sent back home. In particular, I present
qualitative evidence showing a decrease in international migration, in the number of migrants
away from the household and in the probability that the household receives remittances and
goods. This evidence might offer an additional explanation for the negative effect on per
capita consumption. In particular, all these mechanisms might reduce the amount of remit-
tances sent back home, especially by international migrants (sending five to ten times larger
remittances amounts than internal migrants). This possible mechanism is of particular rele-
vance in Ethiopia, where barriers to international migration are generally very high (Mueller
et al., 2018). Moreover, internal migration has likely become riskier in the period of analysis,
with migrants migrating closer to the village and for shorter periods. This has mostly been
due to an increase in inter-ethnic conflicts that plausibly not only made migration, but also
sending remittances back home riskier (Tsegay and Litchfield, 2019).
The paper contributes in several ways.
First, it contributes to the literature on the relationship between migration and migrant-
sending households welfare. Seminal theoretical work on migration focused on the idea that
individuals move in search of a better life (Clemens and Ogden, 2014). Following from the
Harris-Todaro model (Harris and Todaro, 1970), part of the literature has focused on the
individual decision to migrate to maximize the migrant's expected income. Another strand
of the literature started understanding migration as a more complex phenomenon motivated
not only by wage differentials, but by several market failures at origin (Stark and Bloom,
1985). Empirical evidence shows that such investment might be highly remunerative for the
origin household and can cause increases in income and consumption (Gibson and McKenzie,
2014), higher investment in human capital (Yang, 2008), higher food and non-food expenditure
(Bryan et al., 2014), as well as increases in spending and savings (Clemens and Tiongson, 2017).
However, Gibson et al. (2011) show that migration causes a short-run decrease in welfare
when the loss of labor income caused by the migrant's absence does not compensate the
gains from migration, e.g. increase in remittances. Negative effects of migration might also
depend on a change in the distribution of decision making within the households, on shocks to
knowledge transfers and on negative effects on mental health caused by household separation.
These factors lead the authors to conclude that the overall impact of migration on the welfare
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of remaining family members is theoretically uncertain (Gibson et al., 2011). Following from
this mixed evidence, additional research needs to be carried out to evaluate the effect of
migration on household outcomes in different contexts.
Second, this paper contributes to the empirical literature evaluating the effect of migration
on household welfare using panel data. This literature has started growing faster in the last two
decades as more data have become available (Clemens et al., 2014). Traditionally, empirical
studies on migration were based on cross-sectional and correlation analysis. This is mostly
due to the difficulty of studying this topic using experimental methods and from the fact that
migrants are not a random sample of the population (Taylor and Martin, 2001). More recent
literature has started overcoming these challenges thanks to the use of experimental and quasi-
experimental methods (McKenzie and Yang, 2010; Gibson et al., 2011), and to the growing
availability of panel data (McKenzie et al., 2010; Beegle et al., 2011). Although still far from
the ideal experimental setting, panel data and propensity score matching are commonly used
in this literature to attenuate the concerns of unobserved heterogeneity and selection into
treatment (Beegle et al., 2011; Gibson and McKenzie, 2014; de Brauw et al., 2017).
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of migration in Sub-Saharan
Africa. This literature has traditionally been limited by the lack of adequate data on migration
(Lucas, 2006). Empirical evidence from South-East Asia (Yang, 2008; Gibson and McKenzie,
2014; Clemens and Tiongson, 2017) suggests that migration has positive effects on the welfare
of migrant-sending households. As more than half of the extreme poor live in rural areas of
Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2019), understanding how migration can alleviate poverty
by increasing household consumption in the region is key in the development agenda.
Fourth, the paper investigate the effect of different types of migration on household con-
sumption. It shows that migration has different impacts depending on its duration, contribut-
ing to the literature on temporary migration (Clemens and Tiongson, 2017). In line with some
of the evidence presented in this paper, Gibson et al. (2011) find that migration might have a
negative short-run effect on household welfare due to the absence of the migrant and the loss
of his input to household production, especially in rural contexts.
Moreover, this paper contributes to the growing literature on internal migration in devel-
oping countries. Internal migration might differ remarkably from international re-location,
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as the former tends to be shorter and seasonal. Moreover, remittances sent from abroad are
considerably larger than those sent from internal migrants. Empirical studies focusing on
internal migration provide evidence for developed (Molloy et al., 2011) and for South-Asian
countries (Bryan et al., 2014; Bryan and Morten, 2019; Morten, 2019), while less is known on
internal migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, most of the migration in Africa happens
internally and in the form of rural-urban relocation (see here). In particular, Ethiopia has a
large potential for internal migration as a large share of its population still lives in rural areas
and non-agricultural employment opportunities are rising as the country grows (de Brauw
et al., 2017). This paper contributes by showing evidence of both internal and international
migration in this context.
Lastly, it provides evidence on the possible mechanisms explaining the results. By showing
that migration is accompanied by a change in household composition, this paper provides
additional evidence of the trade-offs faced by Ethiopian households investing in migration.
This is in line with previous literature on Ethiopia showing that household might decide not
to migrate to keep their right to use land (De Brauw and Mueller, 2012) and, when they do,
this results in a change to its labor supply (Mueller et al., 2018). These costs plausibly drive
the low migration rate in the country. Moreover, this paper provides qualitative evidence on
changes in migration patterns over the period of analysis in Ethiopia. The country experienced
several shocks that directly, e.g. a ban on migration to the Middle East for domestic workers,
or indirectly, e.g. increasing violence due to conflicts and droughts., affected migration. This
evidence highlights an increase in the risks faced by migrants, which might translate negatively
on origin household's welfare. Moreover, this evidence aims at complementing the analysis
based on a rough measure of migration and highlights the need to study migration as a more
complex phenomenon (Mendola, 2012).
3.2 Related literature
First, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of migration on origin household's
welfare. Migration has long been studied as a way to access better economic opportunities.
The Harris-Todaro model led the way in this field by demonstrating that individuals decide to
engage in rural-urban migration based on their own expected income maximization problem
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(Harris and Todaro, 1970). This seminal work in the micro-economic study of migration
overcame the limitations of the neoclassical Lewis's two-sectors model (Lewis, 1954), formalized
by Ranis and Fei (1961). According to Ranis and Fei (1961), migration is driven only by wage
differentials between rural and urban areas (and potentially between countries) and, as such,
it should cause these differentials to tend to zero in equilibrium. Several limitations to this
model, i.e. persistent urban unemployment in low income countries and the persistence of
wage differentials across rural areas and between sectors (see Taylor and Martin, 2001 for a
review), make the Harris-Todaro model still the benchmark to understand migration decisions
from a micro perspective.
The presence of continuing interactions between the migrant and its origin household
motivated the New Economics of Migration (NELM) literature (formalized in Stark and Bloom,
1985 and Stark, 1991). In this model, households jointly decide to invest in migration not only
to maximize income, but, and mostly, to minimize risk, diversify earnings and loosen financial
constraints. This is particularly relevant in rural contexts, where migration might insure
the household against negative agricultural shocks (Rosenzweig, 1988). Thus, the NELM
motivates migration as a household-level decision driven by rural areas market failures and
asymmetries (Taylor and Martin, 2001). As these are likely to be more severe (and the gains
from migration are likely to be larger) most of the NELM literature is focused on developing
countries. Following from this model, a growing literature has looked at the relationship
between migration and development. Migration might reduce poverty and positively impact
household welfare via a direct income effect, i.e. remittances, but can also affect household
labor supply, decision-making dynamics, the transmission of health practices and of social
norms (Sasin and McKenzie, 2007).
More recently, and thanks to increase in data availability, research has started investigating
empirically the presence and magnitude of these effects (Mendola, 2012), with a particular
focus on the role of remittances (Clemens and Ogden, 2014). Empirical studies have proved
the existence of high returns from migration. Yang (2008) finds that a positive shock to the
value of remittances increases investment in human capital and entrepreneurship in origin
households, as well as causing a 25 percent increase in income. Bryan et al. (2014) find
that migration increases household food and non-food expenditure by 30 to 35 percent and
91
improves household's calories intake in rural Bangladesh. Gibson and McKenzie (2014) provide
experimental evidence on the effects of seasonal work migration on household consumption,
income, savings and assets, showing an increase in income of around 35 percent for households
with at least one labor migrant away. Similar positive effects on households expenditure
on human capital investment and savings are documented in Clemens and Tiongson (2017).
This paper relates to this literature as it provides novel evidence on the relationship between
migration and household consumption in rural Ethiopia.
It should also be noted that the experimental and quasi-experimental evidence on the
effects of migration on household welfare is still scarce and has started growing only in the
last decade. If migrants are not a random sample of the population (Harris and Todaro,
1970), the main issue in any empirical analysis of migration is selection into treatment. The
increasing availability of panel data has helped addressing issues of unobserved heterogeneity
between the treated and control groups and has been crucial in providing evidence on the
effects of migration when experimental settings are not available to the researcher (McKenzie
and Yang, 2010; Beegle et al., 2011; Gibson and McKenzie, 2014). Thus, this paper contributes
further to the literature that aims at estimating the treatment effect of migration using panel
data (Sasin and McKenzie, 2007; McKenzie et al., 2010).
Second, this paper relates to a growing literature studying migration in low-income coun-
tries, where a large part of individual's relocation happens within national borders (Bryan
et al., 2014). A large amount of evidence exists to explain international and high-skilled
migration. This literature aims at explaining the brain drain phenomenon, and how immigra-
tion affects wages in receiving countries (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Gibson and McKenzie,
2012). When looking at the effect of migration on origin household, the existing empirical find-
ings are largely focused on permanent international migrations ( Bryan et al., 2014; Clemens
et al., 2014). Less is known on the effects of internal and seasonal migration on household
welfare, although these might differ considerably from the long-run gains of having a member
migrating permanently and to another country.
The amount of remittances sent back home is considerably lower. Second, the duration of
migration might be shorter and seasonal, not giving the household enough time to benefit from
the migrant's higher wages and network. Empirical evidence shows that internal migration
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allows migrants to benefit from higher wages and increases aggregate productivity (Bryan
and Morten, 2019), it allows households to rely less on informal risk-sharing (Morten, 2019)
and this reduces the probability of informal-risk sharing within the village network (Meghir
et al., 2019). At the same time, internal migration is usually seasonal and can be costly
for the household. Moreover, migrants might underestimate the income in urban areas and
under-invest in migration (Baseler, 2018).
Following from this discussion, this paper contributes to the literature on the short-term
effects of migration and on the effects of temporary migration. When looking at the short-run
effects of migration, Gibson et al. (2011) discuss that migration might have mixed effects on
origin household welfare. It might cause a reduction in non-remittance agricultural income
because of the absence of the breadwinner, it might affect the decision making dynamics within
the household, labor supply decisions, and it might cause mental health problems due to the
separation from a family member. In line with this prediction, Gibson et al. (2011) find that
in the short-run income per capita fell by 22 to 25 percent in Tongan households as a result
one of their members migrating. Although these households receive more remittances, these
are not enough to compensate for the loss in labor earnings.
These negative effects are not corroborated in Clemens and Tiongson (2017). The authors
evaluate the effect of having a member of the household migrating temporarily overseas, high-
lighting the importance of studying temporary migration separately from permanent house-
hold separation. They find that temporary overseas migration has very large positive effects
on household welfare. It causes household expenditure to increase by approximately one third
(estimate in line with Beegle et al., 2011; Bryan et al., 2014), savings to go up and expenditure
in health and education to go up by hundreds of percent. Moreover, Yang (2008) finds that
shocks to remittances values do not affect household consumption, but increase the probability
of carrying out productive investments. Following from these results, Yang (2011) concludes
that the use of remittances might change over time. While at the beginning households might
use remittances to increase their consumption level, later shocks to the value of remittances
might result in an increase in entrepreneurial activities. Given these mixed evidence, this
paper contributes by showing evidence of the effect of different migration experiences, i.e. of
households having at least a migrant away in both waves or just in one.
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Third, this paper contributes to a growing literature on migration in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The existing literature on the effects of migration on household welfare focuses mostly on
migration from South and Central America to the U.S. (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007), from
South-East Asia (Yang, 2008), but less is known on Sub-Saharan countries (Lucas, 2006).
Some studies have looked at the effect of migration on migrant's income and welfare. Beegle
et al. (2011) find that migration increased household consumption by 36 percentage points in
Tanzania. Similarly, de Brauw et al. (2017) use panel data to estimate the effect of internal
migration on migrant's consumption and income in Ethiopia, finding that income increases,
non-food consumption increases by 165 percent for migrants relative to non-migrants and that
individuals who migrated between 2004 and 2009 have better diets. However, and to the best
of this author's knowledge, no evidence exists on the effects of migration on origin household's
welfare, rather than migrant's, in Ethiopia.
3.3 Context
Ethiopia, with a per capita annual income of around $780, is one of the poorest countries in the
world and in the Sub-Saharan region (World Bank, 2019). It is also the second most populous
country in Africa after Nigeria and it has been experiencing a decade of steady economic
growth. For this growth to be sustainable, reforms aimed at reducing poverty further need
to be implemented (World Bank, 2019). Migration constitutes one of the possible ways to
improve the economic conditions of rural households in Ethiopia.
Thanks to its location in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has a long tradition as both a country
of origin and of destination (Marchand et al., 2017), with many migrants transiting through
to access the route to the Middle East from Djibouti. In the period between 2014 and 2018,
several migratory phenomena have interested the country. Conflicts in neighboring countries
(South Sudan, Eritrea) and ethnic-related internal conflicts (escalating to violence in 2018)
forced masses of refugees to enter Ethiopia and made internal migration riskier. In 2015 and
2017, the country experienced severe droughts which have been found to increase work related
migration for men and decrease marriage related migration for women (Gray and Mueller,
2012).
Moreover, work-related emigration, particularly in the form of domestic work, has been
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affected by a ban imposed by the Ethiopian government on migrants traveling to the Middle
East (following from the increase in reports of violence on the workplace against women in
Saudi Arabia). This is also evident in our data, where I find that 30 percent of returning
migrants who were in the Middle East returned because they were deported. In general,
the Ethiopian government has traditionally been adverse to international migration (Mueller
et al., 2018) contributing to the low out-migration rates in the country and to the decline in
international migration documented in our data. All of these factors contribute to the high
costs of migration for financially-constrained households in the country, making it more and
more difficult for them to invest in migration as a way to improve their living conditions.
The context of Ethiopia is of particular relevance for two reasons. First, the majority of
poor people live in rural areas. For this reason, de Brauw et al. (2017) highlight that given
the magnitude of their results (an increase of 145 percent in non-food consumption), policies
lowering the costs of migration could be an effective strategy in facilitating poverty reduction.
Second, and in line with the NELM puzzle of why are not more people migrating?, migration
is accompanied by high costs for the household. In this regard, it is worth discussing in more
detail the role played by land regulations.
The Ethiopian economy is largely dependent on agriculture. Thus, rural households depend
on the right of using land for their livelihood. Land regulations are particularly relevant in
this context and directly affect migration decisions (De Brauw and Mueller, 2012). This is
both because of strict regulations on land transferability and of the increasing scarcity of land
for younger generations (Bezu and Holden, 2014). Land is publicly owned in Ethiopia and
redistribution of land was common before the implementation of land certificates allocating to
each household the right to use a given area of agricultural land (Deininger et al., 2008). These
land rights have traditionally been enforced weakly, causing households to avoid sending out
migrants in fear of expropriation (De Brauw and Mueller, 2012). Although progress has been
made in reinforcing land rights (Deininger et al., 2008), strict restrictions in renting out and
exchanging land still affect migration patterns in Ethiopia. In particular, out-migration rates
in Ethiopia are considerably lower than in other Sub-Saharan countries and are usually higher
for men and women between 15 and 24 years of age (Mueller et al., 2018). This results partly
from the Federal Land Use Law which precludes the household head to migrate in order not
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to lose her land (Bezu and Holden, 2014).
Thus, as the household head cannot migrate and the possibility of renting out and selling
land are very limited, it is often the head's children who migrate out of the household (Mueller
et al., 2018). Moreover, the amount of land available to each household depends on agreements
often based on household size. Thus, if one of the household members migrates, it is common
for the household to substitute him with a member of the extended family or hired workforce.
This pattern is also accentuated by an increasing scarcity of land. As more and more
land has been allocated to existing households, the country is experiencing growing rates
of landlessness among the younger generations, who are then forced to migrate in search of
better livelihood (Bezu and Holden, 2014). Part of the findings of this paper, namely the
negative effect on consumption and the change in household composition, are in line with
some of the mechanisms discussed so far. In particular, the regulations on land and the out-
migration of more productive household members are plausible explanations of why per capita
consumption decreases for households having a member migrating between waves and of why
the composition of the household changes over time.
3.4 Data
The data used in this analysis were collected by the Ethiopia country team of the Migrating
out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium. This project aimed at analyzing the effect
of migration on migrant-sending household's outcomes. Hence, the selection of households at
baseline was carried out in a way such that 65 percent of the households in each of the sixteen
sampled kebeles had at least one of the household's member away as a migrant, i.e. living
outside of the village for three months or more in the past ten years. The dataset is a panel of
around 1200 rural households of the four regions of Amhara, Tigray, Oromyia and Southern
Nations Nationalities and People (SNNP)13.
The survey was conducted for 1207 rural households in September 2014 and it includes both
information on households economic situation and demographic information on each member
of the household (both for all individuals in the roster and only for migrants). The follow-up
13Although not statistically representative at the regional level, these data are qualitatively representative
of the migration flows at the aggregate level.
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survey was conducted in the months of September and October 2018. The attrition rate of
the panel is surprisingly low (less than 1 percent) for the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. In
fact, the second wave of data is available for 1202 of the households interviewed at baseline14.
The team collected household-specific tracking data (using Computer-Assisted Personal Inter-
viewing) in the initial phase of fieldwork, and asked the questionnaire respondent's consent
to be interviewed at follow-up. This ensured that the respondents engaged with the research
project and made them aware that the team would return for a follow-up interview round15.
The key information for this analysis is on the migration status of each member in the
household. For each household, I have information on whether any member is away as a
migrant. A migrant is define to be a person who has lived outside of the kebele (village)
for three months or more, in the past 10 years16. Thus, for each household I define a binary
treatment variable to indicate whether at least one of the members is a migrant. The treatment
variable is defined at the household level. As I will discuss in the next section, I will define this
treatment variable for three treatment types depending on whether they are treated in both
waves or only in one of the periods. The control group will be defined as those households
who had no migrants both at baseline and at follow-up.
The dataset comprises three sources of information: at the individual, household and com-
munity level. Individual level information for non-migrants and migrants includes questions
on age, gender, marital status, employment status, higher level of education achieved, number
of children, mother tongue and religion. Information on income, consumption and remittances
is, instead, available at the household level. Demographic characteristics are calculated at the
household level for the following variables: the ratio of dependent household members (calcu-
14Notice that this is peculiar to the context of Ethiopia and is plausibly possible because of the rigid
land regulations in Ethiopia. Land is publicly owned in Ethiopia and, although, the land certification reform
established rights to use the land for households, the migration of the household head leads to the loss of such
right.
15Each household received a consent agreement in 2014 and was asked to sign it. The team collected evidence
showing that the respondents kept such written agreements and presented them to the team when surveyed
back in 2018.
16This definition builds on the literature aiming at measuring migration in a consistent and comparable
way. There are several dimensions that should be taken into consideration. First, the period of migration
should be long enough for the household to see economically meaningful changes. Second, the distance from
origin household should be taken into account. Third, it is usually more useful to refer to a relatively recent
fixed-period of time during which the migration happen (as opposed to one's lifetime). Further discussion on
the definition of migration and its measurement in survey data can be found in Bilsborrow et al. (1984)and
Bilsborrow et al. (1997).
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lated separately for members below the age of 15 and above the age of 65); the ratio of men and
the ratio of adults in the household who indicate to have received no schooling. Information
on household infrastructure and hectares of land owned is available for each household. In
particular, I will use information on whether the household has access to electricity, to piped
water in the dwelling or in the village and to private toilet facilities, as well as the hectares of
agricultural and homestead land owned.
Additional information is available for community level characteristics at baseline. For
each of the sixteen kebeles, the dataset includes information on population and number of
households, number of shocks (droughts, epidemics, flooding) and investments in infrastruc-
tures (training centers and schools, health posts, roads, water supply) affecting the community
in the past twenty years, as well as distances to main destinations of interest (region's capital,
main road, bus stop, micro-credit facility).
Although the dataset includes a section on the use and value of remittances receives,
this will not be used in the analysis as this information is only available for households with
migrants. However, in the summary statistics section I provide evidence on the main use of
remittances and on the value of goods and remittances received by households with migrants
in both waves and in only one of the two periods. I construct a binary variable equal to one
if at least one member of the household sends remittances (ReceivesRemittances) or goods
(ReceivesGoods) back home. Additionally, I construct two variables indicating the monetary
value of remittances and goods received by the household. I do this by summing the value of
remittances and, separately, of goods received by the household from all the members away as
migrants and adjusting such values for inflation. The questionnaire asks the head of household
to indicate the value of remittances (and goods) received in the past twelve months, but I report
these values at the monthly level for ease of comparison with the consumption figures. I also
present qualitative evidence on the use of remittances. I report the main use of remittances as
indicated by the head of household for each of the following categories: everyday consumption,
land and agricultural productivity, home improvement, savings, health and education costs.
Lastly, I provide descriptive evidence of a change in the destination of migrants over time.
Exploiting information on whether household members migrate internally or internationally.
In particular, I classify household to have only internal migrants, only international migrants
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or both.
I now turn to the description of the outcome variables used in the analysis. The household
data contains information on weekly food consumption, monthly non-food consumption and
annual income received by the household. I construct a measure of annual income17, but,
although useful when discussing possible mechanisms, I do not use this variable as the main
outcome of interest. Given the context of analysis, characterized by high levels of poverty
and a strong dependence on agricultural production, together with the availability of rich
information at the weekly and monthly level, the analysis focuses on consumption measures
to measure household welfare. I discuss these measures in more detail in the following section.
3.4.1 Consumption measures
The main outcome variables are derived from a detailed section on household expenditure in
consumed goods. Information is available for a list of food and non-food items from which I
construct two separate measures of monthly food and monthly non-food consumption.
In the non-food consumption section, each household is asked to report the amount spent
in the last month for thirteen non-food items, and the amount spent in the last year for another
fourteen non-food items consumed less regularly (clothes, furniture, ceremonial expenses, ed-
ucation, healthcare). For each household, I construct a non-food consumption value to be the
natural logarithm of the sum spent for all these items in a period of one month.
Constructing food consumption values proved less straightforward as for each of the twenty-
five items listed in the household questionnaire, each household could report to have purchased,
produced or received as a gift said item. Thus, while quantity consumed in the past week is
available for all items in the list, information on the amount spent for each item is only
available for purchased ones. I construct a median price per unit at the kebele level for each
of the items. Then, I use this median kebele-level price as an indication of amount spent per
unit for items that were produced at home or received as a gift. I then construct the food
consumption variable by taking the natural logarithm of the sum spent by each household in
17I do this using information on cash income received from eleven different sources (non-agricultural and
agricultural waged work, trade and business, renting out assets, government benefits, payments from NGOs,
remittances, gifts from relatives and other members of the community). The variable AnnualIncome presented
in table 21 is the natural logarithm of the sum of the values reported by the household for each category. Values
for the 2018 survey are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2014 Birr.
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a week and multiply this value by four to obtain a monthly-level figure.
Total monthly household consumption is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of food
and non-food consumption expressed in monthly values. All per capita consumption figures
are constructed by dividing household consumption by household size. All consumption values
are in real terms and expressed in 2014-Birr. I adjust prices using regional consumer price
indices, constructed separately for food and non-food items and made available by the Central
Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (for full tables of the Ethiopian CPI, see here).
3.5 Methodology
I am interested in estimating the effect of migration on household consumption.
There are several challenges in estimating the treatment effect of migration. These chal-
lenges are likely to be unaccounted for if looking at the correlation between our measure of
migration, i.e. having at least one migrant in the household, and household monthly con-
sumption using a simple OLS regression. In fact, this regression is likely to produce biased
estimates due to unobserved heterogeneity and selection issues (McKenzie et al., 2010). For
example, it might be that poorer households with lower levels of consumption are more likely
to migrate, but it is also possible that having at least one migrant in the household causes
consumption to increase because of remittances. However, by just looking at the correlation
between migration and consumption I could not distinguish between these two mechanisms.
I can overcome some empirical challenges thanks to the structure of the data. By using
a difference-in-difference specification I will be able to control for time-invariant unobservable
differences between the treatment and control group. This will allow me to isolate the effects
of omitted variables affecting consumption provided that their effect is constant over time.
Given the panel structure of the data, I can also include household fixed effects to account
for household-specific time invariant unobservable characteristics. I present the results of this
second specification in the robustness checks. Using a difference-in-difference estimator is a
standard practice in the literature looking at the effect of migration on consumption (Gibson
and McKenzie, 2014; de Brauw et al., 2017; Beegle et al., 2011).
Similarly to (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014), I define migration has having at least one
migrant in the household. I follow the literature (Beegle et al., 2011; de Brauw et al., 2017)
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in evaluating the effect of migration on consumption by estimating the following equation:
Consumptionh,t = β0 + β1Treatedh ×Wavet + β2Treatedh + β3wavet + h,t (12)
where Consumptionh,t is the natural logarithm of monthly consumption for household h.
Wavetis a binary variable indicating the wave of the survey.
Treatedh is a binary treatment variable equal to one if the household has at least one
migrant in the household. One of the contribution of this paper is in the definition of such
treatment variable. In order to exploit the full information in the dataset and to provide
evidence on how the effect of migration differs by migration experience, I define three treatment
types:
• households with at least one migrant in both wave (AlwaysTreatedh ),
• households with no migrant at baseline and with at least one migrant at follow-up
(OnlyWave2),
• and households with at least one migrant at baseline and none at follow-up (OnlyWave1).
I am able to study these effects thanks to consistent variation in the treatment group between
the two waves. In fact, there is a 43 percent of the households who were treated in wave
one are no longer treated in wave two (N=473), a 12 percent of households with at least one
member migrating between waves, and 27 percent who had at least one migrant in both waves
(N=327). AlwaysTreatedh, OnlyWave2h and OnlyWave1 are binary variables equal to one
if the household has at least one migrant in both waves, only in wave two, or only in wave one,
respectively, and equal to zero if the household never had migrants. Notice that the definition
of these three treatment types is highly dependent on the structure of the data.
Being households the sampling unit in the panel, I define the three treatment types accord-
ing to whether the household has at least one member away in each period or in both waves.
Although this is arguably a simplified measure of migration, it is the only viable definition
consistent with the data structure. Few things should be kept in mind when interpreting the
results. First, AlwaysTreatedh is a binary variable equal to one if the household has at least
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a member away in both waves. This does not necessarily mean that the same individuals are
away in both waves18, nor that the migrants were away for the full period between wave one
and wave two. Second, OnlyWave1 is equal to one if the household had at least one migrant
in wave one, but none at follow-up. This does not necessarily mean that the migrant has
returned to the household19. Third, OnlyWave2 is equal to one if the household has at least
one migrant at follow-up and had none at baseline. This might be due to both migration of one
household member between waves and to the migration of a new member of the household20.
I estimate equation 12 separately for each of these three treatment groups, as follows:
Consumptionh,t = γ0 + γ1AlwaysTreatedh ×Wavet + γ2AlwaysTreatedh + γ3wavet + ηh,t
(13)
Consumptionh,t = δ0 + δ1OnlyWave2h ×Wavet + δ2OnlyWave2h + δ3wavet + ζh,t (14)
Consumptionh,t = λ0 + λ1OnlyWave1h ×Wavet + λ2OnlyWave1h + λ3wavet + θh,t (15)
The coefficients of interest are given by the interaction terms. γ1 measures the change
in household consumption between the two waves for households having a migrant in both
waves compared to households that had no migrants in either period. δ1, measures the change
in consumption for households having at least one member of the household migrating over
time relative to the control group of households that never had a migrant. λ1 measures the
change in consumption for households having at least one migrant in wave one but none
in wave two compared to households that had no migrants in either wave. Estimating the
effect of migration using these three separate treatment categories allows me to explore the
heterogeneity in consumption patterns for three groups of households having a more or less
18Restricting this group to only households with the same migrant away in both waves would drop the
sample size to 29 observations.
19In our dataset, I have only 240 households who had at least one returning migrant in wave one and had
at least one migrant in wave one. The discrepancy in the two sample sizes might be due to two reasons. First,
the question used to define the migration status of one member Did X move away from the household for a
period of three months or more in the past 10 years? was not updated between the two waves. Hence if X
was a migrant within the 10 years before wave one, this definition might not apply to wave two. Second, the
questionnaire defines returning migrants those who are living in the household. It is possible that the member
has returned to live in the village, but not to the household resulting in the treatment variable being equal to
zero.
20In fact, the question defining each individual as migrant is asked to all household members, including new
members of the household. The number of individuals in the baseline data is 6,405, while at follow-up is 7,365.
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consolidated history of migration.
δ1 (and λ1) capture the effect of having a member of the household migrating (or returning)
between two waves on household consumption. While the interpretation of those coefficients is
more straightforward and follows previous literature looking at the effect of a change in migra-
tion status on household consumption, it is worth discussing more in detail the interpretation
of γ1. The decision to look at the change in consumption for households treated in both waves
is motivated by the summary statistics presented in the next section. In general, and as noted
in the paper so far, we observe a deterioration of several aspects of the migration experience
between the two waves.
First, we see that international migration decreases over time and that the value of remit-
tances also goes down. Second, we observe that the household has less migrants away between
the two periods and that they send lower remittances. In absence of an exogenous shock or
quasi-experiment to study the effect of this decrease in migration and in the receipt of remit-
tances, I opt to look at the dynamic effect of having at least one member away in both waves
on household consumption. Using first-differences in the main analysis (and household fixed
effects in the robustness checks) and making the treatment groups less heterogeneous allows
me to control for part of the unobserved heterogeneity that might affect both the decision
to migrate and consumption. However, in lack of additional data to control for pre-trends
in consumption patterns for the treatment and control groups, my estimates of the effect of
migration on consumption is still likely to be biased.
In order to attenuate this issue, I follow the literature that uses propensity score matching
to match households in the treatment group to comparable control units (Gibson and McKen-
zie, 2014; de Brauw et al., 2017), in this case households with at least one migrant in the
household to households with none. I follow this approach in an attempt to control for any
potential remaining bias in the estimates. Using a rich set of observable baseline characteris-
tics, I estimate for each household the probability of being treated. I then use this propensity
score to match households in the treatment group to comparable households in the control
group. If the matching is successful, units in the treatment and control group with similar
propensity scores differ only because of the treatment. Thus, by taking the difference in means
of the outcome variable I am able to estimate the effect of migration. This approach com-
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bined with a diff-in-diff specification allows me to take care both of the selection bias and of
time-invariant unobservable characteristics, and has been often used when experimental data
is not available (McKenzie et al., 2010).
Notice that, although using first-differences and panel data constitutes an important ad-
vantage in estimating the effect of migration, these estimates should be interpreted with care.
This is because of unobserved time-varying heterogeneity that might affect both the decision
to migrate (or return) and consumption. This been said, restricting the sample to only com-
parable households in the treatment and control group, by using propensity scores, increases
the probability that the treated and control households exhibit similar trends in unobservable
characteristics that might bias the results (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014).
Splitting the sample in the three treatment types proves again important when performing
this matching. In fact, if I were to match households with at least one migrant to households
without any migrants at baseline and take the difference in their average consumption I might
be measuring both a change in consumption and a change in treatment status between baseline
and follow-up. This is due to the fact that households might switch their status between waves.











The decision to return or to migrate between the two waves might be endogenous to
household consumption, which would bias the estimation of the difference-in-difference model.
Moreover, pooling in the treatment group at baseline both households that are treated in both
waves and returning migrants households (and similarly in the control group households with
members migrating between waves and households that never had a migrant) would make our
treatment and control group less comparable.
As the results show, there is a large heterogeneity between households with a consolidated
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history of migration and households that are treated in only one of the periods. This might
result in the violation of the key assumption for propensity score matching, i.e. the condi-
tional independence assumption, stating that any systematic difference between treatment and
control with the same baseline observable characteristics is attributable to the treatment.
Thus, by focusing on each of the three treatment groups separately I make sure that the
matching is done on unit as comparable as possible within both the treatment and the control
group. To re-estimate equation 13, I match household that have at least one migrant in both
waves (AlwaysTreatedh) with households that never had a migrant. Separately, I estimate
equation 14 matching that had a migrant in wave two but none in wave one (OnlyWave2) to
households that never had a migrant, and to estimate equation 15 I match households that
had a migrant in wave one and none in wave two (OnlyWave1) to households that never had
a migrant.
I estimate the propensity scores separately to predict each of the three treatments using
baseline characteristics. I use the following variables to estimate the propensity scores: de-
mographic characteristics of the household (household size, children below 15 years ration,
elderly above 65 ratio, men ratio, illiterate ratio), household infrastructure (number of rooms,
square meters, having piped water, having access to electricity), land (land index for land
ownership21, area of homestead land owned, area of agricultural land owned), community
level characteristics (population, number of households, number of households with migrants,
number of shocks experienced in last years, number of investments carried out in the past
years, distance to regional capital, distance to road, distance to bus, distance to bank, cost of
reaching capital, region dummies). I estimate the propensity scores using a logit model in all
specifications.
Lastly, I estimate equations 13, 14 and 15 keeping only observations with propensity scores
that lie on the common support (Crump et al., 2009). Figures 19, 20 and 21 (in Appendix 3)
show, respectively, the result of the matching of AlwaysTreated, OnlyWave1 and OnlyWave2
households with households in the control group. In particular, figures 19-21 show the distribu-
tion of the propensity scores before the matching and after the matching of treated and control
21This is calculated using principal component analysis. For each household the index will have higher value
if the household owns more types of land among: homestead land in village, homestead land in urban area,
agricultural land, commercial land.
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units. The right-hand side figures show that the matching is successful in reducing the differ-
ence in observable characteristics between the treated and the control groups. However, this
matching is more successful for the third treatment type, OnlyWave2. This is plausibly due
to the fact that both the treated and the control group do not have any migrants at baseline
and might be more comparable in terms of both observable and unobservable characteristics
22.
I include village level fixed effects in all estimations to control for common shocks that
might affect households at the local level. This partly controls for village-specific shocks that
might affect consumption for both the treated and control groups. I do not include any
additional covariates in the estimation as I only have information on time-varying household
characteristics that might be also affected by migration (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014).
Section 3.8 shows that the results of the analysis are robust to two additional specifications.
First, I estimate equations 13, 14 and 15 including inverse propensity weights directly in the
regressions. Second, I use household fixed effects to account for household-level unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity.
3.6 Summary Statistics
In this section, I document the differences in characteristics between waves, between the treat-
ment and control group and between the three treatment groups defined in the previous section.
This allows me to unpack qualitative differences useful in interpreting the results.
Table 15 shows the summary statistics for the whole sample, separately for the two waves
of the study. It shows a clear reduction in migration between 2014 and 2018, seeing households
with at least one migrant passing from being 67 percent of the sample in wave one to less than
40 percent in wave two. This drop in households with at least one migrant is accompanied
by a drop in households with only international migrants dropping to 19 percent in 2018,
and a drop in the proportion of households receiving remittances or goods. This suggests
a clear decline in the main channel through which migration can improve origin household
22This is the reason why most of the studies looking at the effect of migration on consumption (Beegle
et al., 2011; de Brauw et al., 2017) focus on households that have at least one member migrating over time and
compare them to households that never had a migrant. Although acknowledging this to be the more convincing
set of results, I conduct the estimation for the other two categories in an attempt to show the heterogeneity of
the effects for different household types.
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consumption (Yang, 2008).
Table 15 also shows that household size increases between the two waves, and that this
increase is not driven by an increase in the share of household members aged less than fifteen
or more than sixty-five. I also see an overall improvement in household infrastructures in terms
of access to electricity, to piped water in the household or village and of the average size of
dwellings. As expected, not much change has been experienced in terms of hectares of land
owned by the household. This follows plausibly from the strict regulations on land allocation
in the Ethiopian context that limit purchase, mortgage or exchange of the land the household
has the right to use (De Brauw and Mueller, 2012).
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Table 15: Summary statistics of migration experience, household and community characteris-




Has at least one migrant 0.67 0.39 -0.271 ***
-internal migrant 0.57 0.72 0.155 ***
-international migrant 0.29 0.19 -0.100 ***
-both internal and international 0.14 0.09 0.055***
Nr migrants in HH 1.91 1.61 -0.294 ***
Receives remittances 0.60 0.39 -0.217 ***
Receives Goods 0.28 0.15 -0.133 ***
Value remittances (monthly) 387.99 573.86 185.88 **
Value Goods (monthly) 173.40 139.55 -33.84
Household characteristics
Household size 5.31 6.12 0.816 ***
% members<15 0.37 0.29 -0.084 ***
% members>65 0.08 0.09 0.007
% Employed 0.22 0.21 -0.013 *
% Illiterate 0.41 0.28 -0.125 ***
% Men 0.49 0.47 -0.019 **
Has electricity 0.25 0.40 0.152 ***
Nr Rooms 1.75 2.27 0.522 ***
Piped water 0.58 0.82 0.239 ***
Toilet in HH 0.87 0.86 -0.012
Hct homestead land 0.06 0.11 0.050 ***
Hct Agricultural land 0.86 0.81 -0.042
Community Characteristics
Population 5,351.19 5,349.65 -1.531
Distance to capital 42.59 42.55 -0.041
Distance to road 4.30 4.29 -0.015
Nr shocks last 20 yrs. 3.37 3.38 0.002
Tigray 0.25 0.25 -0.002
Amhara 0.25 0.25 0.000
Oromyia 0.25 0.25 0.002
SNNP 0.25 0.25 -0.000
Outcome variables
Tot consumption 2002 1991 -11.322
Food consumption 1366 1340 -25.612
Non-food consumption 637 649 12.606
Tot consumption p.c. 409 351 -58.586 ***
Food consumption p.c. 281 241 -39.975 ***
Non-food consumption p.c. 128 110 -18.919 ***
Note: Summary statistics for the pooled sample by wave. Column 1 shows the average for each variable in 2014,
column 3 the average in 2018 and column 3 the difference in means between the two.
I now look more in detail at the differences over time between the treated and control
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groups. As outlined in the previous section, this paper presents evidence on the effects of
migration for three different groups. Table 16 shows the change between waves in sample
characteristics for each of the groups used in the analysis.
Table 16: Summary statistics of household characteristics and household consumption for the
three treatment types and for the control group by year of survey.
AlwaysTreated OnlyWave1 OnlyWave2 Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2014 2018 2014 2018 2014 2018 2014 2018
Household characteristics
Household size 5.32 6.98 5.37 5.57 5.25 6.76 5.20 5.68
% members<15 0.35 0.23 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.22 0.42 0.35
% members>65 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09
% Employed 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.23
% No School 0.38 0.24 0.40 0.30 0.45 0.26 0.43 0.31
% Men 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.47
Has electricity 0.28 0.39 0.25 0.41 0.22 0.40 0.21 0.38
Nr Rooms 1.77 2.46 1.82 2.28 1.71 2.16 1.59 2.05
Piped water 0.58 0.78 0.62 0.84 0.51 0.79 0.56 0.84
Toilet in HH 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.91 0.88 0.81 0.82
Hct homestead land 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.12
Hct Agricultural land 0.93 0.84 0.94 0.81 0.69 0.88 0.69 0.73
Outcome variables `
Tot consumption 2093 2227 2005 1924 2052 1991 1860 1810
Food consumption 1429 1449 1353 1313 1406 1333 1288 1254
Non-food consumption 664 777 652 609 646 658 572 553
Tot consumption p.c. 421 336 404 378 432 311 394 342
Food consumption p.c. 291 220 274 262 294 212 274 244
Non-food consumption p.c. 129 116 130 115 139 98 120 98
Note: Summary statistics are for each treatment type and for the control group by wave. Columns 1-2 contain the
summary statistics for the analysis on households that had at least one migrant in both waves. Columns 3-4 contain
the summary statistics for the sample used in the analysis on households that had at least one migrant at baseline,
but not at follow-up. Columns 5-6 contain the summary statistics for the sample used in the analysis on households
that had no migrants at baseline and at least one at follow-up. Columns 7-8 present the summary statistics for the
control group, i.e.households with no migrants in either wave.Information is provided for each sample by wave of
the survey.
Table 16 is structured as follows. Columns 1-2 present the summary statistics for house-
holds with at least one migrant in both waves (AlwaysTreated). Columns 3-4 present the
summary statistics for households with at least one migrant in wave one, but none in wave
two (OnlyWave1). Columns 5-6 present the summary statistics for households with at least
one migrant in wave two, but none in wave one (OnlyWave2). For each group, I present the
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average value of household characteristics in wave one (2014) and in wave two (2018). The
summary statistics presented in columns 7-8 contain information on the control group used
throughout the analysis, i.e. households that did not have any migrants in either wave of the
survey. Note that the control group is the same throughout the analysis, but the regressions
are run separately for each of the three treatment types.
First, I present the average value of household characteristics in the top part of table 16.
These summary statistics motivate the need to account for selection into treatment in our
empirical analysis. Thus, I use this set of characteristics to estimate the propensity scores
in the empirical analysis and ensure the comparability of the treatment and control groups.
Moreover, some of these figures are useful to interpret the results. I notice that household size
increases between the two waves, but this increase is larger for households with at least one
migrant in both waves (column 2) and households with at least one migrant only in wave two
(column 6).
Then, I present the summary statistics of the outcome variables used in the analysis in
the bottom part of table 16. All the consumption values are monthly and expressed in 2014
Birr. Columns 1-2 show that while household consumption increased (and particularly, non-
food consumption) over time for households with at least one migrant in both waves, per
capita consumption decreased over time. Although this dip in per capita consumption is also
registered for households in the control group, the decrease is larger for households in the
AlwaysTreated category. Several channels might explain this decrease in consumption: from
a drop in the value of remittances received, and in the number of migrants away, to a decrease
in the duration of migration (see table 17).
Columns 3-4 of table 16 show that all consumption measures decrease over time for house-
holds with at least one migrant only in wave one. This dip in both household and per capita
consumption is smaller compared to the decrease in per capita figures reported in columns
1-2. This might suggest two things. First, no longer having one migrant away might de-
crease household consumption, plausibly because of a drop in remittances. Second, the return
of productive members in the household might offset the negative effect due to the loss of
remittances income.
Lastly, columns 5-6 of table 16 show the change in average consumption for households
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with at least one migrant only in wave two. These figures show a decrease in all the measures of
consumption, with the exception of non-food consumption. This might suggest two different
explanations. One, the migration of one of the members might have been too recent (the
median duration of migration is of 24 months for this group) for household consumption to
increase. Two, that the household might need to hire additional labor to compensate for the
loss in workforce due to the migration of younger household members.
It should be noted that consumption is higher on average for the three treatment types
compared to the control group. This is the case throughout the three treatment types sug-
gesting a plausible selection into migration of richer households. This motivates further the
need to evaluate the effect of migration with empirical methods aimed at reducing selection
bias.
The summary statistics presented so far aimed at showing the difference in characteristics
between the treated and control group over time. However, additional information is needed
on the three treatment groups used in the analysis. In fact, observable and unobservable
differences between households treated in both waves or only in one of the periods largely
motivate the empirical specification used in the analysis. I investigate these differences further
exploiting information available from the migrant-only questionnaire. While these variables
cannot be used in the empirical analysis, qualitative evidence on different migration experiences
might help interpreting the results.
Table 17 shows information on the migration experience, on the demographic characteris-
tics of the migrants, on the value and use of remittances and on the destination of migrants
in the household. Columns 1-2 show the characteristics for households that have at least one
migrant in both waves, by wave of the survey. Column 3 shows the summary statistics for
households treated only in wave one, column 4 for households treated only in wave two. Notice
that by definition information for the two latter groups is only available for the wave of the
survey when the household has at least one migrant away.
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Table 17: Summary statistics of characteristics of migration experience for the three treatment
types.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Always migrant Only wave 1 Only wave 2
Wave 1 Wave 2
Destination
Internal migrants 0.56 0.74 0.57 0.67
International migrants 0.30 0.18 0.28 0.21
Both 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.12
Household characteristics
Nr Migrants 1.85 1.63 1.93 1.56
Avg Age 25.40 23.76 25.17 24.46
Avg Months Away 35.05 25.83 35.52 29.49
% Men 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.80
% Head's child 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.96
Nr Migrants remit 1.38 1.25 1.37 1.06
Receives remittances 0.62 0.37 0.59 0.41
Receives Goods 0.30 0.14 0.26 0.16
Value Remittances (monthly) 447.17 521.86 346.11 677.87
Value Goods (monthly) 236.31 152.34 124.80 114.51
Main Use Remittances
Everyday Consumption 0.56 0.64 0.53 0.43
Land and Agriculture 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.24
Home improvement 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.09
Savings 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
Health and Educ 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.12
N 327 327 473 147
Note:Average values of sample characteristics for the three treatment types. Columns 1 and 2 present information
for households with at least one migrant in both waves. Column 3 for households with at least one migrant only in
2014 and column 4 only in 2018.
Table 17 confirms a decline in migration and, particularly, in the probability of having
international migrants across the three treatment groups. This is relevant to interpret the
results as international migrants tend to send more remittances and goods back home relative
to internal migrants. Thus, if the value of remittances received by the household decreases
over time, the reduction in international migration might have a negative effect on consump-
tion. Evidence of the difference in remittances value by destination of the migrant can be
found in table 18. I report monthly average remittances and value of goods 23 received by the
23These measures are constructed as follows. Each household indicating to have at least one migrant sending
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household. The value of remittances received by households with only international migrants
is between five and ten times the amount received by household with only internal migrants.
This is also true for the value of goods received24. Similarly, households with both interna-
tional and internal migrants receive higher remittances and goods than households with only
internal migrants. Thus, the drop in international migration might negatively affect household
consumption for households treated in both waves and for those treated only in wave two. The
results of the next section confirm this intuition.
Table 17 also shows a decrease in the number of migrants per household between the two
waves, both for households in the AlwaysMigrant category, and for households with at least a
migrant only in wave two compared to households with at least one migrant in wave one. When
looking at remittances, I notice a decrease in the number of migrants that send remittances
to the household and in the probability of receiving both goods and remittances between the
two waves. The drop in the probability of receiving goods and remittances, together with the
decrease in the number of migrants over time and with the drop in international migration
might help interpret the results presented in the next section and, in general, a negative
effect of migration on consumption. Although this discussion relies on qualitative evidence,
it helps investigating potential mechanisms not captured by our simplified binary measure of
migration.
Lastly, table 17 provides some information on the use of remittances for the three groups.
The larger share of remittances is used for everyday consumption by all the treated groups,
with households in the OnlyWave2 spending relatively less for this category. Spending in
everyday consumption is followed by use of remittances to improve agricultural and land
productivity25, or to improve one's home26. I notice that households with migrants only in
wave two differ both in terms of the share of remittances devoted to improving land and
remittances or goods is asked to report their value. I sum the value sent home by all migrants currently away
and adjust it for inflation using 2014 as base year. The original value is reported at the annual level, but I
report monthly figures for comparison with the measures of consumption used in the analysis.
24Notice that for households with at least one migrant in both waves, the data shows a substitution effect
between remittances and goods received. While remittances value goes up between waves for households with
only international migrants, the value of goods goes down. This might suggest that as households have a more
consolidate history of migration, they start receiving more income and less in kind transfers.
25This category includes the purchase of land, the purchase of agricultural equipment, seeds, irrigation
systems, water, paying wages to agricultural employees.
26This category includes household goods such as furniture and household utensils, electronic goods and
construction and development of homestead.
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agriculture and the one invested in human capital27. The share of remittances invested in the
latter is also higher for those who always had a migrant relative to those with migrants only
in wave one. This information on the use of remittances suggests that poor households do not
only use remittances to increase their consumption, but might invest it in human capital and
agricultural productivity (Mendola, 2012).
Table 18: Summary statistics of remittances value for the three treatment types and by des-
tination of migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Always migrant Only wave 1 Only wave 2
Wave 1 Wave 2
Value Remittances (monthly)
Only Internal Migrants 109.06 146.93 91.57 220.13
Only International Migrants 792.54 1173.58 504.30 1125.23
Both Internal and International 580.96 567.49 606.98 874.79
Value Goods (monthly)
Only Internal Migrants 59.81 58.68 83.20 53.29
Only International Migrants 1025.24 622.66 388.78 225.39
Both Internal and International 222.86 123.55 143.79 84.11
N 327 327 473 147
Note:Average values of monthly remittances by destination of migrants in the households. Columns 1 and 2 present
information for households with at least one migrant in both waves. Column 3 for households with at least one
migrant only in 2014 and column 4 only in 2018. All values are monthly and expressed in 2014 Ethiopian Birr.
Aside from providing information on the migration experience of these three groups, the
information in table 17 is meant to motivate further the empirical specification used in the
analysis. In particular, by showing that the three treatment types differ in their observable
characteristics, I want to motivate the choice of splitting the sample in these three categories
when performing the analysis. In fact, looking at the summary statistics presented so far we
can infer that households treated in both waves and those treated only in one will differ also
in terms of unobservable characteristics. The results presented in the next section confirm this
assumption by showing heterogeneous effects of migration on the consumption of these three
treatment groups.
27This category includes remittances spend in health and medical expenditure and in education.
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3.7 Results
The results of the main analysis are presented in table 19 and 20. The results presented in
this section show that households with at least one migrant in both waves and those treated
only in wave two experience a decrease in per capita consumption and a change in household
composition. This is not the case for households treated only in wave one. Moreover, household
overall consumption increases for households with at least one migrant in both waves, plausibly
in line with the increase in household size experienced by this group.
Table 19: The effect of migration on per capita monthly household consumption by treatment
type: unmatched and matched sample.
PSM
Total Food Non-Food Total Food Non-Food
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Always migrant
Treated x Wave -0.092 * -0.123 ** -0.079 -0.066 -0.121 * -0.007
( 0.055) ( 0.061) ( 0.080) ( 0.060) ( 0.067) ( 0.089)
N 582 582 582 500 500 500
B: Only wave 2
Treated x Wave -0.187 ** -0.225 *** -0.120 -0.184 ** -0.238 *** -0.070
( 0.075) ( 0.079) ( 0.107) ( 0.082) ( 0.089) ( 0.117)
N 402 402 402 318 318 318
C: Only wave 1
Treated x Wave 0.053 0.046 -0.016 0.047 0.020 0.018
( 0.052) ( 0.058) ( 0.076) ( 0.057) ( 0.065) ( 0.084)
N 728 728 728 609 609 609
Note: All coefficients are estimated using a different regression. Columns 1,2 and 3 are estimated on the unmatched
sample. Columns 4,5 and 6 are estimated using propensity score matching and observations on the common support.
Always migrant is a binary variable equal to one if the household has at least one migrant in both waves, only wave
2 is a binary variable if the household has at least one migrant only in wave 2, and only wave 1 is a binary variable
equal to one if the household has at least one migrant only in wave 1. The control group are households with no
migrants in either wave. Outcome variables are real monthly per capita consumption expressed in natural logs.All
regressions include village level fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Firstly, I look at table 19 showing the results on the effect of migration on per capita
household consumption, conventionally considered as a better measure of welfare in contexts
of poverty (De Brauw and Harigaya, 2007). Columns 1 to 3 present the results when using the
unmatched sample. Columns 4 to 6 show the results when using propensity score matching.
The table shows the estimation of equation 13-15 and presents the coefficients separately
for each of the three treatment types. I report the coefficients for the interaction terms of
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interest γ1, δ1, λ1 , full tables of the main results are presented in appendix 3 (see table 34).
Two main findings emerge from table 19. First, the results obtained implementing propensity
scores matching differ from those obtained running the regressions on the unmatched sample.
Although the differences are not large, the magnitude of the coefficients is smaller and the
statistical significance of the coefficients changes in the two specifications for households with
at least one migrant in both waves. This confirms a bias in the estimates due to selection
into migration for households in this treatment group. Second, the effect of migration on
consumption varies depending on the treatment type.
The results are heterogeneous across the three treatment types. Panel A of table 19
shows an overall negative effect on consumption for households with at least one migrant in
both waves of the survey. However, none of these effects is statistically different from zero,
with the exception of a weak negative effect of around 12 percent on food-consumption. I
interpret these coefficients as showing that there is no statistically significant change in overall
household consumption for households with at least one migrant in both waves relative to
households who had no migrants in either period. The negative sign of the coefficients, however,
indicates a plausible worsening in household welfare. This is in line with a deterioration of
the income channel through which households might benefit in terms of consumption, i.e.
lower probability of receiving remittances, lower number of migrants away, and lower value of
remittances received, as discussed qualitatively in the previous section.
Panel B of table 19 shows that migration has overall negative effects on per capita con-
sumption for households who have at least one member migrating between the two waves: total
consumption drops by 18.4 percent, and this is driven by a larger dip in food-consumption of
around 24 percent. Notice that the magnitude of these effects is in line with that presented in
Gibson et al. (2011). This might suggest that in the short-run the loss of agricultural labor is
not offset by the receipt of remittances. It should also be kept in mind that internal migration
increased between waves and that the amount of remittances sent back home by internal mi-
grants is much lower than in the case of international migration. Moreover, migration became
riskier over the four years of analysis and this might translate in a higher difficulty for the
migrant to send money and goods back home.
Lastly, panel C of table 19 shows that the effect of migration for households treated only in
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wave one is not statistically significant and smaller in magnitude. The interpretation of these
coefficient is less straightforward as the households in this category are less homogeneous. In
fact, it might be that migrants returned to the household of origin bringing back their savings
and positively affecting consumption, but increasing household size might have the opposite
effect. Moreover, as I am unable to measure whether the migrant returned to the household or
just to the village, these coefficients might indicate that little has changed for the household.
To conclude, these findings suggest that migration reduces per capita consumption in the
short-run in line with previous findings for Tongan working migrants in (Gibson et al., 2011).
Moreover, although the coefficients are not statistically different from zero, the sign of the
estimates differs for households in the OnlyWave1 group compared to households in the other
two categories. These results might be driven by a reduction in the access to migration and in
receiving remittances between waves, as documented in the previous section. These negative
changes would not affect households that were treated in wave one and are no longer treated
in wave two and might explain the positive sign of the coefficients in panel C of table 19.
Secondly, I look at whether these results hold when using as outcome variable overall
household consumption measures. Table 20 presents the results. I report the coefficients for
the interaction terms of interest γ1, δ1, λ1 , while full tables of these results are presented in
appendix 3 (see table 35). Using this second set of outcome variables, I find evidence that
migration increases overall household consumption.
Panel A of table 20 shows that this increase is statistically significant only for households
that were treated in both waves. In fact, households with at least one migrant in both waves
see their total consumption increase by 16 percent relative to households that never had a
migrant, and non-food consumption increase by 22 percent. The estimated effect on food
consumption is of 10.6 percent, but not statistically different from zero (however, the p-value
for this coefficient is of 0.12).
Panel B and Panel C of table 20 show that the effect on total household consumption for
those treated in only one of the two waves is not statistically significant. On one hand, panel
B shows that this effect is positive but not statistically significant for households having at
least one of their member migrating between waves. Although not statistically different from
zero, the sign of the coefficients turns positive and oppositely from the results on per capita
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consumption suggests a positive effect of migration on household consumption. On the other,
panel C shows that the sign of the effect for households treated only in wave one is negative
for food and non-food consumption and the magnitude of the effect is very small, in line with
the coefficients for this category in terms of per capita consumption.
The findings presented so far suggest two things. First, that the effect of migration on con-
sumption differs across the three treatment types. Second, that something might be affecting
per capita figures differently than overall household-level consumption for households in the
AlwaysMigrant and OnlyWave2 categories.
Table 20: The effect of migration on monthly household consumption by treatment type:
unmatched and matched sample.
PSM
Total Food Non-Food Total Food Non-Food
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Always migrant
Treated x Wave 0.112 * 0.081 0.128 0.162 ** 0.106 0.226 **
( 0.059) ( 0.063) ( 0.087) ( 0.065) ( 0.070) ( 0.096)
N 582 582 582 500 500 500
B: Only wave 2
Treated x Wave 0.006 -0.032 0.073 0.063 0.010 0.179
( 0.079) ( 0.081) ( 0.114) ( 0.091) ( 0.095) ( 0.129)
N 402 402 402 318 318 318
C: Only wave 1
Treated x Wave -0.025 -0.008 -0.099 0.001 -0.002 -0.028
( 0.056) ( 0.059) ( 0.083) ( 0.061) ( 0.066) ( 0.090)
N 728 728 728 609 609 609
Note: All coefficients are estimated using a different regression. Columns 1,2 and 3 are estimated on the unmatched
sample. Columns 4,5 and 6 are estimated using propensity score matching and observations on the common support.
Always migrant is a binary variable equal to one if the household has at least one migrant in both waves, only wave
2 is a binary variable if the household has at least one migrant only in wave 2, and only wave 1 is a binary variable
equal to one if the household has at least one migrant only in wave 1. The control group are households with no
migrants in either wave. Outcome variables are real monthly per capita consumption expressed in natural logs. All
regressions include village fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
The discrepancy in the findings for household consumption and per capita consumption
leads to explore possible mechanisms. The most straightforward explanation is that migration
affects household size. If more productive younger household members migrate (as shown in
the sample summary statistics and in line with the literature Mueller et al., 2018), it can
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be expected that the household needs to increase its sample size to compensate for the loss
in labor force. This might be even truer if exchanging and renting out land is particularly
problematic or impossible as in this context (De Brauw and Mueller, 2012).
Given the negative and statistically significant effect on per capita consumption limited to
households switching to migration in wave two, it is also possible that this effect is negative
only in the short-term. Table 21 presents the results of the estimation of equations 13, 14 and
15 using several outcome variables and propensity score matching. I report the coefficients for
the interaction terms of interest γ1, δ1, λ1 , while full tables of these results are presented in
appendix 3 (see table 36)
Column 1 in table 21 shows that migration increases household size by 1.3 units for house-
holds with at least one migrant in both waves and by 1.2 units for those treated only in
wave two relative to households in the control group. This suggests that over time households
treated in both waves might need to compensate for the worsening in the migration experi-
ence documented in section 3.6. As they receive less remittances and have less migrants away,
households might need to compensate with extra agricultural labor by either hiring more work-
force or by asking help to the extended family. Similarly, households that have at least one
of their members migrating between waves, might need to insure themselves against the loss
in labor productivity if the income received via remittances is not high enough to compensate
for migration.
Moreover, this increase in household size is largely driven by an increase in the number of
adults in the household (rather than of dependent members below the age of 15 or above 65).
In fact, I find an increase in the number of adults in the household for households treated in
both waves, experiencing an increase of around 0.9 units relative to households that never had
migrants, and for households treated only in wave two, experiencing an increase in adults of
1 unit. This is in line with the qualitative evidence showing that the average age of migrants
is 25 years and with previous findings showing that the majority of migrants in Ethiopia are
head of household's children in the age between 25 and 34 (Mueller et al., 2018).
Column 3 of table 21 shows the change in the gender composition of the household. I find
that the number of men increases for the first two categories (Panel A and B) in table relative
to households that never had a migrant, while there is no effect for households treated only in
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wave 1 (Panel C). Given the importance of gender-roles in agricultural practices in Ethiopia, it
is plausible that this increase in number of men is due to a higher need of productive workforce
in the farm. This is in line with the qualitative evidence presented in table 17 showing that
80 percent of the migrants are men in the sample of analysis, suggesting that the household
might need to substitute this loss in workforce for the agricultural tasks carried out only by
men (e.g. plowing).
Panel C of table 21 shows that households with at least one migrant at baseline and none
at follow-up did not experience a change in household composition. This is in line with the
findings on household and per capita consumption for OnlyWave1 households, showing no
change in consumption over time. Several reasons might be driving this result. First, as
discussed in section 3.5, households in this category do not necessarily have migrants coming
back to the household. Thus, if household members return to the village, but are still out of the
household, per capita consumption might not change (especially if they substitute remittances
with agricultural work or by exchanging goods with their household of origin). Second, if
the migrants do return to the household, they might offset the negative effect on per capita
consumption, due to an increase in household size, with an increase in labor productivity. In
both of these cases, household per capita consumption would not change.
Lastly, column 4 in table 20 shows the results of the effect of migration on household annual
income. This is a different variable from our consumption measures and it is calculated to be
the natural logarithm of the sum of any source of income that the household reports to have
received in the previous 12 months (this includes the category Money received by members
abroad). I find that households treated in wave one and no longer in wave two experience
a significant drop in income of 48 percent. This is plausibly due to a mechanical decrease in
remittances and goods received from members outside the household included in the measure
of annual income for households both in the treatment and control group.
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Table 21: The effect of migration on household composition and annual total income by
treatment type: matched sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HH size Nr adults Nr Men Annual Income
A: Always migrant
Treated x Wave 1.294 *** 0.873 *** 0.547 *** -0.200
( 0.245) ( 0.184) ( 0.179) ( 0.142)
N 500 500 500 500
B: Only wave 2
Treated x Wave 1.210 *** 1.019 *** 0.498 ** -0.004
( 0.321) ( 0.229) ( 0.226) ( 0.177)
N 318 318 318 318
C: Only wave 1
Treated x Wave -0.124 -0.211 -0.024 -0.480 ***
( 0.230) ( 0.180) ( 0.164) ( 0.137)
N 609 609 609 609
Note: All coefficients are estimated using a different regression. Columns 1,2 and 3 are estimated using propensity
score matching and observations on the common support and a diff-in-diff estimator. Always migrant is a binary
variable equal to one if the household has at least one migrant in both waves, only wave 2 is a binary variable if the
household has at least one migrant only in wave 2, and only wave 1 is a binary variable equal to one if the household
has at least one migrant only in wave 1. The control group are households with no migrants in either wave.HH Size
is a variable indicating the number of members in the household. Nr adults is indicating the number of household
members aged between 15 and 65. Number of men is the number of men in the household. Annual income is the
natural log of real household yearly income. All regressions include village level fixed effects. All standard errors
are clustered at the household level.
To conclude, table 21 shows that the change in household consumption is accompanied
by a change in the composition of the household. This is true for households treated in
both waves and treated only in wave two, but not for households treated only in wave one.
The discrepancy in per capita and overall household consumption is driven by an increase in
household size and in the number of adults. Moreover, the results show that gender plays a
role in this change of household composition.
Overall, I find mixed evidence on the effect of migration on consumption. This effect
seems to be negative, at least in the short run. The specific context of Ethiopia, where land
regulations impose high costs on households who invest in migration, seems to matter in ex-
plaining the mechanisms behind the results. In fact, migrant-sending households experiencing
a decrease in per capita consumption, also register an increase in household size over the




This section presents the results of the robustness checks conducted to validate the main
analysis. First, I include household fixed effects in the estimation to net out household-specific
time-invariant characteristics that might affect consumption (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014). I
use the following specifications:
∆Consumptionh = γh + γ1AlwaysTreatedh + ζh (18)
∆Consumptionh = δh + δ1OnlyWave2h + h (19)
∆Consumptionh = βh + β1OnlyWave1h + ηh (20)
Tables 22 and 23 show results very similar to those presented in the previous section
in terms of magnitude, sign and statistical significance of the coefficients. First, table 22
shows the main results on per capita household consumption for the three different treatment
groups. The results presented in table 22 are estimated using household fixed effects for the
unmatched sample (columns 1 to 3) and for the matched sample using the same estimation of
the propensity scores as in the main analysis (columns 4 to 6). Then, table 23 presents the
results for overall household consumption (columns 1 to 6) and for the mechanisms explored
in the analysis, i.e. household size, number of adults, number of men and annual household
income (columns 7 to 10).
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Table 22: The effect of migration on per capita monthly household consumption: household
fixed effects, unmatched and matched sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PSM
Total Food Non-Food Total Food Non-Food
A: Always migrant
Treated -0.088 -0.125 ** -0.070 -0.062 -0.120 * -0.003
( 0.055) ( 0.060) ( 0.080) ( 0.060) ( 0.066) ( 0.088)
N 582 582 582 500 500 500
B: Only wave 2
Treated -0.184 ** -0.225 *** -0.116 -0.181 ** -0.238 *** -0.064
( 0.074) ( 0.078) ( 0.106) ( 0.082) ( 0.089) ( 0.117)
N 402 402 402 318 318 318
C: Only wave 1
Treated 0.057 0.070 -0.010 0.048 0.045 0.020
( 0.052) ( 0.057) ( 0.076) ( 0.057) ( 0.062) ( 0.084)
N 728 728 728 609 609 609
Note: All coefficients are estimated using a different regression and household fixed effects. Columns 1,2 and 3
are estimated on the unmatched sample. Columns 4,5 and 6 are estimated using propensity score matching and
observations on the common support. Always migrant is a binary variable equal to one if the household has at
least one migrant in both waves, only wave 2 is a binary variable if the household has at least one migrant only in
wave 2, and only wave 1 is a binary variable equal to one if the household has at least one migrant only in wave 1.
The control group are households with no migrants in either wave. Outcome variables are real monthly per capita
consumption expressed in natural logs. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Second, I use inverse probability weights directly in the estimation of equation 13, 14 and 15
as an alternative way to make the treatment and control group more comparable. Differently
from propensity score matching, this methodology allows me to use all of the observations
in the analysis, without having to pre-screen the sample to keep only observations on the
common support.
I estimate the inverse propensity weights to be equal to 1/p for the treatment group
and 1/(1 − p) for the control group, where p is the probability of being treated estimated
using a logit model. I estimate the probability of being treated as a function of the same
set of baseline characteristics used in the main analysis: demographic characteristics of the
household (household size, children below 15 years ration, elderly above 65 ratio, men ratio,
illiterate ratio), household infrastructure (number of rooms, square meters, having piped water,
having access to electricity), land (land index for land ownership, area of homestead land
owned, area of agricultural land owned), community level characteristics (population, number
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of households, number of households with migrants, number of shocks experienced in last years,
number of investments carried out in the past years, distance to regional capital, distance to
road, distance to bus, distance to bank, cost of reaching capital, region dummies). I estimate
the weights separately for each of the three samples used in the main analysis.
The results are presented in table 24. I find a large effect of migration on household
consumption for households with at least one migrant in both waves. The estimated coefficients
are strongly significant and larger than those estimated using propensity score matching. This
is plausibly due both to the larger sample size and to a higher bias in the estimation due to
households with weights very close to zero or to one.
Table 23: The effect of migration on monthly household consumption and household compo-
sition: household fixed effects, unmatched and matched sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PSM PSM
Total Food Non-Food Total Food Non-Food HH size Nr adults Nr Men Annual Income
A: Always migrant
Treated 0.114 * 0.081 0.130 0.163 ** 0.106 0.228 ** 1.297 *** 0.863 *** 0.540*** -0.183
( 0.059) ( 0.062) ( 0.087) ( 0.064) ( 0.069) ( 0.095) ( 0.243) ( 0.183) (0.178) ( 0.143)
N 582 582 582 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
B: Only wave 2
Treated 0.007 -0.032 0.075 0.065 0.010 0.182 1.210 *** 1.019 *** 0.498** -0.010
( 0.078) ( 0.080) ( 0.113) ( 0.090) ( 0.093) ( 0.127) ( 0.317) ( 0.226) (0.222) ( 0.176)
N 402 402 402 318 318 318 318 318 318 318
C: Only wave 1
Treated -0.025 -0.009 -0.097 0.001 -0.002 -0.027 -0.124 -0.211 -0.024 -0.509 ***
( 0.056) ( 0.059) ( 0.083) ( 0.061) ( 0.065) ( 0.090) ( 0.229) ( 0.179) (0.162) ( 0.138)
N 728 728 728 609 609 609 609 609 609 609
Note:All coefficients are estimated using a different regression and using household fixed effects. Columns 1,2 and
3 are estimated on the unmatched sample. Columns 4 to 10 are estimated using propensity score matching and
observations on the common support. Columns 4 to 6 show the results for overall household consumption, while
columns 7 to 10 explore possible mechanisms. Always migrant is a binary variable equal to one if the household
has at least one migrant in both waves, only wave 2 is a binary variable if the household has at least one migrant
only in wave 2, and only wave 1 is a binary variable equal to one if the household has at least one migrant only in
wave 1. The control group are households with no migrants in either wave. Outcome variables are real monthly per
capita consumption expressed in natural logs. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
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Table 24: The effect of migration on household consumption, household composition and
annual income: inverse probability weighted estimation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Household level Per-capita Mechanisms
Total Food Non-Food Total Food Non-Food HH size Nr adults Nr men Annual income
A: Always migrant
Treated 0.270 *** 0.172 ** 0.398 *** -0.002 -0.099 0.121 1.490 *** 1.378 *** 0.589*** -0.146
( 0.075) ( 0.080) ( 0.109) ( 0.069) ( 0.077) ( 0.101) ( 0.258) ( 0.228) (0.203) ( 0.152)
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
B: Only wave 2
Treated 0.107 0.033 0.267 * -0.170 * -0.246 ** -0.010 1.310 *** 1.179 *** 0.547** -0.159
( 0.097) ( 0.099) ( 0.146) ( 0.091) ( 0.099) ( 0.130) ( 0.328) ( 0.245) (0.239) ( 0.194)
N 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318
C: Only wave 1
Treated 0.093 0.050 0.133 0.074 0.033 0.113 0.181 0.349 -0.032 -0.245
( 0.073) ( 0.077) ( 0.103) ( 0.065) ( 0.072) ( 0.092) ( 0.241) ( 0.231) (0.186) ( 0.153)
N 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression and using inverse propensity weights in the estimation.
Columns 1 to 3 estimate the effect of having at least one migrant in the household on overall household total, food
and non-food consumption. Columns 4 to 6 estimate the effects on per-capita consumption. Columns 7 to 10 show
the results when investigating possible mechanisms. All the regressions are estimated including inverse propensity
weights in the regressions and clustering the SE at the household level. The propensity scores are estimated using
a logit model to predict the probability of having at least one migrant in the household. The propensity scores
are estimated separately for the three samples in panel A, B and C using a set of baseline characteristics including
demographic characteristics, household infrastructure, land ownership and hectares of land owned, community level
characteristics.
3.9 Conclusion
Migration has long been studied as a way to improve the welfare of migrants (Harris and
Todaro, 1970) and of origin households (Stark and Bloom, 1985).
Its recent inclusion in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals marks the centrality of
this topic for the development agenda of the next decade. This is particularly true in contexts
where poverty rates are high and migrant-sending households are more subject to income
vulnerability, as it is often the case in rural areas of low income countries, and where migration
can help insuring households against negative income shocks (Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig
and Stark, 1989).
Growing empirical evidence has shown that migration can have large welfare effects on
origin households income and consumption, as well as on human capital investments and
entrepreneurship (Yang, 2008; McKenzie et al., 2010; Gibson and McKenzie, 2014; Clemens and
Tiongson, 2017). However, other studies find that in the short-run this effect might be negative
if the increase in remittances income does not offset the loss in agricultural labor productivity
(Gibson et al., 2011) and a literature on internal migration highlights that seasonal re-location
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has different effects from international permanent migration (Clemens and Tiongson, 2017).
Given this mixed evidence, additional studies aimed at measuring the effect of migration
on origin household welfare are still needed. The scarcity of experimental settings and panel
data to study migration (McKenzie et al., 2010), further motivate this study. This paper
contributes to this literature by using panel data to conduct an empirical analysis of the effect
of migration on household consumption in rural Ethiopia.
The context of Ethiopia is of particular relevance both for its high levels of poverty, highest
in its rural areas, and for the large potential gains of migration (de Brauw et al., 2017). In
fact, empirical evidence on Ethiopia shows that the migration rate is relatively lower than
in other Sub-Saharan countries (Mueller et al., 2018) and that this is partly due to the high
costs of migration faced by rural households (Bezu and Holden, 2014; De Brauw and Mueller,
2012; Mueller et al., 2018). Following from these findings, additional evidence is needed to
understand the consequences of migration in this particular context.
This paper contributes to the literature by evaluating the effect of migration on consump-
tion for 1200 rural households in the Amhara, Tigray, Oromyia and SNNP regions of Ethiopia.
Using household panel data from the Migrating out of Poverty programme, it studies the effect
of having at least one migrant in the household on total, food and non-food consumption. In
order to reduce issues of selection and unobserved heterogeneity between the treatment and
control groups, the analysis uses a difference-in-difference matched estimator to evaluate these
effects.
Given the variation in the probability of being treated between the two waves of data, the
results are estimated differently for three types of households: those with at least one migrant
in both years, those with at least one migrant only in 2014 and those with at least one migrant
only in 2018. By splitting the sample in these three groups, the analysis attempts to control
for the endogeneity in the decision of switching status between waves as well as providing
richer information on different migration experiences.
The results show evidence of a 20 percent decrease in per capita consumption for households
that have at least one member migrating between the two waves. Oppositely, total household
consumption increases by 16 to 22 percent for households with at least one migrant in both
waves compared to households that never had a migrant, while the effect is not statistically
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significant for the other two groups. To explain these mixed results, the paper shows that
changes in consumption are accompanied by changes in the household composition. In partic-
ular, it shows that the household size increases over time for those households experiencing a
drop in consumption.
Moreover, this increase in household size is not driven by higher fertility, but with an
increase in the share of adults and men in the household. This is in line with previous
literature on rural Ethiopia showing that as younger and more productive members (mostly,
the head's sons) migrate, the household might need additional workforce to compensate for its
loss in labor (Mueller et al., 2018). The results hold when using household fixed effects and
inverse probability weights directly in the estimation.
Overall, the main conclusion of this paper is that, at least in the short-term, migration can
be negative for household consumption and that the magnitude of the effects is in line with
evidence from other contexts (Gibson et al., 2011). In line with previous studies on Ethiopia,
this negative effect is associated with a change in household composition and the loss in
agricultural labor workforce resulting from the migration of young male head of household's
children.
To conclude, I would like to draw the attention of the reader to some important limitations
of this analysis. The main drawback of the analysis is to not be able to rule out issues of reverse
causality and selection into treatment. Thus, the results presented in the analysis cannot be
interpreted as causal, notwithstanding the effort made by the author of using panel data and
matching techniques to partly address the above mentioned issues.
In absence of an experimental or quasi-experimental setting to study migration, issues
of reverse causality might bias the estimates in the analysis. This means that it could be
negative changes to household consumption driving the decision to migrate or to return to the
household rather than the opposite. This is plausible in either case: household experiencing
a negative shock to consumption (e.g. a drought or conflict in neighboring villages) might
decide to send a member of the household away as insurance mechanism, but might also see a
member of the household return (in the case of rising violence and conflict, having a son away
might make the household more vulnerable). Even considering this issue, the results might
be helpful for policy makers. In particular, I find that migration is associated with a decrease
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in per capita consumption for households having a member migrating between waves. This
information and the heterogeneity analysis for other groups of households can help identify
more vulnerable groups of the population and help target policies aimed at alleviating poverty.
Moreover, the results of this analysis should be interpreted with care as, because of data
limitations, I am not able to test for the core underlying assumption of difference-in-differences
estimators, i.e. the pre-trend assumption. Although using panel data and propensity score
matching techniques reduces the concerns of unobserved heterogeneity and selection, one might
plausibly argue that treated households differ from the control group not just because of the
treatment. Thus, these estimates are likely to be biased compared to the ideal experimental
setting (McKenzie et al., 2010). This been said, the contribution of using panel data when
analyzing migration is non trivial (Beegle et al., 2011) and combining this methodology with
propensity score matching is a valid alternative in non-experimental settings (Gibson and
McKenzie, 2014; de Brauw et al., 2017).
Then, the analysis uses a simplified measure of migration. While the control group is
arguably homogeneous enough, the definition of the three treatment categories might be too
generic, e.g. households treated in both waves have different members of the household mi-
grating over time and I do not consider the fact that they might be returning home during the
two waves, moreover one household might have more than one migrant away and this might
affect consumption differently. However, by splitting the sample in the three treatment groups,
I reduce partly the heterogeneity among households that experience migration at some point
during the period of analysis, while facing the trade-off of sample size reduction.
Lastly, the consumption measures might be biased because of the large portion of food-
items that are produced by the household. By attaching to these items a kebele-level price,
I might be overestimating their actual value. This might be an issue as it is mostly animal
products, usually a better measure of household diet, that fall into this category.
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4 Conclusions
This thesis comprises three papers.
First, it investigates the effect of an increase in wealth inequality on political preferences.
Building on a long-standing literature in economics, it investigates the effect of wealth inequal-
ity on party support and preferences for redistribution. In particular, the first paper looks at
the role of wealth inequality in shaping one's preferences for redistribution and on the proba-
bility to support the Conservative party in England and Wales. Following from this interest
in understanding political preferences, this thesis analyzes their formation. In particular, it
evaluates whether specific policies, i.e. conscription, have a short- or long-run effect in shaping
civic and political engagement and national identity. The motivation of this second analysis
spurs from a renewed interest among policy-makers in promoting policies that increase civic
engagement and national and social cohesion, of which conscription is just an example.
This political discourse around national identity has become increasingly linked with the
topic of migration. Managing the increase in migratory flows from lower-income countries
to Europe (and to the U.S.) has a central role in the agenda of political parties, as it does
in the development agenda. While most of the political debate around this topic focuses on
the effects of migration at destination, the empirical and theoretical literature in economics
has long studied migration as a more complex phenomenon. In particular, migration has
important effects on migrant-sending household's welfare, both in terms of increasing income
and reducing poverty. Following from the relevance of this topic, the third paper presents an
empirical analysis of the effect of migration on origin household consumption in rural Ethiopia.
The first paper analyses the effect of wealth inequality on preferences for redistribution and
support for political parties. Motivated by a growing interest on the effects of rising wealth
inequality, this paper provides novel evidence on its effect on political preferences. The aim of
the paper is to test two mechanisms. First, it looks at whether rising wealth inequality affects
the probability of supporting the Conservative party in England and Wales. Second, it looks
at whether this change in support is accompanied by a change in preferences for redistribution.
With this analysis, I contribute to the literature on the relationship between inequality and
preferences for redistribution, as well as providing evidence on the effect of wealth inequality
129
as separate from income and wages (Piketty et al., 2014). Empirical evidence has long been
testing the validity of the median voter theory (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) finding that income
inequality matters in shaping one's preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009).
Less is known on whether this is the case for changes in the distribution of wealth (Di Tella
et al., 2007; Caprettini et al., 2019). Moreover, and to the best of this author's knowledge,
there is no causal empirical evidence testing that wealth inequality changes both preferences
and party support. Following the rationale of Barth and Moene (2016), this paper investigates
whether as wealth inequality rises richer individuals are more likely to support the Conservative
party and less likely to have pro-public sector preferences.
I investigate this relationship exploiting the house price boom in England and Wales be-
tween 1995 and 2007. Using local-level house price shocks (as in Disney et al., 2010), I evaluate
whether homeowners react differently from renters in terms of political preferences. I find that
a 10 percent house price shock makes homeowners 2 percentage points more likely to support
the Conservative party. However, the effect on preferences for redistribution is not statistically
different from zero, although negative as predicted by the literature. To explain this result I
explore two mechanisms. First, I find that the average effect hides important heterogeneity
among homeowners. I find that owners of more expensive properties are more likely to sup-
port the Conservative party and less likely to support the government's ownership of public
services relative to owners of cheaper ones. Second, I find evidence of endowment effects in
the housing market, and I find that self-reported house value is associated with a change in
preferences in line with the hypotheses tested. The overall conclusion of this paper is that
wealth inequality does have an effect in shaping political preferences, but that the average ef-
fect on preferences for redistribution is not as predicted in the literature. This might depend,
as shown in this analysis, on heterogeneous effects across homeowners or on their perception
of own house value.
The second paper investigates the effect of conscription on political ideology, voting par-
ticipation and national identity. The motivation for this paper is a renewed policy interest
in bringing back national service as a way to foster civic duty and social cohesion. Interest
resulting in some countries following through with this reform (e.g. France, seehere). The
consequences of such reform might be non trivial in terms of costs. The economic literature
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has long studied the effect that conscription has on labor market outcomes. Among others,
Angrist (1990) first found that conscription decreases draftees wages by 15 percent compared
to comparable non-draftees, Bedard and Deschênes (2006) find that it increases mortality
rates, and Galiani et al. (2011) find that it increases crime rates. Given these non-negligible
costs, convincing empirical evidence on the effects of conscription in shaping civic participation
and political attitudes is crucial to inform policy-makers. This paper aims at providing such
evidence.
Exploiting a quasi-experimental setting and data from Germany and Spain, the paper
investigates whether peacetime conscription affects voting participation, political ideology and
national identity. The main analysis evaluates the effect of the introduction of conscription
in West Germany for men born just before and just after the reform. After ensuring that
these two groups are comparable, I find no statistically significant evidence of an effect of
conscription on the outcomes considered. Moreover, I find that the reform has no statistically
significant effect on other forms of civic engagement (namely, volunteering or participation in
local politics), nor on the support for political parties. I perform several robustness checks
to test the validity of the results to different specifications. Among these checks, I also test
whether the results hold when analyzing the effect of the abolition of conscription in Spain.
The main conclusions of this paper are the following. First, I do not find statistical
and economic significant evidence of an effect of conscription in affecting political attitudes.
This is key for the policy evaluation of this reform as strong evidence of negative effects of
conscription is, instead, available. Second, the effects are comparable in sign and magnitude in
the two contexts of analysis plausibly leading one to believe their external validity. Third, the
analysis unpacks both short-term and long-term effects and, in line with the impressionable
years hypothesis (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014), shows that the effect on political and
social values persists over time. Overall, the findings of this analysis do not provide evidence
motivating the reintroduction of conscription with the aim recently proposed by policy makers
(for media coverage of the political discussion, see here and here).
Lastly, the third paper evaluates the effect of migration on household consumption in rural
Ethiopia. Migration is at the center of the political, economic and development agenda (e.g.
Sustainable Development Goals 2030, see here). In line with the New Economics of Labor
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Migration literature (Stark and Bloom, 1985), growing research is looking at migration as a
strategy available to households to improve their livelihood. This is particularly important for
poorer households living under financial constraints and income variability (Clemens et al.,
2014; Clemens and Ogden, 2014), as in the case of rural households in Sub-Saharan countries.
Empirical evidence has shown that migration can have large positive effects on household
welfare (Yang, 2008; Gibson and McKenzie, 2014; Clemens and Tiongson, 2017), but that this
effect might be negative in the short-run if the absence of the migrant (both in terms of earned
wage and role within the household) is not offset by the gains coming from migration, e.g.
remittances (Gibson et al., 2011). Given these mixed results, this paper aims at providing
additional evidence on this relationship. It does so using panel data from rural Ethiopia, one
of the poorest areas in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the world, where identifying strategies that
lift more households out of poverty is of particular policy relevance.
This paper uses panel data collected in 2014 and 2018 to investigate whether having at least
one migrant in the household affects household consumption. The analysis is carried out using
propensity score matching techniques and a difference-in-differences estimator contributing to
the literature on the causal effects of migration on household welfare (Gibson and McKenzie,
2014). Exploiting a large variation in the probability of being treated between the two waves
and a very low attrition rate, the paper provides several findings. First, I find that the effects
varies for the three treatment groups in the analysis: per capita consumption decreases both
for households with at least one migrant in both waves and for households treated only at
follow-up when compared to households that never had a migrant. This is not the case for
households that had at least one migrant at baseline and none at follow-up. Second, I find
that overall household consumption increases for the former two groups.
I explore possible mechanisms to explain these results. On the one hand, I find evidence of a
change in household composition, explained by an increase in household size and in the number
of adults. On the other, I provide qualitative evidence of other channels that might explain the
negative effect of migration on per capita consumption, namely, the decrease in international
migration (usually characterized by a higher value of remittances), the decrease in the number
of migrants per households and in the probability of receiving goods and remittances. The
paper concludes the following. First, that it is crucial to conduct the analysis splitting the
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sample by migration experience to reduce the selection bias. Second, that the high costs of
migration in Ethiopia (in terms of barriers to international migration, in terms of conflict in
and around the country and in terms of land regulations) might concur to explain the negative
effect on per capita consumption. Third, that this effect might be limited to the short-run
in line with other literature in the field (Gibson et al., 2011). Overall, I conclude that more
research needs to be carried out to fully understand the effect of migration on the origin
household. In fact, given the lack of additional data, this analysis addresses only partly issues
of selection bias and endogeneity of particular concern when studying migration.
To conclude, I would like to discuss the key findings of this thesis.
First, this thesis shows that wealth, and not only wage or income, inequality affects both
the support for political parties and preferences for redistribution. The evidence presented
in the first chapter contributes to the current political and economic debate on the effects
of rising wealth inequality on political preferences and redistributive policies. Following from
the economic evidence on the increasing relevance of wealth accumulation at the top of the
distribution (Piketty et al., 2014), this debate hypothesizes that increasing wealth inequality
might translate into higher political polarization and lower levels of redistribution (Bonica
et al., 2013). The economic literature has long investigated the relationship between inequality
and political preferences, but little evidence is focused on wealth. The findings of the paper
aim at inform this discussion and policy-makers. The findings presented in the first chapter
show that wealth inequality increases the probability of voting for parties less-favorable to
redistribution, although on average it does not affect one's beliefs. This is until we consider
the heterogeneity in wealth effects for different groups of the population benefiting more or
less from rising inequality or the relationship between one's perceptions of own wealth and
political beliefs.
Thus, I conclude that political preferences respond to changes in the wealth distribution,
that these changes are driven by those who experience larger wealth positive shocks and
that one's valuation of own wealth matters in explaining political beliefs. In contexts where
wealth is at the center of the political debate, this information might inform political parties
of the electoral response to redistributive policies. It also provides novel evidence of the
relationship between party support and redistributive beliefs. Understanding what changes
133
this relationship, and in which direction, proves relevant in the current research effort aimed at
explaining voting behavior, increasing political and ideological polarization, and the changing
policy platform of traditional parties.
Following from this discussion on political preferences, this thesis investigates the formation
of political ideology, civic values and national identity. The political debate has recently been
focused on several policies aimed at strengthening national cohesion and civic participation,
as well as national identity. Several policy proposals have been put forward: from stricter
immigration rules to more protectionist trade policies. The analysis carried out in the second
chapter aims at informing the policy discussion on the benefits of one of these proposed policies,
i.e. re-introducing conscription. Policy-makers in Europe advocate for the positive effects of
conscription in increasing civic participation and strengthening national identity. The evidence
presented in the second chapter aims at testing whether this is the case.
This evidence is of particular relevance because of the extensive empirical evidence showing
the negative effects of conscription on several outcomes, among which crime rates and indi-
vidual health. Given these costs, policy proposals aimed at bringing back conscription should
be grounded on solid evidence of its intended benefits. The findings of the paper suggest that
these effects are not present both in the short- and in the long-run, as none of the estimated
coefficients is statistically different from zero. Moreover, the results do not seem to be peculiar
to a specific context, as they hold when I conduct the analysis using data from different coun-
tries, nor to the different measures of political preferences (ideology, political party supported)
or civic engagement (voting participation, volunteering, participation in local politics). Thus,
the main conclusion of the paper is that policy-makers might want to reconsider introducing
conscription as a way to achieve this proposed goal.
Lastly, the analysis carried out in the third chapter analyzes the relationship between
migration and migrant-sending household's welfare in a low-income country. Migratory flows
and immigration policies are at the center of the political debate in both developed and
developing countries, and often accompany political discourses on national identity and social
cohesion. Much of this debate focuses on the effects of immigration on receiving countries and
communities, although migration is a more complex phenomenon with important consequences
on origin countries. The economic literature has long studied migration as a way to improve
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the migrant and her origin household's living standards. The evidence presented in the third
chapter aims at understanding whether this is the case in the particular context of rural
Ethiopia.
This context is of interest both for its high poverty rates and for its high barriers to
migration. Moreover, its position in the Horn of Africa has put Ethiopia at the center of the
migration routes to the Middle East and to Europe. The evidence presented in this paper
shows that migration is a complex phenomenon and can have mixed effects on the origin
household. In fact, as much of the rural population in Ethiopia depends on agriculture, as
land regulations deter individuals from migrating, and as much of the migration flows happen
seasonally and withing national borders, the evidence provided in this paper shows an overall
negative effect of migration on household consumption, at least in the short-term.
Drawing from previous literature, the main conclusion of this chapter is that this nega-
tive effect depends on the high costs of internal and international migration in this context.
Evaluating whether this is the case and whether lowering the costs of migration would affect
these results is relevant for policy-makers both in low- and high-income countries. If the costs
imposed on migrant-sending households are too high, the households might not benefit from
migration in terms of welfare and of poverty reduction.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Appendix 1: supplemental figures and tables to paper 1.
Figure 6: Kernel density of the natural log of self-reported house value for home-owners
showing a shift to the right and an increase in the gap between homeowners and renters in
England and Wales in the period between 1995 and 2007.
Figure 7: Correlation between average house prices and support for the Conservative Party in
England and Wales in the period between 1995 and 2007.
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Figure 8: Deviation from linear predicted trend of average house prices in England and Wales
for the period between 1995 and 2007.
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Figure 9: Change in the probability of agreeing with different statements on the role of the
government in the economy in England and Wales in the period between 1995-2007.
(a) Pro-Public attitudes (b) Pro-Private enterprise attitudes
(c) Max wage imposed by government (d) Government ought to provide jobs
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Figure 10: Probability of supporting the Conservative party in England and Wales in the
period between 1995 and 2007 : by property type
(a) Detached house (b) Semi-detached
(c) Terraced (d) Flat
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Figure 11: Probability of supporting state ownership of public sector in England and Wales
between 1995 and 2007: by type of property owned.
(a) Detached (b) Semidetached
(c) Terraced (d) Flat
Figure 12: Average self-reported house value and average real and nominal house prices in
England and Wales between 1995 and 2007.
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Figure 13: Self-reported attitudes on importance of owning a home in England and Wales in
the period between 1995 and 2007: by home ownership status.
Importance of owning a home is measured as the probability of choosing values between 5 and
10 in when asked I'm going to read you a list of things that people value. For each one I'd like
you to tell me on a scale from 1 to 10 how important each one is to you, where '1' equals 'Not
important at all', and '10' equals 'Very important'. Owning your own home. Figure13 shows
the statistics for head of households by homeownership status. This variable is available in
the BHPS for 3 years : 1998, 2003, 2008.
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Table 25: The effect of wealth inequality on the support for the Conservative party and on
political attitudes: excluding movers.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Closer Support Public
Conservative Conservative Labour
Price shock -0.095 -0.154 0.147 -0.140
(0.082) (0.111) (0.113) (0.197)
Price shock x Owner 0.192∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗ -0.103 -0.025
(0.072) (0.110) (0.109) (0.194)
Owner 0.120∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Couple 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)
Household income 0.046∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Higher Degree -0.044∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.026)
Undergraduate 0.003 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
Secondary Edu 0.075∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Male 0.002 -0.001 0.017∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Employed -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.013
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
Household size -0.001 -0.005∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Self Employed 0.093∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
Unemployed 0.009 0.008 -0.010 0.019
(0.011) (0.017) (0.018) (0.029)
Retired 0.030∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.007 0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 40143 28282 40143 15577
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parenthesis
Note: All models estimated using OLS. Standard errors are bootstrapped (200 reps).The dependent variables are binary
variables equal to 1 if :(1) the individual supports the Conservative Party, (2) the individual feels closer to the Con-
servative party, (3) the individual supports the Labour party, (4) the individual agrees with state ownership of public
services. "Price shock all" is estimated as the residuals of an autoregressive model of order 2 on average house prices at
the county level for 53 counties in England and Wales in the period 1995-2007. Owner is a binary variable equal to 1
if the individual is a homeowner and zero if a renter. Sample includes head of households only. Data from the BHPS
wave 5-17 (1995-2007) and from the ONS-HPI. The estimation includes a set of controls: binary variables for marital
status, gender, education level, retirement status, employment status, log hh equivalised income, county, year of survey
and age.
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Table 26: The effect of wealth inequality on the support for the Conservative party and on
political attitudes: excluding Greater London.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Closer Support Public
Conservative Conservative Labour
Price shock -0.076 -0.068 0.111 -0.315∗∗
(0.082) (0.115) (0.113) (0.160)
Price shock x Owner 0.158∗ 0.135 -0.076 0.127
(0.086) (0.107) (0.116) (0.190)
Owner 0.115∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Couple 0.012∗∗ 0.010 -0.007 0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011)
Household income 0.044∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Higher Degree -0.029∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029)
Undergraduate 0.008 -0.031∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017)
Secondary Edu 0.080∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.021∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
Male -0.001 -0.005 0.022∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Employed -0.005 -0.006 0.012 0.016
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
Household size -0.004∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Self Employed 0.101∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017)
Unemployed 0.009 0.016 -0.016 0.027
(0.012) (0.019) (0.016) (0.030)
Retired 0.029∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.002
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.023)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 37556 26314 37556 14543
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parenthesis
Note: All models estimated using OLS. Standard errors in parenthesis are bootstrapped (200 reps).The dependent
variables are binary variables equal to 1 if :(1) the individual supports the Conservative Party, (2) the individual feels
closer to the Conservative party, (3) the individual supports the Labour party, (4) the individual agrees with state
ownership of public services. "Price shock all" is estimated as the residuals of an autoregressive model of order 2 on
average house prices at the county level for 52 counties in England and Wales in the period 1995-2007-Excluding the
county of Greater London. Owner is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is a homeowner and zero if a renter.
Sample includes head of households only.The estimation includes a set of controls: binary variables for marital status,
gender, education level, retirement status, employment status, log hh equivalised income, county, year of survey and age.
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Table 27: The effect of wealth inequality on the support for the Conservative party and on
political attitudes: including 2008.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Conservative Closer Conservative Support Labour Public
Price shock -0.090 -0.158 0.152 -0.158
(0.074) (0.098) (0.094) (0.153)
Price shock x Owner 0.151∗∗ 0.213∗∗ -0.122 0.012
(0.067) (0.084) (0.089) (0.144)
Owner 0.122∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43759 30650 43759 15793
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parenthesis
Note: All models estimated using OLS. Standard errors are bootstrapped (200 reps).The dependent variables are binary
variables equal to 1 if :(1) the individual supports the Conservative Party, (2) the individual feels closer to the Con-
servative party, (3) the individual supports the Labour party, (4) the individual agrees with state ownership of public
services. "Price shock all" is estimated as the residuals of an autoregressive model of order 2 on average house prices at
the county level for 53 counties in England and Wales in the period 1995-2008. Owner is a binary variable equal to 1
if the individual is a homeowner and zero if a renter. Sample includes head of households only. Data from the BHPS
wave 5-17 (1995-2007) and from the ONS-HPI. The estimation includes a set of controls: binary variables for marital
status, gender, education level, retirement status, employment status, log hh equivalised income, county, year of survey
and age.
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5.2 Appendix 2: supplemental figures and tables to paper 2.
Figure 14: Plot of the McCrary test of a statistically significant jump in the discontinuity of
the running variable function: Germany
Figure 15: Plot of the discontinuity in the probability of having been conscripted by month of
birth: placebo cutoffs +/- 12 months Germany
(a) Cutoff -12 months (b) Cutoff +12 months
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Figure 16: Plot of the McCrary test of a statistically significant jump in the discontinuity of
the running variable function: Spain
Figure 17: Plot of the discontinuity in the probability of having been conscripted by year of
birth: placebo cutoffs +/- 1 year Spain
(a) Cutoff -12 months (b) Cutoff +12 months
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Figure 18: Discontinuity in the outcome variables by year of birth for men born within the 4
years before and the 4 years after the abolition of conscription in Spain.
(a) Rightwing ideology
(b) Spanish Identity
(c) Voted in GE
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Table 28: Regression analysis of the correlation between conscription voting participation,
ideology and civic engagement: analysis military vs. civil service.
Rightwing Voted Rightwing: trim Local politics Volunteers CDU/CSU SPD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Conscription 0.155*** -0.023 0.139*** -0.005 0.022 0.142*** 0.025
( 0.023 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.021) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.030 ) (0.025 )
N 2781 2007 2384 2722 2730 2007 2007
Year + Age Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression. Rightwing is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
individual reports to have a political ideology more rightwing than the median. Voted is a binary variable equal to
1 if the individual voted in the last general election. Conscription is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual
was conscripted. All regressions include controls for: year of the survey, age and region of residence at the time
of the survey, marital status, labor force participation, years of schooling, place of residence during childhood and
parental education. SE clustered at month of birth
Table 29: The effect of conscription on right-wing ideology, participation in local politics and
volunteering: cross-sectional sample, non-parametric and parametric models
Political attitude 1-10 Rightwing: trim Local Politics Volunteers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FS RF FS RF FS RF FS RF
SS SS SS SS
Panel A: Non-Parametric
Treated 0.202*** -0.067 0.212 *** 0.001 0.248 *** -0.034 0.247*** 0.096*
(0.055) (0.130) ( 0.064) ( 0.056) ( 0.068) ( 0.035) (0.068) (0.052)
Conscription 0.469 0.223 -0.262 0.408
(0.846) ( 0.293) ( 0.260) (0.365)
Bandwidth 56.5 49.4 35.0 34.6
N 6104 5515 5213 5226
N Eff. obs. 876 706 581 573
Panel B: Parametric with interactions
Treated 0.257*** -0.163 0.255 *** 0.051 0.272*** 0.030 0.232*** 0.141
(0.081) (0.223) ( 0.087) ( 0.080) ( 0.081) ( 0.052) (0.083) (0.086)
Conscription 1.321 0.328 -0.264 0.394
(1.098) ( 0.370) (0.295) (0.465)
Window 48 months 48 months 48 months 48 months
Pol. Order 2 2 2 2
N 756 689 765 850
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression.Political attitude 1-10 is a discrete variable indicating
political ideology with values 1 to 10, where 1 is extreme left and 10 is extreme right. Rightwing: trim is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the individual reports to have a political ideology more rightwing than the median, and trims
the original value of political attitudes of the top and bottom 10percent. Local Politics is a binary variable equal
to 1 if the individual ever participates in local politics. Volunteers if a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual
reports to ever volunteer. Treated is a binary equal to 1 if the individual was born after the introduction of
mandatory conscription. Conscription is the predicted probability of having done military service estimated from
the FS regression. All estimations control for:year of survey, age, region, marital status, years of schooling and
labor force participation of individual at time of survey, place of residence during childhood and parental education.
Panel A presents the results obtained using non-parametric methods following Calonico et al.(2016) for the optimal
bandwidth. Panel B presents the results obtained using parametric methods and interacted second order polynomials
of the month of birth. Standard errors are clustered at the month of birth.
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Table 30: The effect of conscription on support for political parties in Germany: cross-sectional
and panel sample, parametric and non-parametric models.
Cross-section Panel
CDU/CSU SPD CDU/CSU SPD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FS RF FS RF FS RF FS RF
SS SS SS SS
Panel A: Non-Parametric
Treated 0.310*** -0.071 0.310 *** 0.055 0.257*** -0.055 0.257*** 0.094
(0.072) (0.093) ( 0.072) ( 0.062) (0.068) (0.068) (0.062) (0.072)
Conscription -0.229 0.244 -0.321 0.441
(0.299) ( 0.219) (0.375) (0.353)
Bandwidth 50.7 50.7 46.6 48.9
N 3831 3831 31575 31575
N Eff. obs. 647 647 5016 5016
Panel B:Parametric with interactions
Treated 0.251 *** - 0.099 0.251 *** 0.098 0.243*** -0.078 0.243*** 0.177*
( 0.082) ( 0.132) ( 0.082) ( 0.095) (0.084) (0.108) (0.084) (0.103)
Conscription -0.293 0.292 -0.397 0.528
( 0.397) (0.281) (0.485) (0.472)
Window 48 months 48 months 48 months 48 months
Pol. Order 2 2 2 2
F-Stat 11.7 11.7 65.6 65.6
N 619 619 5157 5157
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression. Treated is a binary equal to 1 if the individual
was born after the introduction of mandatory conscription. Conscription is the predicted probability of having done
military service estimated from the FS regression. All estimations control for year of survey and age of individual at
time of survey. Panel A presents the results obtained using non-parametric methods following Calonico et al.(2016)
for the optimal bandwidth. Panel B presents the results obtained using parametric methods and interacted second
order polynomials of the running variable (month of birth). All regressions include controls for: year of survey,
region, age, marital status, labor force participation and years of schooling of individual at time of survey, place
of residence during childhood and parental education. In columns 1-4 the regressions are estimated on the cross-
sectional sample, with standard errors clustered at the running variable (month of birth). In columns 5-8 regressions
are estimated using the pooled panel data and clustering the standard errors at the individual level.
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Table 31: The effect of conscription on right-wing ideology and voting participation in Ger-
many: panel sample.
Rightwing Voted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FS RF FS RF FS RF FS RF
SS SS SS SS
Panel A: Non-Parametric
Treated 0.208 *** -0.008 0.195 *** -0.029 0.323*** 0.058* 0.343*** 0.050
( 0.056) ( 0.065) ( 0.058) ( 0.065) (0.056) (0.033) (0.063) (0.031)
Conscription 0.042 0.149 0.180* 0.147
( 0.308) ( 0.339) (0.108) (0.097)
Year+Age Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
Bandwidth 53.1 56.6 59.3 47.8
N 11669 11669 7310 6117
N Eff. obs. 1584 1526 979 794
Panel B: Parametric with interactions
Treated 0.259 *** 0.016 0.236*** -0.016 0.244*** 0.055 0.417*** 0.027
( 0.091) ( 0.096) ( 0.089) ( 0.101) (0.081) (0.050) (0.089) (0.044)
Conscription 0.064 0.069 0.124 0.066
( 0.369) ( 0.432) (0.113) (0.105)
Year+Age Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
Window 48 Months 48 Months 48 Months 48 Months
Pol. Order 2 2 2 2
F-Stat 15.5 11.74 27.57 21.51
N 1424 1306 869 799
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression. Rightwing is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
individual reports to have a political ideology more rightwing than the median. Voted is a binary variable equal to 1
if the individual voted in the last general election. Treated is a binary equal to 1 if the individual was born after the
introduction of mandatory conscription. Conscription is the predicted probability of having done military service
estimated from the FS regression. Columns1,2,5,6 include controls for year of the survey and age.Columns 3,4,7 and
8 include controls for: year of the survey, age and region of residence at the time of the survey, marital status, labor
force participation, years of schooling, place of residence during childhood and parental education. Panel A presents
the results obtained using non-parametric methods following Calonico et al.(2016) for the optimal bandwidth. Panel
B presents the results obtained using parametric methods and interacted second order polynomials of the running
variable (month of birth). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for within-individual
correlation given the panel dimension of the data (Lee and Lemieux, 2010)
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Table 32: The effect of conscription on right-wing ideology and voting participation in Ger-
many: parametric methods and 36 months window.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FS RF FS RF FS RF
SS SS SS
Panel A: Rightwing
Treated 0.239 *** 0.055 0.233 *** 0.050 0.223 *** 0.065
( 0.067) ( 0.063) ( 0.062) ( 0.062) ( 0.062) ( 0.068)
Conscription 0.228 0.215 0.215
( 0.263) ( 0.266) ( 0.300)
Year + Age N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N Y Y
Window 36 months 36 months 36 months
Pol. Order 1 1 1
F-Stat 12.9 14.1 12.7
N 621 621 571
Panel B: Voted
Treated 0.351 *** 0.050 0.351 *** 0.051 0.334 *** 0.068
( 0.075) ( 0.045) ( 0.072) ( 0.045) ( 0.071) ( 0.042)
Conscription 0.113 0.124 0.124
( 0.123) ( 0.129) ( 0.116)
Year + Age N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N Y Y
Window 36 months 36 months 36 months
Pol. Order 1 1 1
F-Stat 25.8 27.3 25.8
N 453 453 420
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression. Rightwing is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
individual reports to have a political ideology more rightwing than the median. Voted is a binary variable equal to 1
if the individual voted in the last general election. Treated is a binary equal to 1 if the individual was born after the
introduction of mandatory conscription. Conscription is the predicted probability of having done military service
estimated from the FS regression. Columns1,2 do not include controls.Columns 3,4include controls for: year of the
survey and age. Columns 5, 6 include full set of controls for age, year of survey, region of residence at the time
of the survey, marital status, labor force participation, years of schooling, place of residence during childhood and
parental education. All estimations use parametric methods and interacted first order polynomials of the running
variable (month of birth). Standard errors are clustered at the month of birth level.
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Table 33: Placebo regressions with change in cutoff date: +12 months after change introduc-
tion of conscription in Germany.
Cross-section Panel
Rightwing Voted Rightwing Voted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FS RF FS RF FS RF FS RF
SS SS SS SS
Treated (placebo) -0.027 -0.121 -0.063 -0.022 -0.068 0.053 -0.024 -0.026
( 0.107 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.143 ) ( 0.041) ( 0.105 ) ( 0.098 ) ( 0.105 ) ( 0.030 )
Conscription 4.41 -0.009 -1.17 0.277
( 16.86 ) (0.251 ) ( 3.09 ) ( 0.316 )
Year+Age Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Window 48 Months 48 months 48 months 48 months
Pol. Order 2 2 2 2
F-Stat 0.06 1.32 0.55 1.18
N 814 603 1404 868
Note: Each coefficient is estimated using a separate regression. Rightwing is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
individual reports to have a political ideology more rightwing than the median. Voted is a binary variable equal to
1 if the individual voted in the last general election. Treated (placebo) is a binary equal to 1 if the individual was
born 12 months after the introduction of mandatory conscription, i.e. 12 months after the cutoff date. Conscription
is the predicted probability of having done military service estimated from the FS regression. All regressions include
controls for: year of the survey, age and region of residence at the time of the survey, marital status, labor force
participation, years of schooling, place of residence during childhood and parental education. Regressions include
interacted second order polynomials of the running variable (month of birth). In columns 1-4 the standard errors
are clustered at the month of birth. In columns 5-8 standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account
for within-individual correlation given the panel dimension of the data (Lee and Lemieux, 2010)
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5.3 Appendix 3: supplemental figures and tables to paper 3.
Figure 19: Distribution of the propensity scores before and after matching treatment and
control group: always treated vs. never treated
(a) Pre-Matching (b) Post-Matching
Figure 20: Distribution of the propensity scores before and after matching treatment and
control groups: only wave 1 vs. never treated
(a) Pre-Matching (b) Post-Matching
Figure 21: Distribution of the propensity scores before and after matching treatment and
control groups: only wave 2 vs. never treated
(a) Pre-Matching (b) Post-Matching
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Table 34: The effect of migration on per capita monthly household consumption by treatment
type: unmatched and matched sample.
PSM
Total Food Non-Food Total Food Non-Food
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Always migrant
Treated 0.078** 0.045 0.171 0.070* 0.048 0.144 **
( 0.038) ( 0.041) ( 0.053) ( 0.040) ( 0.045) ( 0.057)
Wave -0.151*** -0.153*** -0.195*** -0.161*** -0.152*** -0.242***
( 0.040) ( 0.044) ( 0.059) ( 0.045) ( 0.050) ( 0.067)
Treated x Wave -0.092 * -0.123 ** -0.079 -0.066 -0.121 * -0.007
( 0.055) ( 0.061) ( 0.080) ( 0.060) ( 0.067) ( 0.089)
N 582 582 582 500 500 500
B: Only wave 2
Treated 0.054 0.044 0.085 0.059 0.052 0.076
( 0.052) ( 0.052) ( 0.078) ( 0.059) ( 0.060) ( 0.086)
Wave -0.150*** -0.153*** -0.195*** -0.139** -0.130** -0.228***
( 0.040) ( 0.044) ( 0.060) ( 0.046) ( 0.051) ( 0.069)
Treated x Wave -0.187 ** -0.225*** -0.120 -0.184 ** -0.238 *** -0.070
( 0.075) ( 0.079) ( 0.107) ( 0.082) ( 0.089) ( 0.117)
N 402 402 402 318 318 318
C: Only wave 1
Treated 0.004 -0.011 0.069 0.011 0.001 0.070
( 0.039) ( 0.041) ( 0.055) ( 0.038) ( 0.042) ( 0.054)
Wave -0.151*** -0.153** -0.194*** -0.151*** -0.141** -0.235***
( 0.040) ( 0.044) ( 0.059) ( 0.045) ( 0.050) ( 0.067)
Treated x Wave 0.053 0.046 -0.016 0.047 0.020 0.018
( 0.052) ( 0.058) ( 0.076) ( 0.057) ( 0.065) ( 0.084)
N 728 728 728 609 609 609
Note:: All coefficients are estimated using a different regression. Columns 1,2 and 3 are estimated on the unmatched
sample. Columns 4,5 and 6 are estimated using propensity score matching and observations on the common support.
Always migrant is a binary variable equal to one if the household has at least one migrant in both waves, only wave
2 is a binary variable if the household has at least one migrant only in wave 2, and only wave 1 is a binary variable
equal to one if the household has at least one migrant only in wave 1. The control group are households with no
migrants in either wave. Outcome variables are real monthly per capita consumption expressed in natural logs. All
regressions include village level fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
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Table 35: The effect of migration on monthly household consumption by treatment type:
unmatched and matched sample.
PSM
Total Food Non-Food Total Food Non-Food
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Always migrant
Treated 0.113*** 0.079* 0.207*** 0.097* 0.076 0.171*
( 0.042) ( 0.043) ( 0.061) ( 0.044) ( 0.047) ( 0.065)
Wave -0.047 -0.050 -0.090 -0.087* -0.079 -0.168**
( 0.044) ( 0.046) ( 0.065) ( 0.049) ( 0.053) ( 0.073)
Treated x Wave 0.112 * 0.081 0.128 0.162 ** 0.106 0.226 **
( 0.059) ( 0.063) ( 0.087) ( 0.065) ( 0.070) ( 0.096)
N 582 582 582 500 500 500
B: Only wave 2
Treated 0.077 0.067 0.107 0.057 0.050 0.073
( 0.053) ( 0.054) ( 0.079) ( 0.060) ( 0.062) ( 0.088)
Wave -0.047 -0.050 -0.091 -0.101* -0.092* -0.190
( 0.044) ( 0.046) ( 0.066) ( 0.052) ( 0.056) ( 0.076)
Treated x Wave 0.006 -0.032 0.073 0.063 0.010 0.179
( 0.079) ( 0.081) ( 0.114) ( 0.091) ( 0.095) ( 0.129)
N 402 402 402 318 318 318
C: Only wave 1
Treated 0.053 0.035 0.123** 0.068* 0.058 0.127**
( 0.037) ( 0.039) ( 0.055) ( 0.040) ( 0.043) ( 0.058)
Wave -0.046 -0.050 -0.090 -0.082* -0.074 -0.167
( 0.044) ( 0.046) ( 0.065) ( 0.048) ( 0.053) ( 0.072)
Treated x Wave -0.025 -0.008 -0.099 0.001 -0.002 -0.028
( 0.056) ( 0.059) ( 0.083) ( 0.061) ( 0.066) ( 0.090)
N 728 728 728 609 609 609
Note:All coefficients are estimated using a different regression. Columns 1,2 and 3 are estimated on the unmatched
sample. Columns 4,5 and 6 are estimated using propensity score matching and observations on the common support.
Always migrant is a binary variable equal to one if the household has at least one migrant in both waves, only wave
2 is a binary variable if the household has at least one migrant only in wave 2, and only wave 1 is a binary variable
equal to one if the household has at least one migrant only in wave 1. The control group are households with no
migrants in either wave. Outcome variables are real monthly per capita consumption expressed in natural logs. All
regressions include village fixed effects All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
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Table 36: The effect of migration on household composition and annual total income by
treatment type: matched sample.
HH size Nr adults Nr Men Annual Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Always migrant
Treated 0.055 0.398*** 0.032 0.430***
( 0.184) ( 0.119) ( 0.133) ( 0.094)
Wave 0.359* 0.694 *** 0.044 1.634***
( 0.192) ( 0.146) ( 0.134) ( 0.108)
Treated x Wave 1.294 *** 0.873 *** 0.547 *** -0.200
( 0.245) ( 0.184) ( 0.179) ( 0.142)
N 500 500 500 500
B: Only wave 2
Treated 0.083 0.129 0.029 0.063
( 0.255) ( 0.158) ( 0.174) ( 0.113)
Wave 0.221 0.574*** -0.010 1.661***
( 0.194) ( 0.149) ( 0.136) ( 0.111)
Treated x Wave 1.210 *** 1.019 *** 0.498 ** -0.004
( 0.321) ( 0.229) ( 0.226) ( 0.177)
N 318 318 318 318
C: Only wave 1
Treated 0.161 0.389*** 0.269 0.430***
(0.167) (0.111) (0.121) (0.087)
Wave 0.325* 0.665*** 0.043 1.63***
(0.187) (0.144) (0.133) (0.108)
Treated x Wave -0.124 -0.211 -0.024 -0.480 ***
( 0.230) ( 0.180) ( 0.164) ( 0.137)
N 609 609 609 609
Note:: All coefficients are estimated using a different regression. Columns 1,2 and 3 are estimated using propensity
score matching and observations on the common support and a diff-in-diff estimator. Always migrant is a binary
variable equal to one if the household has at least one migrant in both waves, only wave 2 is a binary variable if the
household has at least one migrant only in wave 2, and only wave 1 is a binary variable equal to one if the household
has at least one migrant only in wave 1. The control group are households with no migrants in either wave.HH Size
is a variable indicating the number of members in the household. Nr adults is indicating the number of household
members aged between 15 and 65. Number of men is the number of men in the household. Annual income is the
natural log of real household yearly income. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
